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SUMMARY 
This study investigated strategic change management in the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) during the period 1994 until 2014. Theoretical perspectives on 
strategic management, institutional culture, leadership and strategic change 
management in the SANDF were discussed. In addition, a historical perspective on the 
evolution of South African military culture was given. The study found that a 
transactional leadership approach was used to transform the SANDF. This transactional 
leadership approach is commensurate with the preservation of the status quo without 
radically transforming the institution. On the contrary, the transactional leadership 
approach fits in well in transforming an institution with a view to bring about a new 
composite institutional culture, drawn from the integrated institutions. The strategic 
change management as applied in the SANDF has not succeeded in creating a unified 
inclusive military culture of the seven former armed forces, from 1994 until 2014. The 
research has also shown that the institutional culture of the SANDF does not reflect the 
shared assumptions, beliefs and values of all integrated armed forces.  
However, the study concluded that transformation in the SANDF as a planned strategic 
change intervention has not been managed adequately between 1994 and 2014, to 
achieve the desired results. 
KEY TERMS: strategic management, change management, leadership, transactional 
leadership, military culture, institutional culture 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
The ushering in of democracy in South Africa has brought about stimulating 
debates, analyses and research interests in the field of organisational 
development, in particular strategic change management. Central to these 
developments is attention to theory and practice of strategic change management 
in the South African public sector. This study sought to evaluate how strategic 
change in the form of transformation was managed in the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) during the period 1994 to 2014. This is an evaluation 
whose recommendations for improvement of strategic change in the SANDF will 
be made. Finally, this research sought to contribute towards placing the strategic 
change management discourse on the agenda for public service officials and 
academics. 
This chapter provides the background to and rationale for the study, an outline of 
the problem statement, study objectives, study demarcation study period, 
clarification of terminology, the research methodology, literature review, and an 
outline of the chapters. 
The next section discusses the background to and rationale for the study. 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
The institutionalisation of apartheid in 1948 through various laws (Jamison, 
2004:75) saw blacks, Africans in particular, including women of all races and 
people living with disabilities marginalised from full participation in the socio-
economic and political affairs of South Africa. Because of this, the then South 
African government lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the larger South African and 
international populace. This legacy bequeathed from the apartheid era policies 
has opened considerable challenges for the new democratic government in South 
Africa. The democratic governance system that became operational on 27 April 
1994 necessitated the transition from an apartheid system of government to a 
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democratic one (Muchie, 2014:1). These regime changes accentuated, through 
legislative provisions, that the public service system should be embedded in 
democratic principles. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 hereafter referred to the 
(the Constitution), as the point of reference for change, provided the framework 
for transformation. Further legislations flowing from this enabling framework are, 
among others, the White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service (1995), 
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the White Paper on Defence (1996), and 
the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service (1998). Therefore, the 
constitutional and legislative injunctions require public institutions to transform and 
reposition themselves so that their functioning is within the context of the new 
dispensation. 
Against this background, the public service found itself in a cycle of change that 
compels it to adapt systematically and pragmatically to the changing policies. The 
Department of Defence (DOD), in particular the SANDF, as one of public service 
institutions has to adapt and reposition itself by complying with transformation 
imperatives.  
With this in mind and in line with all state departments, since 1994, the DOD has 
undergone transformation. According to Cilliers, Schutte, Liebenberg and Sass 
(1997:260), this transformation in the SANDF comprises separate actions and 
policy documents: 
 the South African White Paper on Defence 1996 and the Defence Review 
1998; 
 the integration of seven armed forces into one single national Defence 
Force; 
 affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes; 
 rationalisation of personnel to achieve a core professional force; 
 activities aimed at improving and perpetuating the effective and efficient 
functioning of the DOD; and  
 ensuring the institutionalisation of civil control over the military institution. 
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The above meant that the SANDF had to undergo fundamental strategic changes 
in structures, institutional culture and management styles as well as a mind shift of 
all managers involved. This called for a new management approach and a 
paradigm shift to manage the strategic changes that were required successfully.  
Figure 1.1 below provides a schematic presentation of the research. The first 
stage reflected in the figure relates to the constituent armed forces that integrated 
to form the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Such armed forces 
were non-statutory force, such as Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) and Azanian People’s 
Liberation Army (APLA), and the statutory forces, such as the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) and the TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and 
Ciskei) defence forces (Le Roux, 2005:240). These forces had their unique 
military cultures. 
The second stage reflects strategic change management by changing strategy, 
structure, culture and attitudes and skills of members of the SANDF. The last 
stage involves the maintenance of the achievements attained in stage two. 
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Figure 1.1 Stages of strategic change in the SANDF (1994–2014) 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from Baker (2007:13), Evison (2014:1), Le Roux (2005:240) 
and Robbins, Millet, Cacioppe and Waters-Marsh (2003:411). 
5 
 
It is in the light of these explications that the present study sought to evaluate how 
strategic change in the form of transformation was managed in the SANDF during 
the period 1994 to 2014. 
The next section explains the problem statement. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The transformation of the South African society has its initiation in the Congress 
for Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which took place in 1993 (Maharaj, 
2008:26). 
Concomitant with these political negotiations were deliberations by members of 
Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) on how the different constituent South 
African military components could be integrated into one national defence force. 
Such constituent forces are MK, APLA, SADF and TBVC defence forces (Le 
Roux, 2005:240). 
Consequent to such integration was the need to transform the SANDF into a 
single non-racial and non-sexist institution. 
The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) and the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) primarily drive such transformation process in the 
broader South African public service including the DOD. The SANDF as a 
component of the DOD is expected to align itself with this process. 
The primary research question to be addressed, therefore, was: 
Has transformation in the SANDF as a planned strategic change intervention been 
managed adequately (from 1994 to 2014) to achieve the desired results? 
The next section will discuss the objectives of this study. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this study was to provide an evaluation of the theory and practice 
of transformation as a strategic change intervention in the SANDF during the 
period 1994 to 2014. The following is a summary of the study objectives, namely 
the study sought to– 
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 investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management; 
 explore the institutional culture of the SANDF; 
 examine the effects of strategic change management in the transformation 
of the SANDF; and  
 explore the leadership approach that is necessary for transformation in the 
SANDF. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions that guided the research were the following: 
 What are the theories and concepts of strategic change management? 
 What is the institutional culture of the SANDF? 
 What are the effects of strategic change management in the transformation 
of the SANDF?  
 Which leadership approach is necessary for transformation in the SANDF? 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The time that was covered in this study was the period 1994 to 2014. This period 
was the first two decades of the new democratic government under the African 
National Congress (ANC) government. The choice for this period can be justified 
by the following reasons: 
The choice of 1994 as terminus a quo of the transformation process as a strategic 
change intervention in the SANDF, is that 1994 was a historical landmark in that a 
regime change from apartheid to the new democratic government under the ANC 
took place in April 1994. The year also marked the integration of seven different 
and former adversarial armed forces into the present SANDF. 
The year 2014 was chosen as the terminus ad quem for the study locus as it 
marked the end of the fourth term of the ANC-led government and the end of the 
second decade of democracy in South Africa. 
The first five years of the period 1994–2014 are seen as the period of legislative 
and policy metamorphosis to form the building blocks for transformational change. 
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Public institutions underwent fundamental structural, cultural and behavioural 
changes that were in line with constitutional democracy. The remaining fifteen 
years can be viewed as the beginning of service delivery by government. It is 
fitting, therefore, to evaluate strategic change management in the SANDF as a 
subject of study in the field of organisational development and discipline of Public 
Administration during the above-mentioned period. 
The next section clarifies terminologies used in this study. 
1.7 TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATION 
Although some of the constructs and related phenomena germane to this thesis 
are explained in Chapter two, brief definitions are given for the purpose of clarity 
and common understanding. The following terms are defined briefly within the 
context of the South African situation: 
 Blacks as defined in the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, is a generic 
term that refers to African, coloured and Indian people in South Africa. The 
view of the researcher is that these terms are relevant for the period of 
correcting the imbalances of the past. They are only used to identify the 
victims of the past injustices caused by the apartheid system. There comes 
a time where everyone will be seen as South African and where no colour 
or race identification will be used. 
 Change, according to Bloisi, Cook and Hunsaker (2003:707), can be 
defined as the coping process of moving from the present state to a 
desired state, which individuals, groups and institutions undertake in 
response to dynamic internal and external factors that alter current 
realities.  
 Change agents, according to Smit and Cronje (2003:221), “are those 
people in the institution who make change happen”. In concert with this 
definition, Nixon (2004:11) explicates that change agents are “a group of 
people who act as catalysts within the organisation”. He further asserts that 
change agents “may come from within the institution, such as managers 
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and/or employees, or they may come from outside in the form of 
consultants”. The change agents are, therefore, crucial for the success in 
managing institutional change. They are the ones who translate new 
strategies formulated by top management into a workable and practical 
reality. Perhaps, most of all, these change agents are the people who get 
the results when they are needed most. 
 Change management, according to Meyer and Botha (2000:224), is “the 
process of mobilising resources through the planning, coordination and 
implementation of activities and initiatives to bring about desired change”. 
This is seen as human intervention in managing strategic change. 
 Historically disadvantaged groups/designated groups are those groups 
identified as having been unfairly discriminated against on the basis of past 
(in particular, during the apartheid era) legislation, policies, prejudice and 
stereotypes. Such discrimination has resulted in deprivation of rights, 
career opportunities, education, training or job advancement or who might 
have received less beneficial schooling, fewer benefits, less beneficial 
conditions of service than any other person or groups on the grounds of 
race, gender and disability (White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public 
Service, 1998). 
 Representativeness is defined in the Public Service Regulation of 1999, 
as “the extent to which employment in an organisation broadly reflects 
composition of the South African population, according to race, gender and 
disability”. 
 Davies (2001:104) defines transformation as a fundamental, complete 
and drastic ‘make-over’ process where the desired result is totally different 
from the current situation. Therefore, transformation according to Davies is 
not about fixing what is beyond repair; it is a drastic and complete make-
over from the previous state.  
 
9 
 
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to Babbie and Mouton (2002:75), research methodology entails the 
methodical, methodological and precise execution of the research design. 
However, a particular research method is informed by study objectives, the aim of 
the research and the researcher’s expectations (Breakwell, Smith & Wright, 
2012:9). In this research, both qualitative and quantitative techniques were 
applied. Therefore, the research problem was steered by an analytical plan that 
was the research methodology. 
This study focused on assessing whether transformation as a strategic change 
intervention was well conceptualised and properly implemented and whether it 
managed to achieve the desired end state. 
Research methods employed for data collection comprised both secondary 
sources and empirical research. Therefore, research tools that were utilised were 
content and discourse analyses of documents, reports, policy and relevant 
regulatory framework documents, a literature study on strategic change 
management, institutional culture and administering survey questionnaires and 
interviews. The following is a summary of how some of these tools were 
employed. 
1.8.1 Literature review 
Change management, as a subject of study cannot be comprehended fully 
without conceptualising it within organisational development. Boonstra (2004:25) 
defines organisational development as a “system-wide process of applying 
behavioural science knowledge to the planned change and development of the 
strategies, design components, and processes that enable organisations to be 
effective”. He further contends that organisational development deals with 
relationships between a system and its environment as well as among the 
different components that constitute the design of a system. Concurring with this 
definition, Paton and McCalman (2000:163) assert that organisational 
development is about changing the organisation from one situation, which is 
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regarded as unsatisfactory, to another by means of social science techniques for 
change. 
These definitions reflect that the field of organisational development encompasses 
a complexity of methods and concepts that can be applied in changing 
institutions. In addition, organisational development is largely concerned with the 
process of managing change in an organisation. Based on these assertions, the 
researcher used organisational development as a body of knowledge in 
evaluating transformation as a strategic change management intervention in the 
SANDF. 
It was hoped that the intervention and changes would help to solve problems that 
might have become evident through this study. However, the effectiveness of any 
given human intervention is a matter subject to study. Thus, the theory-to-action 
research continuum relates to the conduct of evaluation to test the effectiveness 
of specific solutions and human interventions. The researcher scrutinised 
literature pertaining to the evaluation of strategic change management in the 
SANDF. The literature lacks focus on managing strategic change in SANDF. The 
dearth of research in this topic was the reason for initiation of this study. Wimmer 
and Dominick (1987:24, 260) assert that a study that does not further the solution 
of problems and provides answers, has little value. In addition, Adler and Clark 
(2003:15) contend that applied research “aims to have practical results and 
produce work that is intended to be useful in the immediate future and to suggest 
action”. 
The literature was used to set the scene for the research. Theory on strategic 
change management, institutional culture and the evolution of South African 
military culture was studied to create a framework for evaluation and analysis. 
In order to assess conceptualisation and to evaluate implementation and 
management of transformation as a strategic change intervention to realise the 
desired end-state, annual reports and other strategic information regarding the 
processes and progress on the transformation of the SANDF were examined. In 
fact, content and discourse analysis of these documents was done using the 
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theoretical framework of analysis that was established. Documentations 
mentioned in the foregoing were analysed to develop an understanding of their 
contents relating to transformation and strategic change management in the 
SANDF. 
Literature analyses and reviews on strategic change management and the 
transformation process were consulted to develop a theoretical framework for 
analysis. Sources for such analyses and reviews were mainly books, journals and 
articles. 
The theoretical framework was utilised to conduct content and discourse analyses 
of the feedback on survey questionnaires, interviews, official policies and 
legislation carefully. This, therefore, means that the theory that undergirds 
transformation, strategic change management and institutional culture was the 
main analytical instrument for the evaluation of management of transformation as 
a change intervention. Concomitant with this was close observation of the 
transformation process as it unfolded within the period of study. 
Afterwards, the gathered primary data was processed through a computer system 
and interpreted. Thereafter, findings, relevant conclusions were drawn and 
recommendations were made. 
1.8.2  Survey questionnaires 
The SANDF units, as components of the whole population of military personnel, 
are geographically dispersed in all provinces of the country, more recently also 
across the borders of South Africa to conduct peace operations. For logistical 
reasons and turnaround time, it was not feasible to make appointments with 
individual change agents in these provinces to conduct interviews.  
The questionnaires were then used to solicit change agents’ opinions, knowledge 
and experiences regarding how transformation as strategic change intervention 
was managed in the SANDF.  
Questionnaires were used to gather information about large numbers of 
respondents (populations) and from small groups (samples). The course 
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attendants from centres of excellence (COEs) were used as samples as they 
represented different arms of services, that is, from the South African (SA) Army, 
SA Navy, SA Air Force and SA Military Health Services. Centres of excellence 
used were the South African Defence College and the South African War College.  
The researcher then drew inferences about the population from the sample data. 
Careful planning and construction of the survey questionnaire were therefore 
critical steps in this research. 
A reason for choosing the survey questionnaire technique is that such 
questionnaire is flexible (Moore, 2000:108). It can be custom-designed to meet 
the objectives of the study. Survey questionnaires can be designed to gather 
information from any group of respondents. They can be administered face to 
face, over the telephone, by mail, and by using computer networks. Usually, 
respondents’ answers are easy to code and tabulate. Respondents will have time 
to think about the answers to questions in the questionnaire. Moreover, a large 
number of respondents distributed over a large geographical area can be 
reached. 
Both close-ended and open-ended questions were utilised. A close-ended 
question limits the respondents to predetermined alternative answers given by the 
designer of the questionnaire. In other words, respondents are provided with a 
uniform frame of reference. Scale ranking of the respondents’ preferred answers 
was used by means of a Likert-type scale. This type of question format was used 
for middle-level management who were seen as change agents in this research. 
Open-ended questions also allow the respondents to answer in their own choice 
of words. Open-ended questions were utilised for participants who were 
representatives of former forces integrated into the SANDF. 
The questionnaires were structured to make it possible that descriptive and 
explanatory data could be collected for use in drawing conclusions and making 
findings regarding how transformation as strategic change intervention was 
managed in the SANDF. 
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1.8.3 Interviews 
In the view of the researcher, middle-level managers in the SANDF are regarded 
as the change leaders in that they are supposed to enthuse their subordinates to 
start the process of change that will result in the realisation of the desired end 
state. For this reason, face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with the middle management of the SANDF, that is, in the rank groups of brigadier 
generals/rear admirals (junior grade), colonels/captains, lieutenant 
colonels/commanders and majors/lieutenant commanders including the Chief of 
the SANDF.  
Senior management of the SANDF was identified as those members who were 
service and divisional chiefs. These members constitute the majority of the 
strategic and corporate management bodies of the SANDF. These interviews 
were conducted with the rank group of major generals and lieutenant generals 
and in some cases with the brigadier generals. It was also seen fitting to interview 
the Secretary for Defence as the director general and accounting officer of the 
DOD. Depending on agreement, interviews were recorded on tape and scribed. 
Afterwards, the gathered primary data was processed. Thereafter, relevant 
conclusions were drawn and recommendations were made. 
The study approach was predominantly descriptive and analytical in nature. The 
study analysed the theoretical base, nature and scope of change management, 
and its practical implementation in the transformation process should highlight 
knowledge relevancy in translating theory to practice. Unravelling complexities of 
strategic change management may help improve methods for future application in 
the SANDF. Furthermore, the inhibiting factors in successfully managing strategic 
change in the SANDF as the public service institution were examined. Finally, 
solutions on how these factors can be managed are also discussed as reference 
for future application. 
Therefore, this study may provide some useful insight to this process of strategic 
change management in the SANDF and suggest recommendations for the 
solution of problems encountered.  
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The next section will give an exposition of the chapters. 
1.9 EXPOSITION OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The summary of each chapter is as 
follows: 
Chapter One comprises the study that was discussed with specific reference to 
background and rationale, an outline of the problem statement, study objectives, 
study demarcation period, terminological clarification, research methodology, 
literature review, and finally an outline of the chapters. 
Chapter Two focuses on the strategic management framework with specific 
reference to theoretical perspectives on strategic management, strategic planning 
and the strategic management process. The discussion on strategic management 
process pays attention to strategic analysis, strategy formulation, strategy 
implementation and strategy evaluation.  
Chapter Three comprises a discussion on the strategic management framework 
with focus on theoretical perspectives on strategic management, strategic 
planning and the strategic management process. The strategic management 
process is discussed, focusing on strategic analysis, strategy formulation, strategy 
implementation and strategy evaluation and monitoring. 
Chapter Four is centred on institutional culture. Special focus is on the theoretical 
positioning on the basic nature of institutional culture, types of institutional culture, 
strong and weak institutional cultures, military culture and military leadership. 
Chapter Five presents a perspective on the history of the evolution of South 
African military culture. In doing so, this chapter gives a summary of the South 
African military prior to 1912, the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and 
the political context and historical overview of UDF (1912–1947). It also discusses 
the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the period 1948 until 1994, the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from 1994 until 2014; the political 
prelude to 1994 military integration, integration of armed forces and their military 
cultures and the resultant military culture from 1994 to 2014. 
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Chapter Six discusses leadership approaches in general and specifically 
leadership approaches that are dominant in military institutions. In addition, in 
Chapter six, strategic change management in the SANDF is discussed and 
evaluated against the government prescripts. 
Chapter Seven provides a description of the research methodology that was 
employed in the research. The content of the research methodology comprises 
the research design, methods of data collection, research setting and participants, 
population and sample, data collection and ethical considerations. 
Chapter Eight comprises the presentation of qualitative and quantitative data 
analysis. Quantitative data was translated into descriptive statistics and is 
presented in the form of bar graphs. In addition, qualitative data that was collected 
through interviews and documents analysis is presented in the form of narratives. 
Chapter Nine provides the summary of the research into findings, 
recommendations and conclusions.   
1.10 SUMMARY 
The problem statement given in this chapter, refers to the need to transform the 
SANDF into a single non-racial and non-sexist institution. This need to transform 
arises from the integration of APLA, MK, SADF and the TBVC defence forces. 
Research objectives and related research questions were stated. In addition, the 
research methodology explaining the suitable research design to guide the study 
was discussed. 
The next chapter discusses the strategic management framework. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter one, the researcher discussed, with specific reference to the 
background and rationale, an outline of the problem statement, study objectives, 
study demarcation period, terminological clarification, research methodology, 
literature review, and finally an outline of the chapters. 
Management, whether in a public or private institution, is faced with an enormous 
challenge of managing change. Based on the study of practice and experience, 
the mainstream management literature has witnessed an expansion in the 
number of attempts to develop theoretical frameworks for guiding the 
management of change. In this chapter, attempts to discuss the strategic change 
management from a theoretical perspective are reflected. In pursuing this aim, the 
discussion informs the theoretical framework for analysis.  
2.2 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
The common understanding of concepts, which formed the crux of this research, 
will help simplify and clarify many questions, which might result from different 
interpretations and perceptions. In this section on the nature and scope of 
strategic change, the researcher endeavours to alleviate such concerns by 
defining and discussing related concepts. 
2.2.1 Strategic change management 
The terms ‘change’ and ‘transformation’ are often used interchangeably in 
literature without giving a clear definition of either term. Therefore, as a point of 
departure, a clarification of these terms should be presented. Before venturing on 
to the understanding of these terms, it may be necessary to give a brief definition 
of the term ‘strategy’.  
Historically, the term ‘strategy’ was adopted from the military and adapted for 
business use to define strategy as the pattern or a unified, comprehensive and 
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integrated plan that integrates the major goals, policies and actions of an 
institution into a cohesive whole to ensure that the basic objectives of the 
institution are achieved (Nickols, 2012:2).  
In addition, Baker (2007:17) avers that strategy is the product of some form of 
planning, and above all, it is the organised process for predicting and acting in the 
future to ensure the achievement of the mission of the organisation. Furthermore, 
within the military context, according to Gray (1999:17–23), strategy is the bridge 
that relates military power to political purpose, and this definition is divided into 
three categories: people and politics, preparation for war, and war proper. These 
categories are selected because they encompass most of what contributes to the 
development and implementation of strategy. 
The above definitions point to the fact that, at the core of each strategy, the 
decision is located (Pfeffenbruck, 2005:27). This means that strategy is about 
making decisions to effect institutional development. 
However, in defining strategic management, Ehlers and Lazenby (2007:2) refer to 
it as the process whereby all the institutional functions and resources are 
integrated and coordinated to implement formulated strategies. Such strategies 
are aligned with the environment, in order to achieve the long-term objectives of 
the institution and therefore gain a competitive advantage. In this regard, strategic 
management and institutional change go hand in hand. A positive culture of 
change would increase the positive acceptance of new ideas and strategies. In 
addition, David (2009:36–37) and Kevair (2007:1) define strategic management 
as the art and science of formulating, implementing and evaluating cross-
functional decisions that enable an institution to realise its objectives.  
The necessity and importance of change are echoed in different ways by many 
researchers and writers on change management. Change, therefore, demands 
that leaders and managers have foresight and an analytical mind to unravel 
complex management challenges. The development of management itself as a 
science must be in concert with rapid institutional change. Change can therefore 
best be defined as the coping process of moving from the present state to a 
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desired state (Bloisi, Cook & Hunsaker, 2003:707). Change in an institution is 
initiated in order to move from a current state to a desired future state, where 
performance is qualitatively better than it had been before (Creasey, 2009:1). This 
means that the new state of things is different from the old state (Meyer & Botha, 
2000:223). This may mean that the desired end state in an institution must be 
improved qualitatively from the old state of things, which means taking the 
institution to greater heights in terms of performance. 
Finally, Nelson and Quick (2005:3) define change as the qualitative change of an 
organisation. In terms of change, they further suggest the following categories: 
 Incremental change is small, but continuous changes to make 
improvements within the institution. Dunphy, Griffiths and Benn (2007:230) 
note that incremental change does not affect fundamental changes in the 
strategy, structure, capability or institutional re-alignment of the institution. 
To put it differently, this may mean that the entire institution remains intact, 
because the change does not affect the basic structure, culture and defining 
values fundamentally or radically. Rather, Dunphy et al. (2007:230) view 
incremental change as concerning changes in the way people work (job 
redesign, teamwork), change to the business unit processes of an institution, 
and changes in reward systems, information systems and technologies. This 
type of change is similar in definition to what is called ‘developmental 
change’, which represents the improvement of an existing skill, method, 
performance standard, or condition which for some reason does not 
measure up to current or future needs. Such improvements are motivated by 
the goal to do qualitatively better, than just to do more (Anderson & 
Anderson 2010:52). 
 Strategic change is larger-scale change to move from an old state to a 
defined new state in a series of stages. In addition, Denhardt, Denhardt and 
Aristigueta (2013:383) contend that strategic change refers to those choices 
by the senior management of an institution, or consultants involved, in 
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planning activities leading to changes that are both broad range and long 
term. 
 Transformational change: Transformation, according to Anderson and 
Anderson (2010:60), is a radical shift of strategy, structure, systems, 
processes or technology, so significant that it requires a shift of culture, 
behaviour, and a mind-set to implement transformation successfully and 
sustain it overtime. 
Based on the above explication, transformational change, therefore, means that 
institutions move to a radically different and even unknown state with the most 
identifying feature being the changes to mission, vision and leadership.  
Baker (2007:12–13), in congruence with this view, asserts that transformation as 
a type of change is about fundamental improvement of an institution. This 
transformation necessitates strategy development, planning and commitment 
throughout the entire institution.  
Table 2.1 below gives a summary of seven steps in transformational change. 
Steps 1 to 7 give a broad chronological sequence of actions that senior 
management needs to follow in implementing change.  
 
Table 2.1 Seven steps in transformational change 
 
Step 1 
Define the change 
strategy 
The institution assesses the need for change and its 
preparedness for it, the most likely change 
configuration and how the process of change will be 
managed and controlled. 
Step 2 
Gain management 
commitment 
The change manager will need to create ‘ownership’ 
within the management, developing a shared 
strategic vision that drives the change and provides 
a focus for the management teams, both individually 
and collectively.  
Step 3 Create change strategy 
The change manager will need to develop a strategy 
for making the change pertinent and relevant to all 
the staff, especially through a coherent 
communication strategy. 
Step 4 Build commitment from 
Potential resistance to change will need to be 
identified and a rationale for persuading staff of the 
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the workforce need for and benefits of will need to be determined. 
Step 5 Develop a new culture 
New values will have to be created and new 
behaviours that are supportive of the new vision for 
the institution, encouraged. 
Step 6 
Reconfigure the 
institution 
Roles will be redesigned, competencies developed, 
structure created and appointments made. 
Step 7 Manage performance 
Performance measures will be developed that are in 
alignment with overall and individual objectives. 
Source: Adapted from Anderson and Anderson (2001:60) and Baker (2007:13) 
Central to these seven steps in transformational change is the individuals within 
an institution, devising change strategy and managing institutional culture and 
institutional structure adaptation. Concomitant with these is the need to address 
resistance to change by individuals. 
During his inauguration speech in January 2009, United States (US) President, 
Barak Obama said, “The world is changing and we must change with it.” In 
addition, Porras and Silver (1991:51–78) assert that change in an institution is 
triggered by an environmental shift which, when sensed by an institution, leads to 
a deliberately planned response. This epitomises the change of an environment, 
which directly affects societies, communities, institutions and individuals, thereby 
forcing them to adapt. This change within institutions is brought about through 
some form of transformation process. It may be conducted in a planned or 
unplanned way. At times, it may appear to be taking place in a natural or organic 
way (Baker 2007:2). 
Managing change, according to Gonҫalves (2007:52), revolves around three 
dimensions, which need to be aligned and developed in a balanced way, namely: 
 Business dimension, which focuses on making sense of the strategic 
context, defines a compelling picture of the future, and which engages 
people’s hearts and minds, shaping and developing strategies and 
objectives to make the vision a reality.  
 Process dimension, focuses on optimising the business process, which 
develops and delivers services and products, and ensures a robust and 
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aligned management process, which provides direction, support and 
challenge for employees.  
 Social dimension, which has to focus on creating a culture in which 
individuals and teams are willing to deliver excellent results, ensuring that 
employees have the required skills to be successful and that the 
organisational structure supports the employees in carrying out what needs 
to be done. 
The three dimensions on which change management hinges, emphasise giving 
strategic direction and changing the hearts and minds of individuals within an 
institution and processes that affect the management of change in institutional 
culture and structure. 
Baker (2007:16) defines change management as the “process, tools, and 
techniques to manage the human-side of the change processes meant to achieve 
the required outcomes”. Such a change management, according to Baker 
(2007:1) – 
[S]hould be underpinned by an overarching strategy that provides a rationale for 
change, vision of the future state, when the changes have to be made, an indication 
of how the changes are to be made, over what time period, and by whom.  
In addition, Prosci (2014:3) defines change management as “[the application of] 
the set of tools, processes, skills and principles for managing the people-side of 
change to achieve the required outcomes of a change project or initiative”. 
Therefore, strategic planning during change management becomes paramount.  
From the above definitions, it can be deduced that, in order then to develop the 
most effective and efficient strategy, it is important to analyse the organisation 
internally and externally. Focus on internal analysis means looking closely at the 
resources, capabilities and core competencies of the institution, in order to have 
an informed understanding of its current situation. This means that institutions 
have to adapt quite rapidly to change, and that they have to focus on their primary 
goals (Ehlers & Lazenby 2007:10). In this section the researcher discussed and 
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defined the concepts ‘change’, ‘strategy’, ‘change management’ and ‘strategic 
management’. In the next section, sources of change will be discussed.  
2.3 SOURCES OF CHANGE 
Having discussed and defined the concepts ‘strategic change’ and ‘change 
management’ in the previous section, the focus in this section is on identifying and 
discussing the sources of change in context. An institution does not operate in a 
vacuum. The environment in which it operates can have an influence on it. Such 
environment could, on the one hand, be different forces external to the institution 
compelling it to change, and on the other hand, compelling sources of change can 
be internal to or from within the institution (Swanepoel, Erasmus, Van Wyk & 
Schenk, 1998:727). 
2.3.1 External change 
In the South African context, the extra-institutional factors influencing change in 
an institution are mainly political, economic and social changes (Swanepoel et al., 
1998:727). What remains significant is that these types of changes may be either 
totally unforeseen or, if they are anticipated, it is their tempo and duration that 
become a concern to an organisation. It is for this reason that many institutions 
find themselves unprepared and unable to cope with and manage such changes 
effectively and efficiently. 
Section of 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, as the point 
of reference for change, provided the framework for transformation in South 
Africa. Further pieces of legislation and official documentation flowing from this 
enabling framework are, among others:  
 the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service of 1995;  
 the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998;  
 the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa 1996   
 the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service of 1998; and  
 the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.  
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The constitutional and legislative injunctions require public institutions to transform 
and reposition themselves so that their functioning is within the context of the new 
political dispensation. 
2.3.2 Internal change 
Swanepoel et al. (1998:727) contend that changes occurring within institutions 
can be necessitated by internal forces, such as the redesign of core structures 
and processes. In addition, Sutevski (2009:1) avers that internal sources of 
institutional changes are forces, which appear inside the institution. The institution 
as a system consists of the following aspects. 
 People – the ones who run the institution by carrying out activities for the 
survival of the institution. People as employees must take initiatives to 
change their workplaces or tasks for better service delivery or more 
efficient and effective performance in an institution. 
 Structure provides for mutual relationships of people and processes in an 
institution. Structure defines the place of employees within an institution 
according to hierarchy and their roles through rules, norms and 
procedures.  
 Processes represent all the activities in an institution to transform input to 
output, which will provide value to clients (Sutevski, 2009:1). 
The influence of external and internal factors is inescapable for institutions. It 
becomes imperative, therefore, for institutions to conduct strategic planning 
sessions, which will serve as introspection of themselves and to conduct 
environmental analyses to confirm how they function in relation to their wider 
environment. 
To determine the choice of approach to managing change processes in an 
institution, first- and second-order change is compared in the next section. 
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2.4  FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER CHANGE AS AN APPROACH 
The previous section showed the influence of external and internal factors in 
institutional change. To help understand this concept of change further, one 
needs to have an idea of what the difference is between first- and second-order 
changes. The literature, which the researcher consulted, suggested a clear 
distinction between these respective approaches to managing change processes. 
The characteristics of first- and second-order change as described by French and 
Bell (1995:3), Smit and Cronje (2003:218), Robbins et al. (2003:406) and Iles and 
Sutherland (2001:14) can be summarised as in Table 2.2 below. 
Table 2.2 Characteristics of first and second-order change 
 FIRST-ORDER CHANGE SECOND-ORDER CHANGE 
A 
Evolutionary, slow, linear, ongoing, 
incremental and gradual. 
Revolutionary, fast, infrequent, episodic, fundamental 
and radical. 
B 
A change on one or a few levels (individual 
and group level). 
Multilevel changes (individuals, groups and the whole 
organisation). 
C 
A change in one or a few dimensions, 
components or aspects. 
Multi-dimensional, multi-component and multi-
aspectual. 
E A change in content. A change in context. 
F The institution as a whole remains intact. Affects the entire organisation. 
G 
Continuous improvements and 
development in the same direction. 
Discontinuous and taking a new direction. 
Sources: Adapted from French and Bell (1995:3), Smit and Cronje (2003:218), 
Robbins et al. (2003:406) and Iles and Sutherland (2001:14) 
The characteristics of first- and second-order changes reflected in Table 2.2 stand 
in stark contrast to each other. In first-order change, the basic issue is to change 
behaviour within a prevailing system without affecting the basic structure, culture 
or defining values of the system (Esterhuyse, 2003:2). This is further explained by 
Van Tonder’s (2004:20) analysis of first-order change, namely “… change is a 
steady state, incremental, sequential change which evolves over an extended 
period of time, does not have an influence on the system and is generally 
perceived to be within the control of the system or organisation”. 
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In addition, Esterhuyse (2003:2) contends that in first-order change, the system 
itself, including its basic structure, culture and defining values is not altered. This 
category of change, according to Esterhuyse (2003:2), is usually referred to as 
“adaptation, renovation, adjustment, incremental change or peace-meal 
engineering”. Change is, moreover, regarded as an evolutionary process. 
Therefore, change, in such situation, is cosmetic in that the fundamentals are not 
changed, but only peripheral issues are changed. First-order change can be seen 
as being restricted in both content and process. 
Second-order change is more radical in nature. Its primary objective is to 
transform the basic structure, culture and defining values fundamentally, including 
the overall form of an institution. In concert with this view, Baker (2007:14) asserts 
that when “fundamental change is required, a full-scale approach is more likely to 
bring the desired ‘turn around’ than a piecemeal approach”. 
Therefore, first- and second-order changes principally differ in context, content 
and process. Understood in this context, transformation as second-order change 
means a new institution, a new structure, a new culture, new core values and a 
new direction for the institution.  
Institutions in South Africa received inputs as the legislative framework to 
transform themselves to make them better placed to deliver quality outputs. 
Because institutions are strongly influenced by their surroundings or environment, 
they are then referred to as “open systems” (Bastedo, 2004:1). It is for this reason 
that the researcher discusses open systems as an approach to change 
management in the next section. 
2.5 CHANGE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
Mabey and Salaman (1995:85) identify three broad change management 
strategies that receive support from different sources of literature.  
 The first strategy identified “argues that until the culture of an institution is 
reoriented, little else will change, except at a cosmetic level and over a 
limited period of time” (Mabey & Salaman, 1995:85).  
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 A second strategy comprises “behavioural change and enhanced 
institutional performance flow – primarily from the way the institution is 
structured with regard to its strategy” (Mabey & Salaman, 1995:85).  
 Finally, the third strategy relates to “the importance of the style of change 
management” (Mabey & Salaman, 1995:85).  
To effect change, managers could focus on various change targets. In other 
words, they could change the strategy, culture, structure or attitudes and skills of 
the people in the institution. 
2.5.1 Strategic change 
Strategic change is defined by Fiss and Zajac (2006:1173) as an alteration in the 
alignment of an institution with its external environment, and frequently involves 
symbolic struggles over the purpose and direction of an institution. However, 
Worley, Hutchin and Ross (1996:16) opine that strategic change involves deciding 
what to change, how to change and when to change specific elements of the 
strategic orientation of an institution. In this case, strategic orientation involves a 
change in mission and the identity or the outside image of the institution 
(Beckhard & Prichard, 1992:37). According to Mabey and Salaman (1995:87), the 
mission of the institution entails its purpose statement, accompanied by a strategy 
outlining the activities, standards and behaviours required to fulfil the mission, as 
well as mission success factors. Strategic change may then subsequently require 
other institutional changes, for instance, in the institution, structure and culture 
(Smith & Cronje, 2003:223). 
2.5.2 Cultural change 
Institutional culture, according to Baker (2007:31), is referred to as “the way we do 
things around here” and is an important factor in facilitating or inhibiting the 
achievement of change in an organisation. In addition, according to McCalman 
and Potter (2015:19), cultural change is a fundamental change that cultural 
members attribute their values and assumptions to, which leads to a shift in the 
nature of the cultural themes in use and the expressive content of the cultural 
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paradigm. This means that the employees of an institution will then have a 
common understanding on how things are done in the institution where they work. 
Culture, therefore, is the driving force for expected behaviour from the members 
of an institution. 
There is also the perception that if the acceptance of key values and norms is 
strong, then that can be translated to mean the existence of a strong culture. Such 
a strong culture, according to Baker (2007:31), is associated with employee 
commitment and organisational performance. Cultural change is also influenced 
by strategic change in an institution. This means a change in the shared values 
and aims of the institution (Dessler, 1995:511). In addition, Smith and Cronje 
(2003:223) contend that it also entails changing the corporate culture of the 
institution. A change in the strategy of the institution may necessitate a change in 
the beliefs, values and attitudes of the people in the institution.  
This therefore means that if the corporate culture of an institution has a negative 
influence on the strategies and performance of the institution, these may have to 
be changed. 
2.5.3 Structural change  
Dessler (1995:511) argues that restructuring or reinstitution of an institution 
involves a redesign of the structure of an institution, that is, a change in the 
department, coordination, span of control, reporting relationships or centralisation 
of decision-making in an institution. Reorganisation is seen to be a relatively direct 
and quick method for change an institution. Smith and Cronje (2003:223) 
elucidate this point further in their assertion that changes in structure normally 
result or can be influenced by a change in strategy of an institution. This in turn 
may mean that the strategy of an institution comes before the change in structure. 
Change in strategy may also involve changes in management levels, the span of 
control, a relook into delegations to all or certain levels, or even deciding on 
devolution of decision-making powers.  
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2.5.4 Changing attitudes and skills  
Employees within an institution that is undergoing change have to change their 
own attitudes, values and behaviour. A variety of techniques are used to change 
the people in the institution. The techniques vary in the extent to which they 
involve in-depth emotional involvement of the employees. The aim here, 
according to Dessler (1995:512–513), is often to encourage employees to develop 
a more open, supportive, organic type of institution. Therefore, the change in 
employees’ attitudes, values and behaviour must be within the context of the 
changing institution and in concert with the strategic direction of the institution. 
The strategic direction of an institution may influence and necessitate change in 
structural outlook, but because an institution consists of employees, their attitudes 
and skills must complement the changing institution. 
In the next section, the researcher focuses on a discussion of approaches to 
manage change. 
2.6 APPROACHES TO MANAGING CHANGE 
There are several popular approaches to managing change. Lewin’s classic three-
step model of the change process, action research (AR), management of 
transformation approach and organisational development, are discussed in the 
next sections. 
2.6.1 Lewin’s three-step model 
According to Robbins et al. (2003:411) and Evison (2014:1), Kurt Lewin (1951) 
argues that successful change in institutions should follow three steps, namely:  
(i) Unfreezing the status quo 
Managers create a need for change by:  
 creating a good relationship with the people involved;  
 helping people realise that present behaviour is not effective; and 
 minimising resistance to change. 
The unfreezing step is important because it ensures the readiness of the 
institution to ensure success for change management. 
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(ii) Movement to a new state/changing 
Managers must implement change by: 
 identifying more effective behaviour; 
 choosing appropriate changes in tasks, culture, technology and 
 structure; and 
 taking action. 
Lewin warns that many managers enter this changing phase too early and, as a 
result, end up creating resistance to change and even a total failure in 
implementing change. 
(iii) Refreezing the new change to make it permanent 
Managers must stabilise the change by: 
 creating acceptance and continuity for the new behaviour; 
 providing support; and 
 using performance-contingent rewards and positive reinforcement. 
Concomitant with this step should be monitoring, evaluation and feedback. 
Adjustments or modifications should be made where necessary. 
2.6.2 Action research 
AR is one of the change models that can be applied in altering an institution. In 
discussing this model, the focus is on the definition, the features and the 
principles of AR. 
2.6.2.1 Definition of action research 
Reason and Bradbury (2006:1) define AR as: 
A participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in 
the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview 
which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks to bring together 
action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of 
practical solutions to issues of pressing concerns to people.  
It is for this reason that the process is viewed as a participatory and democratic 
process concerned with developing practical solutions to practical problems. 
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2.6.2.2 Features of AR 
Koshy (2005:10) identifies the following features of AR, namely that AR: 
 involves researching your own practice – it is not about people outside the 
organisation; 
 is emergent; 
 is participatory; 
 constructs theory from practice; 
 is situation-based; 
 can be useful in real problem solving; 
 deals with individuals or groups with a common purpose of improving 
practice; 
 is about improvement; 
 involves analysis, reflection and evaluation; and 
 facilitates changes through enquiry. 
However, according to Reason and Bradbury (2001:2), AR is a set of practices 
that respond to people’s desire to act creatively in the face of practical and often 
pressing issues in their lives in organisations and communities. AR: 
 calls for an engagement with people in collaborative relationships, opening 
new communicative spaces in which dialogue and development can 
flourish; 
 draws on many ways of knowing, both in the evidence that is generated by 
inquiry and is expressed in diverse forms of presentation as we share our 
learning with wider audiences; 
 is value-orientated, seeking to address issues of significance concerning 
the flourishing of people, their communities, and the wider ecology in which 
we participate; and 
 is a living, emergent process that cannot be pre-determined, but keeps on 
changing and developing as those engaged deepen their understanding of 
the issues to be addressed. This also has the advantage of developing the 
capacity of the clients and researchers as co-inquirers, both individually 
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and collectively. 
These features can be seen as the summary of the descriptions given in defining 
AR. 
2.6.3 Management of transformation approach 
Williams (2001:1) identifies four major transformation ‘clusters’ that can be 
determined within the management of any transformation process (be this in the 
public sector, private sector or civil society) and these are particularly relevant to 
the transformation of the military.  
 Cultural transformation of the military entails transformation of the 
leadership, management and administrative ethos, the value system and 
the traditions upon which the military are predicated.  
 Human transformation entails the transformation of the composition of 
the military with regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender 
composition and its human resource (HR) practices. This component of the 
transformation process must be consistent with the broader policies of the 
organisation. 
 Political transformation strives to ensure that the conduct and character 
of the military conform to the political features of democracy within which 
they are located, an acknowledgement of the principle of civil supremacy, 
institution of appropriate mechanisms of oversight, control and adherence 
to the principles, and practices of accountability and transparency. 
 Organisational transformation constitutes a more technocratic process 
within which the military will be right-sized, its management practices and 
its diverse organisational processes made cost-effective and its ability to 
provide services that are rendered efficiently in accordance with the 
broader principles which have governed the transformation of the military to 
date.  
During the process of managing the transformation processes, it is critical to 
ensure that the key areas of intervention are managed in such a manner that 
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these interventions are strategically coherent and practically based. The 
restructuring of the South African military since 1994 was inextricably determined 
by the specific context within which such initiatives occurred. Although one can 
formulate a general strategy for the transformation of the military regarding unit 
names, their institutional peculiarities and their local character will demand an 
approach that is flexible and context-derived.  
2.6.4 Organisational development 
Organisational development (OD) helps institutions deliver sustainable 
performance improvements through people. Practitioners who practice OD are 
likely to have a strong humanistic and democratic approach to institutional change 
(Foster, 2013:1).  
OD is discussed focusing mainly on its operational aspect. However, the 
researcher first must define OD to create a common understanding. 
2.6.4.1 Definition of organisational development 
Brown (2011:34) opines that OD is the application of an institution-wide approach 
to the functional, structural, technical and personal relationships in institutions. In 
support, Mullins (2011:448) avers that OD is a generic term that embraces a 
range of intervention strategies into the social process of an institution and such 
strategies are meant to develop individuals, groups and the institution as a 
system. 
In an OD programme, the emphasis is on a combination of individual, team and 
institutional relationships. It is a continuous process of long-term institutional 
improvement consisting of a series of stages. It is out of these explications that 
OD as an intervention is seen fitting in second-order change. 
2.6.4.2 Five stages of organisational development 
The five stages of organisational development are reflected in Figure 2.1 below 
and are discussed individually. 
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Figure 2.1: Five stages of organisational development 
Source: Adapted from Brown (2011:35) 
Central and critical features of OD are organisational culture and organisational 
change (Mullins, 2011:448). The OD therefore is a means for realising change in 
the cooperate culture and OD includes diagnosing the institutions’ performance, 
planning for improvement, mobilising resources to effect the plans and evaluating 
the effects (Kipkelwon & Chepkuto, 2011:30).  
In further elucidating this definition, a five-stage model is identified and each stage 
is said to be dependent on the preceding one, while successful change is more 
probable when each of these stages is considered in a logical sequence (Brown, 
2011:35): 
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Stage 1  Anticipate a need for change 
Implementation of change programmes presupposes that the organisation must 
anticipate the need for change. The first step is the leadership’s perception that 
the organisation is somehow in a state of disequilibrium or needs improvement. 
This state of disequilibrium may stem from the growth or decline of the institution 
or from competitive, technological, legal or social changes in the external 
environment (Brown, 2011:35). 
Stage 2 Develop the practitioner–client relationship 
After an institution had recognised a need for change and an OD practitioner had 
entered the system, a relationship begins to develop between the practitioner and 
the client system. The client is a person or an institution that is being assisted to 
find a solution to the problem experienced (Brown, 2011:35). This relationship is 
crucial for the survival of an OD programme in that it determines the success or 
failure of the OD programme. It is advisable that the OD practitioner during the 
process attempts to establish a pattern of open communication, a relationship of 
trust, and an atmosphere of shared responsibility. Issues dealing with 
responsibility, rewards, and objectives must be clarified, defined or worked 
through at this point (Brown, 2011:35). 
Stage 3 The diagnostic process 
The realisation of stage two, which is the development of a working relationship 
between the client and the OD practitioner, paves the way for the diagnostic 
process.  
At this stage, the practitioner and the client begin to gather data about the system. 
The collection of data is an important activity providing the institution and the 
practitioner with a better understanding of client’s system problems, also called 
the diagnosis (Brown, 2011:35). Furthermore, the collected data will then be 
analysed by both the practitioner and the client to identify problem areas and 
causal relationships. The diagnostic phase is then used for the determination of 
the exact problem that needs a particular solution, to identify the forces causing 
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the situation, and helps to provide a basis for selecting effective change strategies 
and techniques (Brown, 2011:35). 
Stage 4 Action plans, strategies and techniques  
The diagnostic phase leads to a series of interventions, activities or programmes 
aimed at resolving problems and increasing institutional effectiveness. These 
programmes apply to such OD techniques as total quality management (TQM), 
job design, role analysis, goal setting, team building, and intergroup development 
to the causes specified in the diagnostic phase. In all likelihood, more time will be 
spent on this fourth stage than on any of the other stages of an OD programme 
(Brown, 2011:35). 
Stage 5 Self-renewal, monitoring and stabilisation 
The logical step after implementation of the action programme is to monitor the 
results and stabilise the desired changes. This stage assesses the effectiveness 
of change strategies in attaining stated objectives. The results stemming from 
assessment inform clients whether they ought to modify, continue or discontinue 
the activities (Brown, 2011:35). Once a problem has been corrected and a change 
programme is implemented and monitored, it means that clients must be devised 
to make sure that the new behaviour is stabilised and internalised (Brown, 
2011:35). If this is not done, the system will regress to previous ineffective modes 
or states. The ideal OD programme will create a client system that has a self-
renewal capability that can maintain innovation without outside support (Brown, 
2011:35). The explications advanced on each approach to the management of 
change give an array of options that can be utilised by different change managers 
in particular situations. 
2.7 SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MANAGING CHANGE  
Brown (2011:58) avers that a systems approach to managing change views the 
institution as a unified system composed of interrelated units. In understanding 
this approach, it is important to define what a system is. In support of this view, 
Montuori (2000:63) contends that a system comprises related and interdependent 
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parts, so that “any system must be viewed as a whole, and that a system cannot 
be considered in isolation from its environment.” In addition, Brown (2011:58) 
views a system as a set of interrelated parts unified by design to achieve some 
purpose or goal. 
There are two fundamental types of systems: open and closed. To place systems 
thinking in context, a distinction should be made between open and closed 
systems, which categorises systems thinking (Brown, 2011:59). Closed systems 
are completely autonomous, independent and in isolation from their environment 
whereas open systems exchange materials, energy and information with their 
environment (Brown, 2011:59). An open system is based on the assumption that 
all inputs can be identified and that all possible variables are usually built into the 
system (Brown, 2011:59). Proponents of the open system see organisations as 
comprising a number of interrelated sub-systems, and this system is one that 
considers outside factors (environment), which can have an influence on the 
design process (Nadler, 1981:6). This implies, therefore, that any activity within an 
open system is the result of influence of one element on another and in continual 
interaction with its environment. Within an institutional perspective, the systems 
approach takes into cognisance and focuses on the effect of managerial functions 
and the interrelationship between sub-elements of the organisation (Brown, 
2011:58). According to this perspective, the institution is viewed as a set of flows 
of information, personnel and materials. There are three basic elements of a 
system: inputs, processes and outputs (Brown, 2011:58–59). 
 Inputs are the resources that are applied to the processing function. The 
inputs like materials, people, and energy, are converted by the institutions 
into services needed by the public (Brown, 2011:58). Interaction takes 
place between the institution and the environment, in that the institution 
receives feedback from the environment. These inputs are then 
transformed by the institution and become improved services that are 
channelled back to the environment (Brown, 2011:59). 
 Processes are the activities and functions that are performed to produce 
goods and services. 
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 Outputs are the products and services produced by the institution. 
Furthermore, systems thinking, according to Montuori (2000:64), enables a 
dynamic, holistic examination of an institution, including changes as they unfold 
as a means of ensuring that the changes made are within the context and in 
concert with environmental changes. Within this institutional context, open 
systems thinking, therefore suggests that issues, events, forces and incidents 
should not be viewed as isolated phenomena but rather be seen as 
interconnected, interdependent components of a complex unit (Brown, 2011:58–
59). 
Flowing from the above explications, it seems that open systems are the systems 
of interest in managing change, because elements within an institution influence 
one another resulting in an activity where issues, events, forces and incidents as 
elements of a complex unit are interconnected to and interdependent on one 
another. To understand resistance to change, the researcher focuses in the next 
section on the discussion of this concept and how systemic and individual factors 
play a role in resisting change. 
2.8 RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
In trying to simplify the complex understanding of change, Baker (2007:2) 
postulates that change is not, in itself, inherently good or bad. It is a common 
phenomenon that impending change in an institution always invokes feelings of 
anxiety and fears and may result in resistance to change. People and institutions 
to which they belong resist transformation for various reasons, be it for the 
defence of the status quo or just fear of the unknown (Esterhuyse, 2003). 
Resistance then becomes a management challenge that cannot be ignored, but 
needs to be planned and managed accordingly. Esterhuyse (2003:5) asserts that 
resistance to change usually occurs at two distinctive levels: the systemic level 
and the individual level. 
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2.8.1 Systemic level  
Systemic factors are built into the institution. Some of the factors, identified by 
Esterhuyse (2003:5), which most institutions have experienced as change 
resistors, are the following: 
 a hierarchical institutional structure and the concomitant obsession to 
maintain existing relations of power and control. This is of interest to the 
military because the military by its very nature is hierarchical in structure to 
effect command and control; 
 non-participative decision-making procedure (one-man rule);  
 an obsession with short-term gain/profit and task-orientated behaviour; and 
 the question of survival, and remaining in business, while retaining stability. 
The fundamental change that involves a change in structure, decision-making 
processes and leadership approaches will then have to be given priority to ensure 
that these systemic factors are eliminated in advance. In addition, when 
embarking on a planned programme of transformation it is therefore imperative to 
consider the built-in factors, which adversely affect change. 
2.8.2 Individual factors 
A wide variety of individual factors play a role. The following are some of those 
individual factors as identified by Esterhuyse (2003:5): 
 Perceived self-interest relates to conflicts of interests between those of 
the individual and those of the institution. The institution sees the need to 
change and the individual has his/her perceived vested interest in the 
institution. Such interests may have a negative influence on the individual 
to support the intended change. 
 Feeling of fear and uncertainty is the natural way of responding to the 
unknown future and concomitant feeling of insecurity.  
 Conservatism manifests itself when change is perceived as a threat to 
acquired skills and knowledge. There is always the tendency to protect and 
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justify the status quo so that the intended change is not effected and 
individuals stay in their comfort zones. 
These perceived individual threats need to be addressed as part of managing 
change in an institution. There are methods that can be applied to overcome 
resistance to change. In the next section, the researcher discusses such methods. 
Constant communication is one of the methods, and to clarify every step of the 
change process is a must to alleviate the negative perceptions.  
2.9 METHODS TO OVERCOME RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
Managing resistance to change is a critical factor in any change exercise. The 
resistance may stem from various sources, including a preference for habitual 
ways of doing things, fear of the unknown or a feeling of power or security that is 
at stake. However, Dessler (1995:528) suggests that whatever the source is, 
resistance to change must be addressed and managed. Kotter and Schlesinger 
(2008:7), Bryant, Coombs and Pazio (2014:1) and Baldwin, Bommer and Rubin 
(2014:524–525) suggest the following general strategies for overcoming 
resistance to change: 
 Communication requires that the desired changes in an institution be 
communicated with employees. Employees should be informed about 
change initiatives and their progress. It is therefore necessary to plan for 
ways to communicate that are varied and tailored to different stakeholders 
in the institution. 
 Participation refers to the need to involve potential resisters in designing 
and implementing change. Allowing participation has the benefit of 
enhancing the feeling of understanding and a feeling of control and 
ownership for the employees. This also reduces uncertainty.  
 Facilitation strategy is concerned with providing skills training and 
emotional support to employees. 
40 
 
 Negotiation is used when confronted with powerful resisters, and 
management needs to make specific exchanges and offer incentives for 
making the change. 
 Coercion refers to the use of authority and the threat of punishment or 
even loss of job or promotion opportunities for those who resist change. 
Although these strategies appear independent of each other, they can be applied 
in combined ways depending on the prevailing situation. The key to application of 
these strategies is the understanding of situational factors at play.  
 
2.10 SUMMARY 
In the introduction to this chapter the researcher indicated that the intention was to 
discuss strategic change management from a theoretical perspective. To pursue 
this, the discussion sought to inform the theoretical framework for analysis and 
later an evaluation of strategic change management in the SANDF. The nature 
and concept of strategic change management was discussed by first providing a 
definition and discussion of the concept and those who are connected with it, 
namely strategy, change, management and change management. A distinction 
was established between first- and second-order change by identifying and 
discussing their different characteristics. It was explained that first- and second-
order change principally differ in context, content and process.  
The open systems approach was selected as appropriate for discussing change 
management in this thesis. This is based on the fact that the systems thinking 
enables a dynamic holistic examination of an institution, including changes, 
thereby suggesting that issues, events, forces and incidents should not be viewed 
in isolation but should be seen as interconnected, interdependent components of 
a complex entity. Resistance to change was also discussed as a management 
challenge, and the levels at which it occurs, as well as the methods to overcome 
this challenge were identified and discussed. Different approaches to managing 
change – which include Lewin’s three-step model, action research and 
organisational development were discussed briefly.  
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Finally, it was concluded that the ‘people’ or ‘human’ dimensions of strategic 
change management are in all probability one of the most complex issues that will 
confront military leaders in managing the strategic realignment of any military 
organisation. The ability of military leadership to respond strategically to changing 
conditions is determined largely by the human factors involved. The so-called 
‘people issues’ relate to changing paradigms of management, establishing 
learning organisations, having to deal with organisational politics, re-skilling of 
staff, emotional intelligence, stress management and resistance to change that 
collectively translate into complexity in the strategic alignment of an organisation 
within its turbulent environment. 
In the next chapter, the researcher focuses on strategic change management. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AND PROCESS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two, strategic change management was discussed from a theoretical 
perspective. The discussion focused on transformational change as a type of 
change, among other sub-topics. In this chapter, the focus of discussion is on the 
strategic management framework with specific reference to theoretical 
perspectives regarding strategic management, strategic planning and the strategic 
management process. The discussion of the strategic management process 
hinges on strategic analysis, strategy formulation, strategy implementation and 
strategy evaluation. 
3.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
To clarify the terms used in this chapter, in this section, the researcher considers 
strategy in context by defining what is meant by ‘strategy’. The meaning of 
strategy in a business management and a military context is discussed.  
3.2.1 Strategy in context 
The term ‘strategy’ was adopted from the military and adapted for use in the 
business context (Nickols, 2012:2). For the purposes of clarifying the concept of 
strategy and placing it in context, the definition of strategy is explored and models 
of strategy, dimensions of strategy and levels of strategy is discussed. 
3.2.1.1 Strategy defined 
In the military, strategy may be intended as a manoeuvre to outwit an opposing 
force by using an artful plan (Grattan, 2011:14). In concert with this definition, 
Nickols (2012:2) postulates that strategy often refers to the manoeuvring (that is 
deployment) of troops into positions before the opposing force is actually 
engaged, and that once the opposing force is engaged, the focus changes to 
tactics. In this situation, the employment of forces becomes central in engaging 
the opposing forces. Therefore, strategy in a military sense is about a well-
considered and clever plan to outmanoeuvre and engage the opposing forces. 
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According to Karami (2007:3), in business and management, the concept of 
strategy is analogous to that in the military. In a business and management 
context, ‘strategy’ is defined by Robson (1997:5) as the pattern of resource 
allocation decisions made throughout an institution. A more expanded view is 
shared by Deffner (2003:2), who contends that strategy is the means and 
methods required to satisfy the conditions necessary to achieve the ultimate goal 
of a system. Sharing a similar view, Veettil (2008:35) sees strategy as the 
direction and scope of an institution over the long term, which achieves an 
advantage in a changing environment through its configuration of resources and 
competencies with the aim of fulfilling stakeholders’ expectations. 
However, an expanded definition is that offered by Bryson (2004:183), who posits 
strategy as a pattern of purposes, policies, programmes, actions, decisions and 
resource allocations that defines what an institution is, what it does, and why it 
does it. Strategy, therefore, is pattern of deliberate actions that an institution 
undertakes to out-perform its rivals (Ehlers & Lazenby, 2005:2). However, it is 
imperative to note that to create a pattern of deliberate actions, strategy should be 
applied consciously and consistently over time (Nillson, Olve & Parment, 
2011:14). 
In the same vein, De Kluyver and Pearce (2012:2) contend that strategy is about 
positioning an institution to gain a competitive advantage, and involves making 
choices about industries in which to participate and which products and services 
to offer, and making decisions regarding the allocation of resources. In concert 
with these definitions, strategy is said to be the art and science of planning and 
marshalling resources for their most efficient and effective use (Maalu & Wekesa, 
2012:176). 
The above definitions and explications have two common essential characteristics 
(Karami, 2007:4), namely: 
 they are made in advance of the actions to which they apply; and 
 they are developed consciously and purposefully. 
It is important to note that in the above definitions, the emphasis is on making 
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decisions about resource allocation that is providing the means for realising the 
vision, and achieving the goals and objectives of the institution. Therefore, 
stemming from these explications is the fact that strategy is about planning and 
defining goals and objectives and ensuring that resources are allocated to realise 
the plans. In addition, strategy provides guidance to institutions on how to achieve 
their vision and strategic goals. 
Furthermore, Mintzberg et al. (2003:3) identified five interrelated definitions of 
strategy as plan, ploy, pattern, position, and perspective. 
 Strategy as plan is viewed as a consciously intended course of action, 
and a guide to deal with a situation (Karami, 2007:4). This definition, 
according to Mintzberg et al. (2003:4), can be dissected into two essential 
characteristics. First, the plan is a conscious and purposeful effort, and 
secondly, it is prepared in advance, that is, before the action takes place. 
However, it is interesting to note that ‘strategy’ is often considered 
interchangeable with ‘plan’ since both are consciously intended courses of 
action (Karami, 2007:4). Strategy as a plan is some sort of intended course 
of action or a set of guidelines to deal with a situation and shows an 
institution how to reach its intended position from its current state (Veettil, 
2008:35). A plan, therefore, is a deliberately and carefully crafted path that 
an institution follows in order to improve its status to reach its intended 
situation. 
 Strategy as ploy: Mintzberg et al. (2003:4) argue that the plan itself might 
be meant to achieve a specific purpose, or it might be just a general 
approach to solve general challenges. Mintzberg at al. (2003:4) further 
postulate that plan to achieve a specific purpose is called a ploy, and a 
ploy can be used to outmanoeuvre the opposing forces in war or outwit 
competitors in business. In concert with this definition, Veettil (2008:35) 
contends that a ploy could be a specific manoeuvre intended to outwit an 
opponent or competitor so that the competitive scenario changes in the 
favour of the manoeuvre. A ploy, therefore, is a specific move designed to 
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outsmart the opposing force, or in the business sense, to gain an 
advantage over competitors. 
 Strategy as pattern is linked to the resultant behaviour once the planned 
strategy is employed in an institution. When resultant behaviour is seen to 
be consistent, it can be called a pattern, hence, strategy as a pattern 
(Mintzberg et al., 2003:4). In addition, strategy as a pattern refers to 
patterns in a stream of actions and by this definition, strategy is consistency 
in behaviour whether or not intended (Veettil, 2008:35). This means that a 
pattern is the degree of consistency in the strategic actions of an institution. 
However, the challenge that can emanate from this consistency is 
predictability, which a competitor or opposing force can use to predict which 
course of action will be taken (Grattan, 2011:14). 
 Strategy as position is seen as a means of locating an organisation within 
the larger outside environment (Karami, 2007:4). In other words, the 
organisation must be able to define its reason for existence within the 
context of what is happening in the broader business environment 
(Mintzberg et al., 2003:6). Sharing the same view, Veettil (2008: 35) posits 
that strategy as a position is a means of locating an institution in an 
environment and by this definition, strategy becomes a mediating force 
between institution and environment. In business terms, this means finding 
a niche in a market where the available resources could be concentrated to 
the best advantage. Practically, the niche and the decisive point have to be 
discovered by the strategist and are not always obvious (Grattan, 2011:14). 
Stemming from this definition, ‘strategy’, therefore, is a means of locating 
an institution in the environment, and matching the institution to its 
environment relative to its competitors or the opposition. 
 Strategy as perspective refers to an ingrained way of seeing the world 
from an institutional point of view (Mintzberg et al., 2003:7). This refers to 
the world outlook according to the institution. In this case, the institution is 
represented by its executives, and strategy is the perspective shared by 
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the members of the institution through their intentions and/or by their 
actions (Karami, 2007:4). This definition looks inside the institution. In this 
respect, strategy is to the institution what personality is to the individual 
(Veettil, 2008:35). The definition of strategy as a perspective, suggests that 
strategy is a concept (Veettil, 2008:35). Strategy then arises from the 
institution paradigm: how members of an institution think the world looks 
and works (Grattan, 2011:14). 
In this section, the definition of strategy was discussed and it was found that 
strategy provides the means for realising the vision and achieving the goals and 
objectives of an institution. Above all, strategy is concerned with planning and 
defining goals and objectives and with ensuring that resources are allocated to 
realise the objectives as enshrined in the plans. Finally, strategy is not a panacea 
for all the ills of an institution but rather guidance to institutions on how to realise 
their vision and strategic goals. Added to the discussion of the definition of 
strategy were five interrelated definitions of strategy, namely as plan, ploy, 
pattern, position, and perspective. 
In the next section, the researcher provides a brief discussion of what strategic 
planning is and what it entails. 
3.3 STRATEGIC PLANNING 
In the previous section, the researcher dealt with the definition of strategy, thereby 
laying the foundation for a discussion of strategic planning. In this section, the 
researcher gives a summary of the definition of strategic planning. 
3.3.1 Defining strategic planning 
Strategic planning starts with the full understanding by the firm of the business in 
which it operates (Zimmerman & Blythe, 2013:37). This understanding of business 
is followed by strategic planning, which is a process of developing and 
maintaining consistency between the objectives and resources of the organisation 
and its changing opportunities (Robson, 1997:17). In addition, strategic planning 
is defined by Bryson (1988, cited in Poister & Streib, 1999:309) as “a disciplined 
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effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an 
institution is, what it does, and why it does it”. 
To expand on these definitions, Bryson (2004:15–16) posits that strategic 
planning is about clarifying the mission, mandates, vision, goals and the nature of 
the common good and public value to be achieved. In tandem with this definition, 
Belcourt and Bohlander (2011:44) assert that strategic planning involves a set of 
procedures for making decisions about the long-term goals and strategies of the 
institution. 
Furthermore, strategic planning is used to manage institutions effectively and to 
enhance their performance. Strategic planning is seen as a rational, top-down 
process through which management can programme future success and decision-
making responsibilities. In this situation, strategic planners are expected to 
provide careful analyses of internal and external data (Rothaermel, 2013:39). 
Thereafter, executives tie the allocation of resources to the strategic plan and 
constantly monitor the ongoing performance accordingly. In this process, the 
strategy formulation is separated from the strategy implementation (Rothaermel, 
2013:39). 
Strategic planning, according to Poister and Streib (1999:309), is a “big picture” 
approach that – 
 is concerned with identifying the most fundamental issues facing an 
institution and responding to them; 
 addresses the subjective question of purpose and the often competing 
values that influence mission and strategies; 
 emphasises the importance of external trends and forces as they are likely 
to affect the agency and its mission; 
 attempts to be politically realistic by taking into account the concerns and 
preferences of internal, and especially external, stakeholders; 
 relies heavily on the active involvement of senior-level managers and 
sometimes elected officials, assisted by support staff where needed; 
 requires the candid confrontation of critical issues by key participants to 
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build commitment to plans; 
 is action-orientated and emphasises the importance of developing plans for 
implementing strategies; and 
 focuses on implementing decisions now to position the institution 
favourably for the future. 
In this section, strategic planning was described as a disciplined effort to produce 
fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an institution is all 
about. It is during strategic planning that the mission, mandates, vision and goals 
are clarified so that everyone in the institution works towards the achievement of 
these. Participation in the process of strategic planning is dominated by 
management, meaning that it is a top-down approach. 
In the next section, the strategic management process is discussed. 
3.4 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
In this section, the researcher discusses the strategic management process by 
first defining what strategic management is. Then the focus shifts to the 
discussion of strategic analysis, the formulation of vision and mission statements, 
strategy formulation, strategy implementation, and strategy evaluation and control.  
3.4.1 Definition of strategic management 
The strategic management process can be described as an objective, systematic 
approach for making major decisions in a business enterprise (Fredrickson, 
1990:40). In addition, according to Robson (1997:6), strategic management is the 
process whereby all the institutional functions and resources are integrated and 
coordinated to implement existing and agreed-upon strategies. Such strategies are 
aligned with the environment, with the aim of achieving the long-term objectives of the 
institution. Secondly, Kamara (2007:12) defines strategic management as the art 
and science of formulating, implementing and evaluating cross-functional 
decisions that enable an institution to achieve its objectives. Analysing and 
considering this definition further, Kamara (2007:12) asserts that strategic 
management is a broad activity that encompasses mapping out strategy, putting 
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strategy into action, and modifying strategy or its implementation to ensure that 
the desired outcomes are reached. Agreeing with this definition, Barney and 
Hesterly (2010:4) define the strategic management process as a sequential set of 
analyses and choices that could increase the likelihood that an institution would 
choose a good strategy. Furthermore, Coultier (2013:5) defines strategic 
management as a process of analysing the current situation, developing 
appropriate strategies, put these strategies into action and evaluating and 
changing those strategies where the need arises.  
Strategic management as a process, then entails specifying the mission, vision 
and objectives of the institution, developing policies and plans which are designed 
to achieve these objectives, and then to allocate resources to implement the 
policies and plans that result in projects and programmes (Jagdish, 2013:19). 
Finally, Chemingich (2013:3) views strategic management as a process by which 
top management determines the long-term direction and performance of the 
institution by ensuring that careful formulation, effective implementation and 
continuous evaluation of strategy take place. This implies that strategic 
management is the process of coordinating and integrating the management 
function in a structured manner to achieve institutional goals and objectives. 
Permeating throughout the above definitions are characteristics pertinent to 
strategic management as identified by Coulter (2013:5), such as that strategic 
management: 
 is interdisciplinary, encompassing all functional areas; 
 has an external focus, which involves interaction with its environment; and 
 has an internal focus, which involves assessing the resources and 
capabilities of the institution. 
In addition, the process of strategic management is the domain of the analysis of 
top management of the environment in which the institution operates prior to 
formulating a strategy, as well as the plan for the implementation and control of 
the strategy (Parnell, 2014:2). It can also be argued that the environmental 
analysis of top management is the reflection of their own perceptions about the 
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environment (Parnell, 2014:2). 
It can therefore be concluded that the strategic management of an institution 
entails three ongoing processes, as identified by Dess, Lumpkin and Taylor 
(2005:2).  
 An analysis of strategic goals such as vision, mission and strategic 
objectives. This is done simultaneously with the analysis of the internal and 
external environments of the institution. Based on this analysis, leaders 
should make strategic decisions. 
 Such decisions by leaders address two fundamental questions: 
- Which industries should the institution compete in?  
- How should the institution compete in those industries?  
 Actions that should be taken to implement the strategies. 
3.4.2 Basic activities of strategic management 
The basic activities of the process of strategic management, as reflected in Figure 
3.1, are discussed below. 
 
Figure 3.1 The basic strategic management process 
Source: Adapted from Coultier (2013:5) 
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3.4.2.1 Strategic analysis 
Strategic analysis, also known as ‘environmental scanning’ (Bohlander & Snell, 
2007:52), is the systematic monitoring of the major external forces influencing the 
institution. By scanning the environment for changes that have a possibility to 
affect an institution, managers can anticipate the effect of these changes and 
make adjustments early (Bohlander & Snell, 2007:52). In addition, strategic 
analysis plays an important role in the strategic thinking process, and is used to 
derive correlations, identify and evaluate trends, patterns and performance gaps 
(Tovstiga, 2010:74–75). 
Internal strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) concern resources, capabilities and 
competences. External opportunities (O) and threats (T) come from the general 
environment of the institution. The analysis of the above environments is referred 
to as a SWOT analysis (Rothaermel, 2013:105–106). The gathering of information 
for a SWOT analysis allows managers to link internal factors (strengths and 
weakness) to external factors (opportunities and threats). Managers need to 
consider additional resources and capabilities and mitigate threats. Considering 
these issues allows managers to balance current and future resources and 
capabilities with the external environment (Rothaermel, 2013:105–106). 
3.4.2.1.1 Assessing the macro environment (external environment) 
In their quest to consider alternative strategies, it is paramount for managers in 
institutions to consider events and potential changes in the environment. This is 
called a macro-environmental analysis, which helps to identify opportunities (O) 
and threats (T) outside the institution (Bowhill, 2008:331–332). The external 
environment consists of all the physical and social factors outside of the 
boundaries of an institution. Some of these elements provide an institution with 
potentially favourable (positive) conditions and are called opportunities. Other 
elements provide potentially unfavourable (negative) conditions and are labelled 
threats (Stewart & Brown, 2011:41). The understanding of both favourable and 
unfavourable conditions is critical for effective strategy formulation. Effective 
strategy formulation thus begins with information about threats and opportunities 
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outside an institution (Stewart & Brown, 2011:42). 
Supporting this definition, Hill and Jones (2008:8) aver that the essential purpose 
of the external analysis is to identify strategic opportunities and threats in the 
operating environment of the institution that will affect how it pursues its mission. 
For example, a favourable economic situation of the country might be an 
opportunity for the SANDF to get an increased defence budget, whereas a threat 
might be an increase of terror attacks in neighbouring states. The SANDF 
therefore has to plan strategically to utilise or take advantage of the opportunity 
and eliminate the threat.  
The macro-environment can be divided into six sub-environments: the economic 
environment, the political and legal environment, the technological environment, 
the social environment, the physical and ecological environment, and the global 
environment (Goldman, Maritz, Nienaber, Pretorius, Priilaid & Williams, 2010:7).  
 Macro-economic forces, according to Parnell (2014:54) have a direct 
influence on institutional operations. According to Jones and Hill (2013:71), 
macroeconomic forces affect the general health and well-being of a nation 
which, in turn, affect the ability of the institution to be economically viable 
and sustainable (Jones & Hill, 2013:71). This refers, among others, to the 
growth or a decline in the gross domestic product (GDP) and the status of 
the economic indicators, such as inflation, interest rates and exchange 
rates. Coupled with these factors are hikes in energy prices and the cost of 
health-care and access to labour.  
In addition, South Africa is considered an emerging economy and as such, 
it is associated with threats rather than opportunities. In addition, as an 
emerging economy, South Africa cannot compete with economic greats like 
the United States of America and China with respect to sales volumes and 
prices. This requires, therefore, South African institutions to select the 
niche markets carefully (Goldman et al., 2010:7). 
 Political and legal forces are composed of variables such as trade 
agreements (Goldman et al., 2010:8), the outcomes of elections, legislation 
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and judicial court decisions, as well as the decisions stemming from 
various commissions and agencies at different tiers of government (Parnell, 
2014:54). Jones and Hill (2013:74) agree and aver that political and legal 
forces are a result of changes in the laws and regulations of a country and 
consequently affect managers and institutions. Such laws are shaped by 
political processes and are constraints on the operations of institutions and 
managers, and thus create both opportunities and threats for the 
institutions. 
 Social forces refer to the degree to which changing social mores and 
values affect an institution (Hill & Jones, 2013:73). Analysed and explained 
by Parnell (2014:79), social forces include societal values, trends, 
traditions, and religious practices. Societal values, in turn, refer to concepts 
and beliefs that the members of society hold in high regard. Furthermore, 
social forces include societal concerns such as childcare, care for the 
elderly, the environment, and educational priorities (Belcourt et al., 
2011:47). 
 Technological forces comprise information technology, innovations and 
automation (Belcourt et al., 2011:47). In addition, Parnell (2014:91) 
postulates that the pace of adoption of technological change is difficult to 
predict and can even be influenced by competing technologies.  
Furthermore, accelerated technological change has unleashed a process that has 
been called a “perennial gale of creative destruction” (Hill & Jones, 2013:73). 
This implies that technological change can make already established products 
obsolete overnight, and concomitantly create new product possibilities. Thus, 
technological change can be both an opportunity and a threat (Hill & Jones, 
2013:73). 
3.4.2.1.2 Assessing the micro-environment (internal environment) 
An internal analysis serves to identify the strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) of an 
institution, such as identifying the quantity and quality of the resources and 
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capabilities of an institution and finding ways of building unique skills. Hill and 
Jones (2003:9) assert that the strengths of an institution lead to superior 
performance whereas weaknesses of an institution translate into inferior 
performance. Areas of high capabilities are labelled ‘strengths’ and low 
capabilities are called ‘weaknesses’ (Stewart & Brown, 2011:42). This means that 
strength is something that is advantageous to the institution or something at which 
the institution is good, whereas weakness is considered something an institution 
lacks or where it is outperformed by rivalries (Bowhill, 2008:398). The ultimate 
objective of internal assessment is to equip decision-makers to be able to identify 
the primary strengths and weaknesses of an organisation and to find a way to 
capitalise on the strengths and improve or minimise the weaknesses (Mello, 
2011:105). 
In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the formulation of the 
vision and mission statements. 
3.4.3 The formulation of vision and mission statements 
Vision and mission statement formulation is part of strategic management. In this 
subsection, vision and mission are defined and discussed. 
3.4.3.1 Formulating vision 
A vision describes aspirations for the future, without specifying the means that will 
be used to achieve those desired ends (Miller, 1998:41). In addition, the vision 
statement answers the question ‘what do we want to become?’ and serves as the 
road map for the institution. The vision statement focuses on a desirable future, 
and is often referred to as an ‘enduring promise’ (Ehlers & Lazenby, 2005:48). 
Such a vision statement, according to Belcourt and Bohlander (2011:45), portrays 
the future business scope of an institution and provides a perspective on where 
the institution is going or what it could become in the future, in other words, it 
clarifies the long-term direction of the institution and its strategic intent. 
Furthermore, within the context of strategic management, ‘vision’ refers to the 
category of intensions that are broad, all inclusive, and forward-looking in terms of 
thinking. In content, vision statements are generally less detailed and formal than 
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strategic plans, but can still guide managers at all levels in their day-to-day 
decision-making (Mello, 2011:107). Vision statements reflect the perception of 
management of what the organisation should be (Zimmerman & Blythe, 2013:37).  
After conceptualising the vision statement of the institution in achievable terms, an 
outline plan is formulated specifying actions that need to be taken and when, in 
order to achieve that vision. This outline plan creates a framework of priorities and 
budget constraints, and establishes specific and measurable objectives. In many 
institutions, the vision and objectives and the master plan for achieving them are 
combined into a single deliverable called the “strategy plan” (Robson, 1997:18). 
However, it needs to be noted that a lack of a vision statement does not 
necessarily mean that there is no vision. This is much more relevant in situations 
where characteristics of an institution can be very clear to its members without 
having anything at all specified in official writing (Zimmerman & Blythe, 2013:37). 
3.4.3.2 Mission statement 
In defining ‘mission statement’, Ehlers and Lazenby (2005:51) aver that a mission 
statement embodies the philosophy, identity and character of an institution and 
also the image the institution wants to project. It is a statement of intent, attitude, 
outlook and orientation, and typically describes the business and purpose of the 
institution (Hough, Thompson, Strickland & Gamble, 2011:5). In other words, the 
mission statement explains the purpose and reason for the existence of the 
institution (Mello, 2011:103), and the mission statement helps legitimise the 
function of the institution in society (Robson, 1997:18). 
Furthermore, taking the explication further, Hill and Jones (2008:8) argue that 
such a mission statement provides the framework or context within which 
strategies are formulated. It is for this reason, that the researcher discusses the 
strategy formulation stage in the next section. 
3.4.4 Strategy formulation 
In the previous section, the researcher dealt with the formulation of the vision and 
mission statements. Under discussion in this section is the strategy formulation 
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process. After managers have used a SWOT analysis (see 3.4.2.1) to examine 
the internal strengths and weaknesses of the institution, as well as the external 
opportunities and threats, they have the information they need to formulate 
strategies (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:65). Strategy formulation is about developing 
and choosing appropriate strategies derived from identifying the competitive 
strengths and weaknesses of an institution, determining the external opportunities 
and threats of the institution, and establishing operational goals aligned with value 
creation, developing and analysing alternative strategic paths, and selecting 
among them the appropriate and effective ones for the institution (Fredrickson, 
1990:40). In addition, strategy formulation, according to Thompson and Strickland 
(1998:25), is the entire direction-setting management function of conceptualisation 
of the mission, setting performance objectives, and developing a strategy. 
In addition, Bowhill (2008:317) avers that strategy formulation is the process of 
determining appropriate courses of action for achieving institutional objectives and 
accomplishing organisational purpose. During this strategy formulation process, 
an institution adopts institutional policies and practices that are consistent with its 
own strategy (Barney & Hesterly, 2010:10). 
The end product of strategy formulation, according to Thompson and Strickland 
(1998:25), is a strategic plan, with appropriate strategies such as the following: 
 Functional-level strategies (operational strategies) are composed of 
goal-directed plans and actions of the functional areas (Fredrickson, 
1990:40) of the institution. In addition, strategic priorities are translated into 
functional areas of the institution (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:70). 
Furthermore, the functional-level strategy is directed at improving the 
effectiveness of operations within an institution (Hill & Jones, 2008:9). 
 Business-level strategies are the goal-directed plans and actions 
concerned with how an institution competes in a specific business or 
industry. The goal-directed plans and actions are focused on how the 
company will compete against rival institutions in order to create value for 
customers (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:68). In concert with this view, Hill and 
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Jones (2008:9) posit that a business strategy encompasses the way an 
institution positions itself in the broad field against rival competitors. A 
business strategy defines how institutions compete (Verweire, 2014:17). 
 A global strategy is about addressing how to expand operations of an 
institution outside the home country, to grow and prosper in a world where 
a competitive advantage is determined at the global level (Hill & Jones, 
2008:9).  
 Corporate strategy defines where institutions compete (Verweire, 
2014:17). In addition, corporate strategy addresses the following: 
- The business or businesses that the institutions should be in order to 
maximise their long-run profitability and the profit growth of the 
institution. 
- Concerns about how institutions should enter and increase their 
presence in these businesses to gain a competitive advantage. The set 
of strategies identified through the SWOT analysis should be 
implemented effectively (Hill & Jones, 2008:9). 
- Guiding the institutions regarding which business(es) to be in, what to do 
with those businesses, and where and how they will compete (Coulter, 
2013:7). Corporate strategy, therefore, focuses on domain selection 
(Snell & Bohlander, 2007:67). 
Stemming from the above explications, strategy formulation, according to Jagdish 
(2013:22), is a combination of the following processes: 
 performing a situation analysis, self-evaluation and competition analysis, 
both internal and external, and both at the micro-environmental and the 
macro-environmental; and 
 concurrent with this assessment, objectives are set. These objectives 
should be on a time-line. This involves developing vision statements, 
mission statements, overall corporate objectives, strategic business unit 
objectives and tactical objectives.  
Top managers, as the developers of strategy, always bear the responsibility for 
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the ramifications of strategy formulation decisions: This reflects their authority to 
commit resources of the institution to the implementation of strategy (Karami, 
2007:16). 
It can, therefore, be concluded from the above explications of the definition of 
strategy formulation, that it is the process of developing appropriate courses of 
action, meant for the realisation of the objectives and institutional purpose of the 
institution. Concomitant to this process of strategy formulation, is an adoption of 
institutional policies and practices that are consistent with its own strategy. In the 
next section, the researcher presents a discussion of strategy implementation. 
3.4.5 Strategy implementation 
The logical step that follows after strategy formulation is strategy implementation. 
In this section, therefore, strategy implementation is discussed. 
Strategy implementation, according to Thompson and Strickland (1998:25), is 
about putting the chosen strategy into practice, supervising it, and achieving the 
desired objectives. Sharing a similar view, Sage (2010:1) suggests that strategy 
implementation is the process that turns strategies and plans into actions in order 
to reach strategic objectives and goals. Concomitant with this action, is the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities among managers, through the design of 
institutional structures, allocating resources, setting short-term objectives, and 
designing the control and reward system of the institution (Hill & Jones, 2008:7). 
Institutional structures should be appropriate for the efficient performance of the 
required tasks and relationships, permitting coordination of subdivided activities 
(De Wet & Meyer, 2004:73). Such institutional structures are seen by Snell and 
Bohlander (2007:71–73) as the framework within which the activities of the 
institution are co-ordinated to fulfil expected results. 
Once structures are in place, what follows is the establishment of systems and 
processes. These include formal and informal procedures that guide and govern 
daily institutional activities. Re-engineering and process redesign to implement 
new strategies, need to be in place (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:71–73). Sharing a 
similar view, Karami (2007:16) postulates that implementing strategy is achieved 
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by developing a strategy-supportive culture, creating an effective institutional 
structure, and motivating individuals to learn new ways of contributing to improved 
performance. This means that strategy implementation requires the enterprise to 
devise policies, common values and incentives to motivate employees and to 
allow identified strategies to be pursued successfully (Fredrickson, 1990:40). 
Coupled with these explications on strategy implementation, is the fact that 
leadership is important and sometimes decisive for the success of the 
implementation of strategy (De Wet & Meyer, 2004:73). 
For the purpose of this study, strategy implementation was defined as a process 
that converts institutional strategies and plans into pragmatic actions and making 
decisions regarding the allocation of resources for the realisation of strategic 
objectives and goals. Coupled with this, are the distribution of roles and 
responsibilities, and the establishment of systems and processes. In addition, the 
success of the process of strategy implementation is said to be dependent on 
leadership. In a different context, it is important to note that, according to Grattan 
(2011:11–14), there is a formulation–implementation dichotomy, on the grounds 
that those who developed the strategy are not the ones who implement it. 
Once the strategy is implemented, strategy evaluation and control mechanisms 
must be in place. In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of 
strategy evaluation and control. 
3.4.6 Strategy monitoring (evaluation/control)  
For the purpose of this section, the terms ‘monitoring’, ‘evaluation’ and ‘control’ 
are used interchangeably. The attached meaning, therefore, is to reflect the extent 
to which the strategies of the institution are realised in attaining its goals and 
objectives (Pernell, 2014:327). In order to do strategy monitoring of their 
performance, institutions need to establish a set of parameters that focus on the 
‘desired outcomes’ of strategic planning, as well as the metrics they will use to 
monitor how well the institution delivers against those desired outcomes (Belcourt 
et al., 2011:75–76). In tandem with this view, Karami (2007:16) postulates that 
realistic strategy evaluation of the performance of the institution presupposes the 
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development of performance indicators linked to key improvement factors of 
institutional performance. Such performance indicators are meant to ensure that 
the institution achieves what it planned to realise as set out during the strategy 
formulation and implementation process. Strategy evaluation involves evaluating 
both the outcomes of the strategies and how they have been implemented 
(Coulter, 2013:8). This process of monitoring is underpinned by the ultimate aim 
of the institution to create a competitive advantage by evaluating its performance 
against other institutions. Among other ways of doing it, this comparison can be 
done by ‘benchmarking’. Benchmarking is defined as the process of identifying 
best practices in a particular area. Among others, it can be productivity, logistics, 
brand management or training. Then management compare the practices and 
performance their institution to those of other institutions in the same business 
(Belcourt et al., 2011:75–76).  
Parnell (2014:329) identifies a five-step strategic monitoring process that can be 
employed to facilitate this process. 
 
Step 1: Identify factors to serve as focus of strategic 
control 
 
Step 2: Develop standards or benchmarks for the 
factors 
 
Step 3: Measure actual performance both quantitatively 
and qualitatively 
 
Step 4: Compare measurements with standards or 
benchmarks 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Five-step strategic control process 
Source: (Parnell, 2014:329). 
Step 5: Take corrective action as needed to align 
performance with standards 
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A five-step strategic control process, as depicted in Figure 3.2, can be employed 
as follows. 
1. In this process, it is the function of top management to determine the focus 
of control. This is done by identifying internal factors that can serve as 
effective measures for the effectiveness of strategy, as well as outside 
factors that could trigger responses from the institution. 
2. Establish standards (benchmarks) for internal factors with which the actual 
performance of the institution can be compared after the implementation of 
the strategy. 
3. Management evaluates the actual performance of the institution by using 
quantitative and qualitative methods. 
4. Performance evaluations are then compared with the previously 
established standards. 
5. If performance is below the expected standards, then corrective steps are 
taken. However, if performance is above standards, there is no need for 
corrective action. 
Therefore, strategy monitoring helps top management to diagnose the flaws in the 
implementation of their strategies. The five-step approach to monitor strategy is a 
guide that informs top management how to follow a logical approach in monitoring 
their institution. This can be a tedious process, in that time and again, 
management will be forced to go back to the drawing board to rectify the 
implementation plan or even to review the formulated strategy. 
The process of strategic management is the area of responsibility for the top 
management of an institution. It is vital for the environmental analysis prior to the 
formulation of strategy, as well as the strategy implementation plan and for 
monitoring of strategy. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the definition of strategy was discussed within the context of 
business and the military. In business and public institutions, strategy is defined 
as the means for realising the vision, achieving the goals and objectives of an 
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institution, and concomitantly ensuring that resources are allocated to realise the 
achievement of objectives as enshrined in the plans. In the military context, 
however, strategy is seen as a well-considered plan to outsmart and engage the 
opposing forces. However, strategy should be taken as guidance by institutions 
regarding how to realise their vision and strategic goals. 
Following the discussion of strategy was strategic planning which, in summary, 
was described as a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and 
actions that shape and guide what an institution is all about. In addition, in 
pursuance of the definition of strategic management, it was found that strategic 
management is the process of coordinating and integrating the management 
function in a structured manner to achieve institutional goals and objectives. This 
process was categorised in stages for its successful realisation (see 3.4.2). 
The first stage of strategic management is strategic analysis, also known as 
‘environmental scanning’, which is the systematic monitoring of the major external 
forces influencing the institution. Within this analytical stage of strategic 
management, vision and mission statements were discussed. 
The second stage of strategic management is called ‘strategy formulation’. This is 
regarded as the process of determining appropriate courses of action for 
achieving the objectives of the institution, and accomplishing institutional purpose. 
It is during this strategy formulation process, that an institution adopts institutional 
policies and practices that are consistent with its own strategy. The ultimate 
resultant product of this stage is a strategic plan with appropriate strategies.  
The third stage of strategic management as discussed in this chapter, is strategy 
implementation, which is defined as the process that converts institutional 
strategies and plans into pragmatic actions, and making decisions regarding the 
allocation of resources for realisation of strategic objectives and goals. 
Concomitant with this process is the distribution of roles and responsibilities and 
the establishment of systems and processes. In addition, associated with the 
process of strategy implementation is the development of a strategy-supportive 
culture, creating an effective institutional structure, and motivating individuals to 
63 
 
learn new ways of contributing to improved performance. Coupled with these 
explications on strategy implementation, is the fact that leadership is important 
and sometimes decisive in the success of the implementation of strategy.  
The last stage of strategic management is strategy evaluation, which involves 
evaluating both the outcomes of the strategies, and how they have been 
implemented. 
In the next chapter, the researcher provides a discussion of the institutional 
culture. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, the discussion focused on the strategic change management 
framework, with specific reference to theoretical perspectives on strategic 
management, strategic planning and the strategic management process. The 
discussion of the strategic management process was dissected into strategic 
formulation, strategy implementation and strategy evaluation. 
To put the topic in context, in this chapter the researcher discusses theoretical 
positioning on the basic nature of institutional culture, types of institutional 
cultures, strong and weak institutional cultures, military culture and military 
leadership. Finally, the researcher draws a conclusion on the basis of the above 
topics. 
4.2 THEORETICAL POSITIONING: THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURE 
Every institution has a unique culture, different from all other organisations. 
However, the nature of institutional culture needs to be understood before any 
attempt can be made to deal with issues of changing and managing culture. In 
trying to untangle the complex nature of institutional culture, in this section the 
researcher endeavours to define culture in its institutional context, discusses the 
characteristics of institutional culture, and defines types of institutional culture. 
4.2.1 Defining institutional culture 
In order to understand institutional culture as a concept, it is imperative first to 
define what culture is. Meyer and Botha (2000:112) assert that culture represents 
the relatively enduring set of values that underlie a social system. Secondly, 
Cooper (1995:57) defines culture as that which characterises an established 
social group and denotes a moral framework and shared language, carrying key 
values, beliefs and assumptions that guide behaviour.  
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In addition, Meyer and Botha (2000:112), and Nel, Werner, Haasbroek, Poisat, 
Sono and Schultz (2008:17) share the view that culture represents what is 
metaphorically called the self-image or personality of the institution. This serves 
as the distinguishing features of an institution. This means, therefore, that to 
change the manner in which things are done, is to tamper with the existing culture 
of the organisation. 
Furthermore, according to Meyer and Botha (2000:112), underlying values and 
norms are a “meaning system”. This meaning system allows members of the 
organisation to attribute meaning and value to the external and internal events 
that they experience. In addition, Cameron (2004:3) contends that culture is a 
socially constructed attribute of institutions, which serves as the “social glue” 
which binds an institution. 
In concert with this view, Stippler, Moore, Rosenthal and Doerffer (2011:88) aver 
that culture is the set of learned beliefs, values, symbols, rules, traditions and 
behaviours of a group of people. 
Common to these definitions is the notion of values and norms that are embraced 
by society. These values and norms are then regarded as the guiding principles 
for observable and actual behaviour. The practical behaviour is measured against 
the accepted norms and values over a long period until it is the accepted way of 
doing things. What is now defined as culture can be categorised into different 
levels, which the researcher discusses in the next section. 
4.2.2 Levels of culture 
Scheel and Crous (2007:29) note three levels of culture. In congruence with these 
views, Stippler et al. (2011:78) similarly suggest that culture is composed of levels 
such as artefacts and climate, espoused values and perceived ‘culture’ as well as 
tacit basic assumptions that are taken for granted. However, Phillips and Gully 
(2012:482–483) add norms in looking at values, and further differentiate between 
espoused and enacted values. 
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4.2.2.1 Artefacts  
Refer to the physical and social environment of the institution (Scheel & Crous, 
2007:29). Artefacts are visible symbols of culture such as, in the military, the 
uniform, the habit of saluting, language usage and so on (Richardson, 2011:59–
61).  
Artefacts also include physical space and layout, technological output, written and 
spoken language and the overt behaviour of members of the organisation 
(Mullins, 2008:465). Artefacts are the most visible aspect of culture and as such 
can be experienced best through dialogue and observation (Linstead et al. 
2009:157). The definition by Phillips and Gully (2012:482) is congruent with the 
above explications, namely that artefacts are physical manifestations of the 
culture. These artefacts also include the myths and stories told about the 
organisation, awards, ceremonies and rituals, decorations, office space allocation, 
the dress code, how people address each other, among others (Phillips and Gully, 
2012:482). 
4.2.2.2 Values  
Are those principles that are valued by employees (Scheel & Crous, 2007:29). To 
expand on the definition of culture, McKee (2010:458) defines culture as ideas 
that a person or a group believes to be right, wrong or bad, attractive or 
undesirable. Values are not visible, but members of a society or the organisation 
are made aware of these values (Linstead et al., 2009:157). Phillips and Gully 
(2012:482–483), add norms when looking at values and further identified that 
values are subdivided into two parts: espoused and enacted values. Espoused 
values are said to be explicitly stated and articulated by an institution and guide 
institutional members on what ought to be (Richardson, 2011:59–60). Enacted 
values, on the other hand, are said to be exhibited by employees based on what 
they observe as opposed to what is actually happening in an institution (Phillips & 
Gully, 2012:482–483). 
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4.2.2.3 Basic Assumptions  
Are the underlying cognitive structures that determine how group members 
perceive, think and feel (Scheel & Crous, 2007:29). Such assumptions are taken 
for granted, and are not visible, preconscious and easily accessible (Linstead et 
al., 2009:157). In addition, Richardson (2011:59–60), in propounding a similar 
view, avers that basic assumptions evolve from a continuous application of a 
problem solution that has been used before and have been successfully applied 
and unconsciously become the taken-for-granted solution for similar problems. 
However, Phillips and Gully (2012:482–483) opine that assumptions become so 
taken for granted that they become the core of the culture of the institution and 
may become highly resistant to change.  
However, in looking at the cultures in different institutions, there are common 
characteristics that permeate all. In the next section, the researcher discusses 
such components. 
4.2.3 Surface components of institutional culture  
Within the levels of culture, there are certain observable components that 
characterise a particular culture. Schermerhorn (2004:132) identifies the following 
components of institutional culture as observable culture, which helps employees 
share and reinforce the uniqueness or own ‘personality’ of an institution. 
 Ceremonies are special events in which institution employees celebrate the 
myths, heroes and symbols of their institution (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; 
Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284). 
 Rites and rituals are the ceremonial activities and meetings, planned or 
spontaneous, meant to communicate specific ideas or accomplish particular 
purposes. These may be meant to celebrate important occasions and 
activities that were achieved by the institution in the past. To reinforce 
cultural norms and values these may be repeated over time (Schermerhorn, 
2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).  
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 Stories represent oral histories and tales of past events that illustrate and 
transmit deeper cultural norms and values. These are told repeatedly among 
employees of an institution about good and bad incidents in the life of the 
institution (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).  
 Myths are fictional stories that help explain activities or events that might 
otherwise be puzzling to the employees of an institution and beyond 
(Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284). In addition, 
Peters and Waterman (1982:83), aver that myths have certain 
characteristics: 
o they have an imperative feature, and they are composed of 
expressions which are defined by intent rather than by content; 
o they reflect an innocent vision, natural reality and ignore the 
complexity of the encountered situations; 
o myths are both tradition and an ending, and are not far from arbitrary 
or false; 
o the relationship between ‘consumers’ and myths is settled in real 
terms; and 
o myths turn historical personalities in archetypes and make 
permanent use of tautological formulas. 
 Heroes are successful people singled out for special attention and they 
embody the values and character of the institution and its culture. Their 
accomplishments are recognised with praise and admiration among 
employees of the institution. These heroes may include founders and role 
models (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284). 
 Symbols offer common meanings or understandings. Cultural symbols 
could be objects, actions or events used to communicate important themes 
of institutional life or they might serve as instruments for delivering a 
message with specific significance within the institution. Philosophies and 
values, ideals, beliefs and shared expectations are transmitted through 
cultural symbols (Schermerhorn, 2004:132). The special use of language 
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and non-verbal expressions help employees of the institution to exchange 
complex ideas and emotional messages (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 
2010:284). 
 Language is a collection of verbal symbols that often reflect the particular 
culture of the institution. There is always common, understandable and 
agreed-upon meaning of the verbal symbols by the employees of an 
institution (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284). 
Although the list of common characteristics is not exhaustive, the above 
characteristics may appear common, but the content of each characteristic differs 
from institution to institution. The different contents could also result in different 
types of institutional culture meant to give a particular ‘personality’. In the next 
section, such types of institutional cultures are discussed. 
4.3 TYPES OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURES 
There are a number of ways in which to classify different types of institutional 
cultures. Developing from the original ideas of Handy (1978:37), four main types 
of institutional cultures, namely power culture, role culture, task culture and 
person culture can be identified. 
4.3.1 Power culture  
Power culture depends on a central power source, with rays of influence from the 
central figure throughout the institution (Mullins, 2008:465). In this type of culture, 
decisions are reached swiftly. Control is exercised from the centre by a selection 
of key individuals. There are few rules, procedures and bureaucracy (Riley, 
2012:1). 
However, when it comes to rewards and sanctions in this cultural type, there is a 
strong bias towards power figures (Linstead et al., 2009:165). Employees who 
show support towards power figures are rewarded. In addition, mistakes and 
misdemeanours are punished if they threaten power figures. However, in this 
cultural type of culture, power figures are immune from punishment if they happen 
to break the rules and regulations (Linstead et al., 2009:165). 
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4.3.2 Role culture  
Role culture is sometimes viewed as a bureaucracy and is known to work by logic 
and rationality (Mullins, 2008:465). Role culture rests on the strength of strong 
institutional ‘pillars’: the functions of specialists, for example in a military context, 
infantry, armour and artillery (Mullins, 2008:465). The work of and interaction 
between the pillars is controlled by procedures and rules, and coordinated by a 
small band of commanders (Riley, 2012:1). Role culture is characterised by the 
fact that rewards are given, among others, for high task performance and project 
leadership. Secondly, focus is on low task performances or differences of expert 
opinions. Thirdly, rejection from the elite group or cancellation of a project is 
possible. Fourthly, problem solving is achieved through technical expertise. 
Finally, senior management in this role culture can be challenged on technical 
grounds (Linstead et al., 2009:165; Riley, 2012:1). 
In a role culture, incentives are offered for adhering to existing rules, regulations 
and procedures (Linstead et al., 2009:165). However, punishment is meted out for 
working outside role requirements or breaking rules, procedures or 
communication patterns. Behaviour in keeping with defined authority, 
relationships, rules, procedures or communication patterns is encouraged (Riley, 
2012:1). This type of culture is dominant in military institutions, albeit not the only 
cultural type. 
4.3.3 Task culture  
Task culture is job-oriented or project-oriented. In terms of structure, task culture 
can be likened to a net, some strands of which are stronger than others, and with 
much of the power and influence at the interstices (Mullins, 2008:465). Task 
culture seeks to bring together the right resources and people, and utilises the 
unifying power of the group (Mullins, 2008:465). Influence is widely spread and is 
based on expert power, rather than on position or personal power (Riley, 2012:1). 
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4.3.4 Person culture 
Person culture refers to situations where the individual is the central focus and 
any structure exists to serve the individuals within it (Mullins, 2008:465). When a 
group of people decide that it is in their own interests to band together to carry out 
their specialisation and share office space, equipment or clerical assistance, then 
the resulting institution would have a person culture (Mullins, 2008:465). 
Examples are groups of air force pilots, anti-air defence specialists and military 
planners. Management hierarchies and control mechanisms are possible only by 
mutual consent. Individuals have almost complete autonomy and any influence 
over them is likely to be on the basis of personal power (Mullins, 2008:465). 
However, Linstead et al. (2009:165) aver that person culture within a group is 
enhanced by acceptance by peers, and any deviation from group norms is 
threatened with expulsion from the group.  
In summary, most large institutions are likely to be something of a mixture of 
different types of cultures, with some examples of each of the four types in 
different areas of the institution. This means, therefore, that types of institutional 
cultures cannot by themselves or in isolation from other types of cultures, be 
utilised to assess an institution as applying a particular type of culture. Finally, it 
needs to be noted that different people enjoy working under different types of 
institutional cultures, and these people are more likely to be happy and satisfied at 
work if their attributes and personalities are consistent with the culture of that part 
of the institution. 
4.4 INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE: STRONG AND WEAK 
The above explications on certain types of organisational cultures supply a basis 
for comparison of strong and weak cultures. The culture of an institution is 
considered strong where the majority of the employees share the same types of 
beliefs and values with regard to the institution where they are working (Shahzad, 
Luqman, Khan & Shabir, 2012:977). This means, therefore, that most employees 
of an institution are fully aligned, and that they believe in and accept the dominant 
core values of the institution. In concert with this definition, McKee (2010:469) 
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avers that in a strong culture, central values and norms are shared and strongly 
upheld by most employees of the institution. Sharing this, Robbins and Judge 
(2013:548) assert that in a strong culture, the core values of the institution are 
both intensely held and widely shared. Also congruent with this definition, Riley 
(201:21) avers that a strong culture is one which is deeply embedded into the 
ways a business or institution does things.  
A strong culture has the benefit of creating an internal climate of high behavioural 
control and further builds cohesiveness, loyalty of members and institutional 
commitment (Stephen, 2005:216–217). Furthermore, Robbins and Judge 
(2013:548), in support of this view, argue that the more employees accept the 
core values and the greater their commitment, the stronger the culture and the 
greater its influence on employees’ behaviour, because the high degree of 
‘sharedness’ and intensity creates a climate of high behavioural control. This 
strong culture, according to McKee (2010:469), empowers employees to perform 
at a high level because they are committed and self-confident. Another benefit of 
a strong culture is that it reduces employee turnover, because a strong culture 
demonstrates high agreement about what the institution represents (Robbins & 
Judge, 2013:549). 
Conversely, a weak culture exists when there is little alignment between the 
employees of the institution and the institutional values and the culture of the 
institution (Addis, 2012:1). In addition, in a weak culture, the core values of the 
organisation are not widely held or intensely felt (Stephen, 2005:216–217). 
Further clarity on this definition comes from McKee (2010:471), who says a weak 
culture is one where the values and norms are shared by a limited number of 
people. Furthermore, a weak culture has little influence on employees’ behaviour 
and the institution needs more detailed policies and regulations to guide the 
behaviour of members (Addis, 2012:1). 
Leaders in an organisation, more especially at a senior level, need to bear in mind 
the importance of the culture in their institutions. The analysis and management of 
the culture in institutions is the duty of the leaders in institutions. 
73 
 
The above explications on institutional culture give a broad understanding that 
can now be used as a framework to discuss further what military culture is. In the 
next section, military culture is discussed within the context of institutional culture. 
4.5 MILITARY CULTURE  
Every nation or society has its own culture, which in turn is composed of sub-
cultures. The constitution of a particular country, for example, is an embodiment of 
what the culture of that society should be. The military culture as a sub-culture of 
society, and therefore it has to reflect and function within the context of the culture 
of the particular society. The military, as a component of society, refers to its own 
culture ‘the military culture’. Therefore, military culture should be seen to be 
functioning within the context of the culture of the broader society, in which the 
military finds itself. It is important to give an etymology with regard to the military, 
comprising of a definition of the elements of military culture and finally military 
leadership. 
4.5.1 Etymology regarding the military 
The military cannot exist without the most important component called the soldier. 
But what is a soldier? Historically, a soldier was a warrior whose justification for 
existence was based on the family’s need at the given time to protect the territory 
and possessions physically (Dunivin, 1997:2). This physical protection was 
against the greedy and envious neighbouring communities or societies. They 
were what today are still known as ‘infantrymen’ (Dunivin, 1997:2). They used 
rudimentary weapons, such as clubs, spears and daggers, javelins, slings and 
short bows (Dunivin, 1997:2. Similar to what the modern armies call ‘reserves’, 
such armies were not full-time soldiers. However, they were called together when 
the need to engage in battles in defence of their belongings arose (Dunivin, 
1997:2). Above all, soldiering was viewed, in the main, as a masculine function 
because combat has generally been defined as a male domain (Keegan 1986:11). 
This perception is still dominant in the military. Hence, there is a need to transform 
and to allow women to be recruited into combat roles. 
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Based on the above explications, the core business or activity of the military (that 
is, its reason for existence) is combat, and soldiers as the HR component of the 
military, are crucial to conduct combat on behalf of their own countries. In 
addition, in order for the military to function well, it must rely on a carefully 
structured hierarchy of leadership. In the next section, the researcher presents a 
discussion of the definition of the term ‘military culture’. 
4.5.2 Military culture defined 
The military as an institution is one of the oldest and traditionally most prominent 
examples of a formal institution that has attracted considerable attention from 
social research scientists (Heng, 2013:6). In an attempt to define the term military, 
Hull (2005:97) asserts that militaries, as institutions, develop cultures in somewhat 
more specific ways than do cultures at large. Military institutions, according to 
Keegan (1986:43–49), are particularly rich in symbolic expressions of institutional 
culture, and Keegan points out that such expressions manifest themselves in 
military uniform, drill, military training, customs, military courtesy, hand salute and 
traditions. Hull (2005:93) defines military culture as a way of understanding why 
an army acts as it does in war. This perspective focuses on practices during war. 
By practice, Hull refers to the actions that result consciously from applied doctrine 
and training. Furthermore, Hall (2012:137) avers that military culture is a 
“symbolic toolkit” of rituals, ceremonies, assumptions and beliefs that grow out of 
and guide a military force. However, Murray (1999:27) avers that the military 
represents the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms of experience and 
intellectual study, that contribute to a common core of understanding of the nature 
of war within military institutions. 
This explanation is confined to a narrow sense of the military in that it only 
focuses on the officer corps. It does not take into consideration the role of the rest 
of the soldiers in exhibiting the common culture of the military institution. 
According to Hull (2005:97), military institutions produce a strong institutional 
culture because they: 
 are led by long-serving professionals (officers); 
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 aspire to be total institutions that control their charges around the clock, 
even off duty; 
 devote tremendous resources to training and indoctrination; 
 consciously inculcate values (of strict obedience, indifference to danger, 
use of violence, for example) at odds with those of the surrounding society; 
and  
 attempt extreme regulation via printed rules, and so forth. 
In striving for a strong military culture, military institutions have to make sure that 
in their strategic planning, the qualities listed above are planned for and executed 
to yield a strong military culture as a result. The qualities listed above can be 
universal in strong cultures. Values, traditions and philosophical underpinnings 
can be seen to be the dominating factors in military cultures, but the contents 
differ from country to country.  
In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the elements of a 
military culture. 
4.5.3 Elements of military culture 
The most formative aspect of a military culture is clearly the general task of 
exercising violence on a mass, systematic scale to satisfy the national interests 
(Hull, 2005:98). This is the reason for the existence of a military institution in 
society. Analysing and discussing what the elements of culture are, will help to 
clarify further what is meant by culture in a military institution. 
As identified by Collins, Ulmer and Jacobs (2000:8), and Heng (2013:6), military 
culture is composed of four elements, namely discipline, professional ethos, 
ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps. These elements are 
discussed below. 
 Discipline, in the military sense, relates to the extent of compliance with 
rules, the acceptance of orders and authority, and the way the institution 
deals with disobedience through overt punishment (Australian Defence 
Force, 2007:2–4). In support of this view, Arvey and Jones (1985:370–371) 
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contend that discipline operates as a direct behavioural control mechanism. 
In addition, Hall (2012:138–139) argues that discipline is an essential 
element meant to alleviate confusion and disintegrative consequences 
during battle by imposing order. This view is enhanced by ritualisation in 
the form of repetitive drills and “provides rules on and when military 
personnel can violate the usual social prohibition on killing and violence” 
(Asch & Hosek, 2004:10). During battles, discipline, among other factors, 
determines success. It is the quality that enables military units to operate 
under extreme combat situations. According to Dorn et al. (2000:8), 
discipline emanates from unit cohesion and the examples set by inspiring 
military leaders. Furthermore, Hall (2012:138–139) asserts that discipline is 
the orderly conduct of military personnel perfected through repetitive drill 
that makes the desired action a matter of habit. The military in effecting its 
time-honoured approach, uses discipline techniques to ensure that its 
forces survive during military operations (Australian Defence Force, 
2007:2–4). 
 Professional ethos centres on the imperative of combat. It is 
characterised by the willingness to engage an armed opposing force, to 
sacrifice yourself, and to display physical and moral courage, and discipline 
(Dorn et al., 2000:8). Supporting this view, Hall (2012:138) defines military 
ethos as “a corporate identity based on expert knowledge of and control 
over means of violence with a commitment that presumes personal 
willingness to kill and accepts the risk of being killed.” This, according to 
Asch and Hosek (2004:10), defines the code of conduct for soldiers. A 
code of conduct helps to guide soldiers in their behaviour, be it internally, 
or towards the members of society, and further instils patriotism (Asch & 
Hosek (2004:10). 
 Ceremony and etiquette refers to salutes, uniforms, ribbons and medals, 
which are meant to acknowledge lawful authority or control, or to mask 
anxiety, affirm solidarity, and celebrate the unit or the individual (Collins, 
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Ulmer & Jacobs, 2000:8). Ceremonies are seen to be catalysts for forging 
a common identity among soldiers, and when performed in public, 
ceremonies have a positive influence in strengthening the essential bond 
between the armed forces and civilian society (Collins, Ulmer & Jacobs, 
2000:8). Sharing this view, Hall (2012:138) argues that the most important 
purpose of military ceremonies is to “connect the burdens of military 
service with larger society … and to convey the full meaning of military 
service to show how central military service is to the life and well-being of 
the country”. 
 Cohesion and esprit de corps can be defined separately as follows: 
Cohesion is the shared sense of sacrifice and identity that glues members of the 
military together with their fellow men and women in arms (Collins, Ulmer & 
Jacobs 2000:8). On the other hand, ‘military cohesion’ refers to the feeling of 
identity and comradeship that soldiers hold for their colleagues in the same 
immediate unit (Collins, Ulmer & Jacobs, 2000:8), while esprit de corps refers to 
the commitment and pride soldiers take in the larger military establishment to 
which their immediate unit belongs (Hall, 2012:139). Both cohesion and esprit de 
corps address the issue of unit morale and willingness of members of the unit to 
execute the unit’s given mission (Asch & Hosek, 2004:10). Cohesion and esprit de 
corps are the results of patriotism and ideological commitments to the state 
(Collins, Ulmer & Jacobs, 2000:8).  
Adding to the differences between military and civilian institutions, Caforio, 
(2006:240–246) identifies three specific aspects that characterise the military. 
 The ‘communal’ character of life in uniform relates to the degree to 
which the control of the institution extends to various aspects and stages of 
personal life, much more than in an ordinary institution.  
 A hierarchical structure, which may even lead to a certain authoritarian 
leadership approach. 
 A chain of command, postulating a downward flow of directives. This 
chain of command simply aims at the execution of orders, hence 
introducing command and control. 
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The difference between military culture and institutional culture in general is 
further argued by Goodale, Abb and Moyer (2012:15–19) to be that: 
 the demands of military life create a unique set of pressures on soldiers 
and their families; 
 military life offers a sense of community and camaraderie with defined rules 
and expectations; 
 soldiers and their families share a unique bond, professional ethic, ethos, 
and value system; 
 military culture fosters a warrior ethos that rewards physical and emotional 
prowess; 
 the military defends the constitution; 
 military leaders at all levels are given widespread authority over their 
soldiers’ personal affairs and are held personally responsible to resolve any 
issues that have the potential to affect the performance of their duties; and 
 military families endure many of the same restrictions as their military 
partners.  
  
These explications of the elements of military culture are clear evidence of the 
uniqueness of a military culture, compared to other institutional cultures. Although 
the elements, discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, cohesion 
and esprit de corps can be used to analyse culture in other institutions, it is worth 
noting the context within which they are used. However, the difference between a 
military culture and an institutional culture in general lies in the clear distinguishing 
features, which are deliberately perpetuated to preserve military culture. These 
elements and characteristics should be in agreement with the notion of military 
leadership, and military leadership styles applied in the context of a particular 
situation.  
4.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, theoretical positioning of the basic nature of institutional culture, 
types of institutional cultures, strong and weak institutional cultures, and military 
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culture were discussed. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn on the basis of the 
above discussions. 
In discussing the nature of institutional cultures, various definitions of ‘culture’ 
were provided. It was found that values and norms are regarded as the 
cornerstones for observable and actual behaviour in institutions. The practical 
behaviour of members of an institution is therefore measured against the 
acceptable norms and values of that particular institution. In addition, culture is 
found to be composed of four levels, which help to identify and analyse the culture 
of an institution. Furthermore, such levels of culture can also show the intensity or 
the strength of each level in an intuition. 
However, in looking at the cultures in different institutions, there are common 
characteristics that permeate all, but the content of each characteristic differs from 
institution to institution. The different contents can also result in different types of 
institutional culture meant to give a unique ‘personality’ to the institution.  
Also in this chapter, different types of culture, such as power, role, task and 
person culture were discussed. Interesting to note is that most institutions are 
likely to be something of a mixture of different types of culture with some 
examples given for each of the four types in different areas of the institution. This 
means, therefore, that types of institutional culture cannot be singled out or stand 
in isolation from other types of cultures.  
In addition, military culture was discussed, and found to be unique from the 
cultures of other institutions. To expound on this, military culture is seen to be 
universal internationally, and what makes the difference between countries is the 
societal culture of that particular country. In most countries, such societal culture 
is enshrined in the constitution of the country. This means, therefore, that values, 
traditions and philosophical underpinnings can be seen to be the dominating 
factors in military cultures, but the contents is specific to the country.  
Also noted was the fact that elements of military culture show the uniqueness of 
military culture in terms of other institutional cultures. The elements, such as 
discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de 
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corps, can be used to analyse culture in institutions within the context where such 
institutions are operating. Furthermore, the characteristics, such as the communal 
character of life in uniform, the hierarchical structure and the chain of command, 
are unique to the military and can be used in tandem with the elements of culture 
to analyse culture in military institutions. 
In the next chapter, the researcher gives a historical perspective on the evolution 
of the South African military culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CULTURE:  
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4, the theoretical positioning of the nature of institutional culture, types 
of institutional culture, strong and weak institutional cultures and military culture 
were discussed. 
In this chapter, the researcher gives a historical perspective of the evolution of the 
South African military culture. In doing so, the researcher gives a summary of:  
 the South African military prior to 1912;  
 the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and the political context;  
 a historical overview of the UDF (1912–1947);  
 the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the period 1948 until 1994; 
and 
 the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from 1994 until 2014, 
including:  
o the political prelude to the 1994 military integration;  
o the integration of armed forces and their military cultures; and  
o a discussion of the military culture from 1994 to 2014. 
To be able to analyse the current manifestation of the military culture prevailing in 
the SANDF, it is imperative to examine the evolution of the South African military. 
To unravel the complex evolution of the military culture in South Africa between 
1910 and 2014, it is necessary to look at three important epoch-making events in 
the history of the armed forces in South Africa. The first of these events took place 
in 1912, when the colonial forces of the four colonies comprising South Africa 
came together to form the Union Defence Force (UDF) of the new Union of South 
Africa, which was created in 1910.  
The second event followed the 1948 election, which heralded the accession to 
power of the National Party (NP) and the transformation of UDF into the South 
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African Defence Force (SADF). The third event followed the first, broad-based, 
democratic elections in 1994, which led to the formation of the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) (Vreÿ, Esterhuyse & Mandrup, 2013:181–182). 
Thus, the crux of this chapter is to reflect the evolution of military culture in South 
Africa during the different historical periods under different statutory governments. 
In this study, the analysis of the military cultures of the statutory forces after the 
integration of the forces was done to look at the influence that the government in 
power has on shaping the military culture. 
5.2 A COMPENDIUM OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRIOR TO 1912 
A variety of military institutions of varying sizes, capabilities and traditions and 
military cultures existed within the borders of what is now known as Republic of 
South Africa (Williams, 2000:1).  
In this section, the researcher endeavours to give a synopsis of the experiences 
of wars, albeit not exhaustively, of land dispossession by European settlers and of 
resistance by indigenous African people. 
5.2.1  The Portuguese and Dutch against the Khoikhoi and San  
The first chapter in the chronicles of the military history of South Africa was the 
encounter in 1510 between Dom Francisco d’Almeida and his men, and the 
Khoina clan of the Cape (Steenkamp, 2012:1-2). D’Almeida from Portugal landed 
with about 150 men who were well armed with swords, lances and crossbows 
(Steenkamp, 2012:3). The local clan, the Khoina, had no real weapons except 
fire-hardened spears and poisoned arrows. The Portuguese were defeated by the 
Khoina and D’Almeida himself was killed, as well as more than 50 of his men. 
Lessons learnt out of this clash have drawn the interest of military historians 
(Steenkamp, 2012:1–4). 
Subsequent to this clash there were wars of resistance that were fought by the 
Khoikhoi against the Dutch during 1657 and 1673, and an ongoing ten-year 
guerrilla campaign led by Chief Gonnema before he was finally driven into the 
mountains (Williams, 2006:10). In addition, the San also offered fierce resistance 
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from the 1770s on the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony when the 
Trekboers encroached on their land (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:73). The battles of 
1770 to 1810 between burghers and the San were merciless (Giliomee & 
Mbenga, 2008:73). However, all those wars ended, ultimately, in the defeat of the 
Khoikhoi and the San people (Williams, 2006:10). 
5.2.2  The Boers and British Settlers against the amaXhosa 
The period between 1799 and 1836 was characterised by the three so-called 
frontier wars between the amaXhosa and the frontier Boers, followed by the 
Fourth War (1811–1812), the Fifth War (1819–1820). The Sixth War took place 
from 1834 to 1835 and was known to the amaXhosa as Maqoma’s War or the 
War of Hintsa (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:81). On the amaXhosa side, this war 
was led by Chief Maqoma and Chief Tyhali who were angry about the loss of their 
land and the ongoing raids conducted against them by the colonial forces 
(Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:81). The Seventh War followed in 1846 and ended in 
1847, while the Eighth War raged from 1850–1851 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 
2008:81). The so-called Eighth Frontier War or the War of Mlanjeni broke out in 
December 1850 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:81). Common to all these wars of 
resistance by amaXhosa chiefs was discontent concerning their land losses. Chief 
Maqoma (1798–1873) was a renowned military leader of the nineteenth century 
frontier wars (Stapleton, 1994:9). His guerrilla campaign in the mountains, forests 
and the valleys of the Waterkloof were successful and through his ingenuity, he 
managed to outmanoeuvre and destroy the British forces (Stapleton, 1994:10). 
Regarded as intelligent and brave, Chief Maqoma, the Rharhabe chief was a 
capable guerrilla leader who is still regarded as the greatest fighting general ever 
produced by the amaXhosa. He was banished to Robben Island in 1857 and died 
there in 1873 (Uys, 1992:146). 
Concomitant with these wars of resistance against the Boers and British was the 
movement of many Dutch Boers further inland to areas to the northwest and 
northeast of the Cape areas in 1835. This was due to Dutch Boers being indignant 
about the possibility of being swallowed up by the British community as second-
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class citizens. These Dutch Boers (later known as Afrikaners or Voortrekkers) 
conquered the land of the indigenous blacks and established autonomous Boer 
Republics (Jamison, 2004:76). 
5.2.3 The Boers and British Settlers against Zulus 
The first military encounter between the British and the amaZulu was in 1879 
when Cetshwayo kaMpande (1826–1884) was king of the Zulu kingdom (1872 to 
1879). The British gave Cetshwayo an unreasonably short ultimatum to relinquish 
power and to dissolve his army (Guy, 1975:130). This he resisted vehemently. 
This was a sequel to the War of Isandlwana in 1879, which was the first major 
encounter in the Anglo–Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu 
kingdom (Guy 1975:132). The battle was a crushing victory for the Zulus and a 
humiliating defeat of the British in their invasion of kwaZulu territory. The defeat 
was humiliating in the sense that the British Army was technologically superior to 
the indigenous Zulu force, but still lost (Hasting, 2014:1). Another encounter 
between the British and the amaZulu was the Bambatha Rebellion, which was a 
Zulu revolt against British colonisation and the introduction of taxation in Natal, 
South Africa, in 1906 (Thompson, 2004:43). The revolt was led by Bambatha who 
was killed and beheaded during the battle (Hasting, 2014:1).  
This means that the defeat of the Khoikhoi, San, amaXhosa, Zulus and the rest of 
the South African indigenous people by the British meant that all these groups 
were landless and that they had to endure subjugation to the British rule for years. 
This started a new chapter in African military history in that the foreign militaries 
dominated in the conquered territories and the indigenous militaries were 
destroyed. 
Furthermore, the wars of resistance fought prior to 1912 were planned and 
executed meticulously by all who were involved, be they Khoikhoi, San, 
amaXhosa, Zulus, amaNdebele and other African leaders in defence of their land 
and the Boers and British forces on the other side. The experience and strategic 
planning capability of the African groups were recorded less in the military history 
of South Africa and as a result much of the experience and military strategies 
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have been lost. During the integration of forces for the creation of the UDF the 
wealth of experience of the black commanders was ignored because they were 
not integrated into the UDF. The defeated and subjugated black military 
commanders and leaders were never part of the integration process of the armed 
forces. 
In the next subsection, the researcher provides a synopsis of the war between the 
British and the Boers. 
5.2.4 Anglo-Boer War: 1899–1902  
According to Giliomee and Mbenga (2008:206–223), the Anglo-Boer War of 
1899–1902, was provoked by British imperial aggression and its expansionist 
policies, which were coupled with heavy taxation on the Boers without the Boers 
enjoying political rights. This Boer War was an anti-colonial struggle based on the 
need of the Boer Republics for independence to govern themselves as modern 
states and legal sovereign entities and to manage their political affairs according 
to their own constitutional and political requirements (Williams, 2006:6). 
Significant about this war was that it marked the end of an arduous and protracted 
process of British conquest of South African societies, both black and white 
(Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:206–223). 
In the next section, the researcher reflects on the different governments and their 
relationships with the UDF, SADF and SANDF. Particular focus is on the influence 
of the government on shaping the military culture. 
5.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
MILITARY: 1912–2014 
The universal goal of colonialism, as practised by the European colonisers in 
Africa, was to extract economic benefits for their own countries. The British, 
among others, wanted to exploit resources and create an environment that would 
be conducive to achieving profitability for its own settler communities (Fenwick, 
2009:2). Furthermore, the British imposed direct or indirect rule, limiting rights of 
the African peoples, and established a complementary economy based on 
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exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. Concomitant with this 
was the introduction of the European culture and enforced teaching of their own 
history (Fenwick, 2009:3–4). 
To understand the influence of British traditions in the military system one needs 
to understand the British cultural dominance in South Africa. English economic 
dominance led to British cultural dominance among the white, coloured and 
African elite (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190). In 1865, the government of the 
Cape Colony decided that all future instruction in government schools had to be 
given in English (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190). The few top schools attended 
by children of the white elite became bastions of the British cultural influence 
(Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190). Almost all education for coloureds and blacks 
were in the hands of churches and missionary stations. In amaXhosa areas, there 
were several mission stations spreading British culture, the gospel of work and 
individual respectability (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190–191). By 1887, more than 
2 000 blacks had received a missionary education in Lovedale alone (Giliomee & 
Mbenga, 2008:190–191). Furthermore, colonisation of South Africa since 1652 
was effected through a litany of bloody and violent military actions (Fokkens, 
2006:iii). It was the Boer commandos and the British regiments and volunteer 
regiments that were directly involved in wars of dispossession of land of the 
indigenous black population (Fokkens, 2006:iii).  
In the next section, the researcher reports on the establishment of the UDF in 
1912 and its relationship with the Union Government. 
5.3.1 Union Defence Force: 1912–1947 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Britain had the ambition to dominate 
southern and central Africa (Ashton, 2008:13). Such British supremacy in South 
Africa entailed merging the four provinces into one united or federated state, 
which would be more advantageous to Britain and white South Africans in case of 
war, than four separately governed colonies. This idea was exacerbated by race 
relations after 1905, which made many whites in South Africa support the 
unification of four colonies into one (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:229). As a 
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consequence, the South African Act was passed and endorsed by the British 
parliament on 20 September 1909 with the intention to merge the four colonies of 
the Cape, Natal, Orange River colony and Transvaal into the Union of South 
Africa, a dominion within the British Commonwealth (Alvarez-Rivera, 2014:1). 
Finally, the South African Act, a piece of foreign legislation, created an artificial 
macro-state in Southern Africa, called the Union of South Africa. The Union of 
South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910 with the political union of the four 
colonies (Ashton, 2008:13). 
This South African Act cobbled together an artificial mega-state structure, which 
brought diverse peoples together (Southall, 2014:2). This guaranteed the triumph 
of British capital and granted sovereignty to the white minority at the expense of 
indigenous black majority (Southall, 2014:2). However, the exclusion of most 
blacks from political arrangements, such as franchise rights, raised the mass-
based urban resistance to racial segregation (Williams, 2006:7). Blacks felt bitter 
and betrayed by their exclusion from their political rights and formed the African 
Native National Congress (ANNC), the forerunner of the African National 
Congress (ANC) (Gillings, 2008:1). Furthermore, the Union of South Africa had a 
constitution just like any statutory government. However, this constitution had 
distinct features in that it did not have a Bill of Rights, probably due to the 
following factors as identified by Nthai (1998:148): 
 the constitutional process was influenced by the British constitutional 
system; and 
 the main role-players, such as Smuts and Merriman, were in favour of the 
British system, which was based on the sovereignty of Parliament. 
A further development was the establishment of a powerful South African Defence 
Force, which was necessitated by the Bhambhatha Rebellion of 1906. This 
rebellion was seen as the largest and most violent manifestation of racial conflict 
since the Anglo–Zulu War of 1879 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:229). Finally, the 
UDF was created in 1912, sanctioned by the Defence Act of 1912, following the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 (Stott, 2002:4). The 
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philosophical basis of the Defence Act of 1912 hinged on the principle of personal 
service, that is, the defence of the Union was the responsibility of every individual 
citizen (Stott, 2002:4). However, it is ironical that the Act in its provision 
pronounced that every male European citizen between the ages of 16 and 17 
years was required to undergo military training, and persons of non-European 
origin were not liable to render personal military service (Dorning, 1987:2). This 
was a clear exclusion of the indigenous people of South Africa. Their wealth of 
experience amassed in fighting wars of resistance was ignored. 
Of interest was also the fact that the UDF was built on a different military tradition. 
The white soldiers who were integrated into the UDF were divided along English 
and Afrikaner military traditions and as such were recognised and catered for in 
the integrated UDF. An example of this was that whilst part of the same army, the 
majority of Afrikaans-speaking soldiers from the platteland (the countryside) were 
only allowed to serve in mounted units, and the English-speaking town dwellers in 
the infantry (Mills & Wood, 1993:1). The appointment of the high command of the 
UDF was a conundrum that even resulted in the whole force being placed under a 
divided command to protect sectarian interests (Van der Waag, 2008:187). The 
two most important positions were filled by Brigadier-General HT Lukin, the former 
commander of the Cape Colonial Forces, and the republican former Boer general, 
CF Beyers. These two men were then expected to create an atmosphere in the 
UDF that was congenial to both English- and Afrikaans-speaking white South 
Africans. Many high-ranking officers provided institutionally for their clients and 
political followers. For example, General Beyers purged the volunteer regiments 
of the Citizen Force of their more ‘British’ officers. As a consequence, the 
establishment of these institutional fiefdoms and biases stifled institutional 
development and denied the UDF an opportunity to employ officers with the 
appropriate military training and education (Van der Waag, 2008:187). 
Furthermore, the first leadership of the UDF was composed of South Africans who 
enjoyed a multi-layered identity, with transnational linkages. This leadership was a 
mixture of British and South African generals. A number of colonial-born South 
Africans attained general or flag rank in the British armed forces, and served as 
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general officers of the British Armed Forces (Dix-Peek, 2007:1). Some of the 
officers attended courses in Britain between the two world wars (Van der Waag, 
2008:189). It is not surprising, therefore, that this cross-pollination had a profound 
influence on the military culture of the UDF. That is, the military procedures and 
even training and doctrine were influenced by the British (Van der Waag, 
2008:189). 
Another example is that of the Israelites, who were a religious group that squatted 
at Ntabelanga in Queenstown, and who created a tabernacle and built some huts 
without registering themselves and paying taxes (Fokkens, 2006:iii). Using the 
military and the police, the Smuts government crushed this group, killed 180 
people and wounded 100 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:247). Concomitant with 
these military actions was the suppression by the government of the militant 
Afrikaner uprisings during the First World War and the Second World War 
(Fokkens, 2006:iii). Evident in this historical background of the UDF is the fact that 
the military was used by the government to quell any political dissent against the 
state, and working class struggles waged against the employers, violently. In 
addition, the military culture dominant during the existence of the UDF was that of 
the British. The motivating factors, among others, were that the British were the 
dominant component in the UDF, they had trained most of the senior officers, and 
this translated into the new military culture being British.  
Furthermore, in terms of the relationship between the military and the 
government, the military was supposed to be subordinate to civil authority. 
However, this relationship was to be guarded against abuse by the civil authority. 
In examining this relationship between the UDF and Union of South African 
government, it was evident that the UDF was used by the government in the 
suppression of strikes and uprisings against the Union of South Africa.  
In the next section, the researcher focuses on the relationship between the 
military and the state during the period from 1948 until 1993.  
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5.3.2 South African Defence Force (SADF): 1948–1993 
In 1948, the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party and its allies came to power as the 
majority party during the whites-only elections and implemented its racially based 
policy of separate development (apartheid). In other words, apartheid began as 
the governmental system after the elections of 1948 (Jamison, 2004:75). The civil 
service, including the military, underwent cultural change through adoption of 
Afrikanerisation of government institutions. Concerning the military, transformation 
took another turn during this new dispensation. The newly appointed Minister of 
Defence, FC Erasmus, demonstrated from the onset his commitment to transform 
the military from a British to an Afrikaner military culture. In pursuance of this 
ideal, he introduced what he called the “national” characteristics of the defence 
force (Jamison, 2004:75).  
The then Minister of Defence introduced a programme of renaming the existing 
Active Citizen Force (ACF) regiments after Nationalist heroes, which begun in the 
early 1950s. This was meant to dispose the UDF of their colonial origins and 
emblematic connections with British regiments. To kick-start this process, in 1951, 
the 2nd Battalion of the Botha regiment, named after the Union’s first premier, 
became Regiment Christiaan Beyers (Van der Waag, 2008:190–191). Another 
example was the re-naming of the Die Middellandse Regiment, after Gideon 
Scheepers. Die Regiment Gideon Scheepers was in the 1960s renamed by the 
Minister of Defence, JJ Fouche, as Regiment Groot Karoo (Boulter, 1997:95). 
In addition, the spirit of the commando was revived as they were historically 
viewed as the custodians of traditions and history of Afrikanerdom. In addition, the 
armed forces now had two tasks identified. The first of these was to prevent 
internal unrest and, where this arose, to protect people and property. Lastly, the 
armed forces were to guard against external attacks (Van der Waag, 2008:190–
191). 
Furthermore, due to difficulties stemming from recruiting, there were insufficient 
volunteers to swell the ranks of the ACF in the post-war period and this led to the 
introduction of the ballot system of conscription for young white male South 
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Africans in 1953. This decision was based on the 1912 Defence Act whose 
implementation was delayed (Dorning, 1987:16). 
At the political level, two years after the Congress of the People in 1955, the 
Congress Movement organised a general strike on the eve of the parliamentary 
elections, and the military was placed on alert (Bamber, 2001:1). This was an 
indication that, if the police failed to suppress resistance, the military was ready to 
take action against the civil society. Moreover, the new Defence Act was 
introduced and the UDF was renamed the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
(Bamber, 2001:1). This is the same Defence Act, albeit amended, that is still in 
use in the current SANDF. 
To sum up, the decade of the 1950s marked a further polarisation of the South 
African society along racial lines. The segregation policies of the National Party 
were given meaning by getting the police and the military to enforce and defend 
these policies. Any dissentions or challenges to these policies were met with 
brutal force. The decade of the 1950s displayed all the ingredients of a climacteric 
eruption in South Africa. However, the political situation hardened the attitudes of 
the black majority and resorting to an armed struggle against the government was 
seen as the only justified option. 
Testimony to the fact that the military was undergoing transformational changes 
since the mid-1950s and that it was used as the tool to suppress opposition to 
government is borne out in a statement made by the then Minister of Defence JJ 
Fouche on 21 March 1960, the day on which 69 Africans were killed by police in 
the Sharpeville massacre (Fouche, 1960, cited in Cawthra, 1986:12–13): 
It is the defence policy of the Union first of all to concentrate its defence organisations 
upon the implementation of internal security tasks. The task of the Army and the Air 
Force is to take action for internal security as soon as disturbances have reached a 
degree where the police are unable to control them. The reorganisation which was 
started some years ago, has been completed and the changes are starting to take 
shape. Greater mobility, armoured protection and increased striking power in the form 
of Saracens have been given to twelve of the infantry units at strategic places.  
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This statement reflects the role of the military as prescribed by the government in 
that there was a shift from strategic preparation of forces against foreign 
aggression to internal security tasks. The desperation shown is that the strategic 
deployment of the military internally was seen to be the only solution to quell 
internal unrest.  
In addition, in 1960, as the result of a referendum, the government declared South 
Africa a republic, which meant a complete break from colonial control of the British 
(Van der Waag, 2008:191). Concomitantly, black consciousness and Pan-
Africanism as an ideology grew side by side among the black people, partly in 
response to the consolidation of Afrikaner political and military power (Van der 
Waag, 2008:192). This period of the 1960s also witnessed the banning of political 
parties, such as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African National 
Congress (ANC). This brought about the birth of the military wings of these 
liberation movements (Stott, 2002:4). The armed military wings of liberation 
movements using their liberated neighbouring countries as springboards to launch 
their attacks, fought an interconnected series of wars in Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), in the then Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola, and in 
the northern part of the territory of South West Africa (now Namibia), combined 
with an armed struggle against South Africa itself (Van der Waag, 2008:191–192). 
To counter this situation, the South African government provided military support 
to white colonial governments of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Mozambique and 
Angola. However, the situation changed after the liberation of these countries. 
The SADF was forced to find ways to defend the country, and hence members of 
the SADF were regularly engaged in a number of “low intensity” military 
deployments, incursions and cross-border raids against MK and frontline states 
(Stott, 2002:4). For example, during the 1970s and 1980s, the SADF operated 
extensively in Angola and Namibia where they fought against the South West 
African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), in support of the Movement for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), and against the Armed Forces of Angola 
(FAPLA), which were supported by Cuban and Soviet Union forces (Le Roux, 
2005:243). The counter-insurgency forces were operating internally against the 
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liberation movement led by the ANC and its armed wing umKhonto weSizwe (MK) 
(Le Roux, 2005:243). 
To sum up, the beginning of the 1960s saw a shift in how the South African 
government was dealing with its political opponents. The muzzling of political 
parties that were fighting against the government forced political organisations to 
find alternative ways of struggle. A turning point was the brutal suppression and 
killing of protesters. The birth of military wings like the ANC’s umKhonto weSizwe 
and PAC’s Azanian People’s Liberation Army heightened the military involvement 
in fighting political opponents. The heavy-handed approach to fighting political 
opponents was justified by what was perceived by the government as the “total 
onslaught” pursued by the communist bloc (O’Malley, 1986:1). As a result, a 
counterstrategy called ‘total strategy’ was conceived and launched by the South 
African government. 
In the next section, the researcher provides a discussion of total strategy as a 
counterstrategy to the perceived total onslaught strategy, and the role played by 
the South African Defence Force. 
5.3.2.1 Total strategy and the role of the SADF 
As a result of the precarious situation in which South Africa found herself in 1979, 
a situational analysis was made (Geldenhys, 1981:3). According to the then 
Minister of Defence P.W. Botha, the Republic of South Africa was a target for 
international communism and had been singled out as a special target for the by-
product of their ideologies which were seen as black radicalism, exaggerated 
individual freedom, one man one vote, and a host of other slogans employed 
against the country (Geldenhys, 1981:3). 
In 1979, in pursuit of this total strategy, the security agency chiefs of South Africa, 
such as senior police, defence force and intelligence officers, convened in the 
Western Cape for the formulation and implementation of a plan, and to decide 
who would take responsibility for the security of specific geographic areas 
(O’Malley, 1986:1). The outcome of this conference of security chiefs was the 
allocation of specific tasks, areas of responsibility defined and a broad outline 
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given of the tactics to be employed, and the SADF was chosen as the primary 
vehicle for the destabilisation of those neighbouring countries which were not 
friendly to apartheid South Africa. Both the South African Police (SAP) and the 
SADF would be the leading agencies for counter-revolutionary efforts supported 
by the National Intelligence Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs playing 
the supporting roles (Sweegers, 1996:163). 
In the next section, the researcher discusses the structural arrangements for and 
roles in the total strategy. 
5.3.2.2 The State Security Council (SSC) and the National Security 
Management System (NSMS) 
The ‘total strategy’ also involved the development of an intricate politico-security 
infrastructure that was to stretch from the highest echelons of government down 
to remote rural communities (Ellis, 2000:62). Structurally, at the apex of the total 
strategy was the State Security Council (SSC) whose role was elevated to that of 
central policy-making function (Ellis, 2000:62). This SSC, according to Swilling 
and Phillips (1989:143), was seen as a highly centralised bureaucratic cum 
military structure authorised to coordinate and oversee the implementation of 
both security and political policies, and also having responsibility for the strategy 
formulation. This bureaucracy was structured in what was known as the National 
Security Management System (NSMS) with a network of Joint Management 
Centres (JMCs) as its operational arm. The Secretariat of the SSC was 
composed of members of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the SADF 
(Sweegers, 1996:166). In other words, the NSMS provided the infrastructure for 
the implementation of ‘total strategy’, encompassing both “hard war” methods 
that are meant for “eliminating revolutionaries” and “maintaining law and order”, 
and a “soft war programme” designed to win black community support through 
socio-economic upgrading schemes (Swilling & Phillips, 1989:145). 
Furthermore, the NSMS and the Inter-departmental Committee on Security were 
meant to provide the SSC with the necessary national security profile in order to 
take decisions at both national and local levels (Coleman, 1998:21).  
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The SSC, therefore, functioned as the national command centre of the NSMS, 
whose function was to evaluate current intelligence, formulate policy, and direct a 
nation-wide organisational network dedicated to implementing the total strategy in 
terms of security measures, while concomitantly endeavouring to “winning the 
hearts and minds” of the black communities by pseudo socio-economic upgrading 
(Coleman, 1998:21).  
The SADF was also used by the government domestic security arrangements, 
specifically in the townships (Stott, 2002:15). In addition, the SADF was central in 
influencing the foreign relations of the country, particularly in neighbouring states, 
and was increasingly involved in domestic security arrangements, in terms of 
“traditional” law and order responsibilities, and also in other arenas as diverse as 
education, labour and health (Stott, 2002:15). In 1985 alone, for example, some 
35 500 troops were used in the townships to evict rent defaulters, occupy 
classrooms, identify the injured seeking treatment in health clinics, break up 
strikes and murder by “death squads”, as well as making prominent anti-apartheid 
activists disappear (Stott, 2002:15). 
However, Cock (1990:88) avers that the degree to which the SADF and the SAP 
were linked during this period, in suppressing black resistance, was an important 
indicator both of the level of violent conflict and the role of the SADF within that 
conflict. 
Subsequently, in November 1989, the new South African government under 
President De Klerk eventually announced the abolishment of the NSMS and its 
replacement by the National Coordinating Mechanism, which was under civilian 
control (Magubane, 2006:91). 
Stemming from the above discussions, it would seem that the ushering in of the 
total strategy gave more freedom of action to the SADF to run the programmes of 
the apartheid government. The danger of this was that limitations were placed on 
politicians to say or decide about anything because of fear of the military. Also 
giving more powers to the military was tantamount to a silent coup by the military 
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with no accountability to civil authority. This can be summed up to mean that the 
military around this period lacked professionalism as part of a military culture. 
In the following section, the researcher discusses the role of the homeland 
governments in South Africa during the apartheid era. 
5.3.3 THE ROLE OF THE TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA, CISKEI AND 
VENDA (TBVC) 
The South African government developed the concept of the independent ‘black 
homelands’ which were identified and demarcated as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). By 1984, these homelands were granted 
‘independence’, but were not recognised by the international community except by 
South Africa itself, and were established with the same doctrine as the SADF to 
police the activities of the homeland (Rupiya, 2005:258). Furthermore, these 
TBVC defence forces were seen to be nominally independent, albeit effectively 
under SADF control (Stott, 2002:4). This means, therefore, that they were little 
more than an extension of the SADF, and were responsible for regime security in 
their respective homelands (Le Roux, 2005:245). 
Common to all these homelands is that they were marred by military coups by 
their own armies (Williams, 2000:11). For example, in 1987, the Transkei Defence 
Force (TDF) officers ousted the Stella Sigcau administration and expelled the 
former Rhodesian officers who dominated the TDF. These events ushered in an 
intriguing period in the history of the Transkei in the Eastern Cape. The other 
homelands followed suit, which resulted in two coups d’état by both the Ciskei and 
Venda defence forces against their respective administrations and an abortive 
coup by the Bophuthatswana Defence Force against the Mangope administration 
(Williams, 2000:11). 
Therefore, the fact that all TBVC defence forces were directly involved in politics 
and military coups was a cause for concern with respect to the professionalism of 
the military. The security of people was of little concern. Rather, regime protection 
was the main reason for the existence of these homeland defence forces. There 
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was, therefore, no military culture that was distinct from the maternal culture of the 
SADF. 
In the next section the researcher presents a discussion of the emergence of 
liberation forces and their identity in terms of a military culture. 
 
5.3.4 EMERGENCE OF LIBERATION FORCES: UMKHONTO WESIZWE 
(MK) AND THE AZANIAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (APLA) 
This section presents the history of the military wing of the ANC, umKhonto 
weSizwe (MK) and the military wing of the PAC, the Azanian People’s Liberation 
Army (APLA). Various factors influenced the inception of the armed struggle in 
South Africa. The most significant catalysts for the establishment of the armed 
struggle were, first, the general failure of the ANC-directed campaigns of the 
1950s to persuade the government to pay heed to political aspirations of black 
people, and secondly, the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960, which was 
another testimony to the heavy-handed response of the state to peaceful 
demonstrations, and lastly, the banning of political opposition (Ellis, 2011:3). This, 
and the radical nature of the policy of apartheid of the National Party more 
generally, caused some opponents of the government to wonder whether 
organised violence may not emerge as a real option within the foreseeable future 
(Ellis, 2011:4). 
In the next subsections the researcher gives a synopsis of MK and APLA. 
5.3.4.1 A synoptic overview of the history of umKhonto weSizwe (MK) 
On 16 December 1961, MK was pronounced the armed wing of the ANC. This 
pronouncement was accompanied by a series of explosions, which rocked all 
major cities on 16 December 1961 (Williams, 2000:2). The creation of MK 
represented the creation of a modern guerrilla army with its mission being the 
pursuit of a guerrilla war against the armed forces of the state in support of the 
political programme of the ANC (Williams, 2000:2). However, a pamphlet issued 
98 
 
by the command of MK (Legassik, 2002:7; Maharaj, 2008:7) emphasised the 
objective at the time and openness to negotiate change in the following statement: 
We of UmKhonto weSizwe have always sought – as the liberation movement has 
sought – to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We do so still. We 
hope – even at this late hour – that our first actions will awaken everyone to a 
realisation of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We 
hope that we will bring the government and its supporters to their senses before it is 
too late, so that both the government and its policies can be changed before matters 
reach the desperate state of civil war. 
In addition, the founding manifesto that was published on the same day as the 
launch of MK on 16 December 1961 echoed its reasons for existence and stated 
their subordination to the national liberation movement as lead by the ANC 
(1961:1): 
UmKhonto weSizwe will carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by 
methods, which are necessary to complement the actions of the established national 
liberation organizations. Umkhonto weSizwe fully supports the national liberation 
movement and calls on members, jointly and individually to place themselves under 
the overall political guidance of the movement. 
Furthermore, MK had a military code to guide its members, and this code stated 
that MK was the army of volunteers drawn from the revolutionary sections of the 
people. In addition, the code stipulated that by joining MK, combatants were 
committing themselves to the solemn and noble duty of serving the suffering and 
dispossessed people in the struggle that will continue until victory or death (ANC, 
1985:1). 
Most MK cadres received training in the Soviet Union during the 1960s and early 
1970s. This means that their military culture was influenced by Soviet military 
practices and traditions, such as drill, instruction, officer training and weapons 
(Williams, 2000:3). Added to this military culture influence, were classic guerrilla 
army traditions, such as minimum rank structure and an emphasis on self-
sufficiency, innovation and mission-oriented command once deployed (Williams, 
2000:3). 
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Williams (2001:4) identifies three key cultural features that characterised the birth 
of the new guerrilla army, MK. 
 First, the activities of MK were situated solidly within the tradition of 
subservience to the political and civil authority of the ANC. MK was from its 
nascent stages the instrument of the ANC, and its military strategy was 
drawn from the political policy and strategy of the ANC. This was amplified 
in the Morogoro document (Williams, 2000:3), where the conference also 
recognised the primacy of the political leadership as unchallenged and 
supreme and that all revolutionary formations and levels were to be 
subordinated to the political leadership. 
 Secondly, a strong element of moral restraint characterised the initial MK 
campaigns. This restraint was based, among others, on the realisation that 
the population had to be politically and psychologically prepared to support 
an armed struggle. 
 Lastly, the distinguishing feature of MK was its non-racial character drawn 
from the ideology of non-racialism of the ANC. This was reflected in the 
multi-racial and multi-ethnic nature of the hierarchy of the MK echelons and 
its rank-and-file membership. Furthermore, unparalleled with any other 
military formation at the time, MK displayed itself as the microcosm of the 
diverse population of South Africa in both its institutional make-up and in its 
culture and traditions. 
However, it needs to be noted that MK had political education, and this was 
formalised in April 1969 at Morogoro in Tanzania at a conference under the 
auspices of the ANC (Ngculu, 2011:242). The need to emphasise the political 
education of its members was born out of the realisation that more members 
joining the ANC, and in particular its military wing MK, were ill equipped with the 
politics of the ANC as an organisation (Ngculu, 2011:242).  
To sum up, it needs to be noted that subservience to the political leadership of the 
ANC was a building block for future civil–military relations in South Africa after 
1994. Lastly, reflected on MK, was its non-racial character drawn from the  
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ideology of non-racialism of the ANC. In a way, this characterised the future 
diverse South African society. 
In the next sub-section, the researcher presents a historical overview of the 
Azanian People’s Liberation Army. 
5.3.4.2 Historical overview of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
(APLA) 
The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed in 1959 with its long-term goal 
reflected in the phrase ‘Africa for Africans’ (kaPlaatjie, 2006:704). In a nutshell, 
this slogan epitomised the political goal of the PAC of a government ‘of the 
Africans by the Africans’. The ideal South Africa, as the PAC conceived it, would 
be one where there was no guarantee of minority rights and a guarantee of 
individual liberties was seen as the highest guarantee necessary (kaPlaatjie, 
2006:705). 
The  repressive action of the government against peaceful Sharpeville 
demonstrations and killings in 1960 also influenced the PAC to adopt a militant 
stance of resistance and this culminated in the establishment of Poqo, a 
paramilitary wing of the PAC in 1960 (Le Roux, 2005:248). Poqo was organised 
into cells as an underground paramilitary movement, operating within South Africa 
after the banning of the PAC whose raison d’être was to hit back at the regime. As 
from 1962, Poqo went through a process of metamorphosis, to form the military 
wing, the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA). APLA received training in 
Zaire, Ghana, China and Yugoslavia (Le Roux, 2005:248). 
Field commanders and political commissars had a dual authority and APLA’s 
military commission, which was the PAC’s sub-committee, was composed of nine 
members, some of whom were from the PAC civilian leadership (kaPlaatjie, 
2006:730). This arrangement was a display of subordination of the armed wing to 
civilian leadership authority. 
Furthermore, between 1971 and 1975, APLA had a problem with infiltration into 
South Africa for its guerrilla insurgency. In its endeavour to infiltrate into South 
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Africa, APLA arranged for passage through Botswana and SWAPO through the 
Caprivi Strip. However, after the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) victory 
in Mozambique in 1975, APLA insurgency activities increased along the South 
African–Swaziland border (kaPlaatjie, 2006:726–735). Rural resistance against 
tribal authorities in Northern Natal was leveraged for the advantage of APLA 
guerrilla activities to provide a potential base for APLA activities (kaPlaatjie, 
2006:726–735). 
The PAC had strong links with the People’s Republic of China, where most of 
their APLA cadres were trained (Williams, 2001:6). Strong links also existed 
between the PAC and the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU), led by 
Mugabe, and the two armies, APLA and the Zimbabwean African National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) respectively. Common to both PAC and ZANU was their 
political focus on building strong power bases amongst the rural peasantry 
(Williams, 2001:6).  
Therefore, the 1960s signalled an important watershed in the struggle in South 
Africa against apartheid. The liberation movements realised that the aftermath of 
the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, ushered in the beginning of a far more brutal 
and intensive phase of state repression. In response, the ANC and the PAC 
resorted to armed struggles, hence the establishment of their military wings, MK 
and APLA respectively.  
5.4 CREATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE 
(SANDF) AND THE NEW INCLUSIVE MILITARY CULTURE 
In 1994, South Africa became the model country in the world for having 
negotiated a democratic settlement without the intervention of outside countries. 
Simultaneously, the military leaders managed to sit around the table to create a 
defence force that became credible and respected not only in Africa, but also in 
the rest of the world. In this section, the researcher gives a synoptic analysis of 
how the SANDF came into being and developed an inclusive military culture as 
influenced by the constitution of the country. 
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5.4.1 The creation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
The negotiated settlement in South Africa had its nascent stage as far back as 
May 1990 when the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA) 
took a delegation to meet the ANC in Zambia. The delegation was an 
amalgamation of retired and serving officers of the SADF, military analysts, 
researchers and officers from the Transkei, Ciskei and Venda Defence Forces. It 
was out of this meeting that commitment to the negotiated settlement was born. 
The sequel was the integration of the armed forces (Ngculu, 2011:247). 
Formal negotiations started in December 1991 under the umbrella body of the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) with a follow-up structure 
called the Multi-Party Process (Maharaj, 2008:26). The belligerent parties had to 
make compromises to reach amicable solutions. In addition, the compromise 
between the apartheid regime as led by the Nationalist Party (NP) and the 
liberation movements, as led by the ANC, was a solid foundation upon which the 
South African political transition from apartheid authoritarian rule to a democratic 
system of governance was based (Stott, 2002:24). The view of Stott (2002:24) is 
that in situations of compromise, a negotiated settlement is possible. Furthermore, 
Berdal and Keen (1997:813) elucidate this view by emphasising the fact that in 
these situations of compromise, the achievement of ‘lasting peace’ and the 
viability of a formally agreed peace accord are directly tied to the future of the 
armed forces and the reform of the security sector. It is for this reason that the 
military as an institution of the state was seen to be pivotal in the political 
transition of the South African society. A new national defence force that reflected 
all the militaries of the contending political parties was a reality not to be ignored. 
The establishment of the SANDF was provided for in sections 224–228 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 1993 (the interim Constitution) 
and further ratified in the final Constitution of 1996. Specifically, section 224(3) 
was significant to the establishment of the National Defence Force. 
Save for the National Defence Force, no other armed force or armed organisation or 
service may be established in or for the Republic other than – 
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a. as provided for in this Constitution; 
b. a force established by or under an Act of Parliament for the protection of public 
property or the environment; or 
c. a service established by or under law for the protection of persons or property. 
As a sequel to the establishment of the new South African National Defence 
Force, the Sub-Council on Defence (SCD) was set up and given the task to 
promote the preparation for and transition to a democratic order in South Africa 
(Le Roux, 2005:240). The regulatory framework, which gave credence to 
establishment of the SCD was the Transitional Executive Council Act 151 of 1993 
which was also the source for the establishment of the Transitional Executive 
Council (TEC), which was composed of representatives of the political parties set 
up to conduct the main political negotiations between the contending parties in 
South Africa. To give muscle to the SCD, the Joint Military Coordinating Council 
(JMCC) was created to assist and advise the SCD (Le Roux, 2005:240). This 
JMCC was further mandated by the TEC to develop provisional policies for the 
establishment of a new Ministry of Defence and to address the issues of 
integration and a future defence policy. Among the guidelines given was that such 
a ministry “was to be governed by the principles of transparency, accountability, 
separation of powers and legality” (Le Roux, 2005:240). In addition, the JMCC 
was to help create the solid foundation on which the SANDF was to be 
established (Le Roux, 2005:240). 
The main contending forces during the deliberations of the JMCC were the SADF 
and MK with mandates from the NP and the ANC respectively. However, the 
resultant force design of the new SANDF was seen to be dominantly based on 
that of the former SADF and the strategies, doctrines and procedures remained 
unaltered (Le Roux, 2005:240). 
In summary, the structural arrangements for the smooth running of the negotiation 
process gained legitimacy from all participants because of their fair and inclusive 
manner. In addition, the regulatory framework set up helped to channel and 
expedite the process. In the next section, the researcher reports on the nature of 
the inclusive culture that was created within the SANDF since 1994. 
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5.4.2 INCLUSIVE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CULTURE 
Creating an inclusive institutional culture posed a challenge for the SANDF from 
the inception of the integration of former forces into the SANDF. The integration 
included five statutory forces (the SADF, the TBVC, and the two non-statutory 
forces, MK and APLA (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20). McShane and Von Glinow 
(2005:487–488) agree, stating that integration involves the combining of two or 
more cultures into a new composite culture that preserves the best features of the 
previous cultures. As no culture is inferior or superior to another (Thiart 1996:26), 
the new institutional culture of the SANDF had to reflect the shared assumptions, 
beliefs, traditions and values of all former forces (McShane & Von Glinow, 
2007:255).  
Strategies were developed to inculcate the new institutional culture in the SANDF 
with a purpose of instilling among members respect for the values of the 
democratic society as enshrined in the Constitution. Such programmes are the 
civic education programme, a new code of conduct, the example set by 
leadership, name changes, equal opportunities and affirmative programmes. This 
was done to achieve the following objectives, namely to: 
 ensure that the functioning of the Department of Defence is consistent with 
constitutional principles, democratic values and the law; 
 ensure that military personnel treat each other and members of the public 
with respect and dignity; 
 maintain and enhance military professionalism; 
 build public confidence and pride in the SANDF; and 
 build patriotism, loyalty, unity, discipline, morale and combat readiness 
within the SANDF. 
In this sense, there is continuity in change since South Africa is building an 
inclusive military culture with the best values and traditions of all the constituent 
forces, through a mutual learning process. It is also important to note that since 
1994, the state influenced the development of a democratic constitution, which 
laid a firm base for the military culture to be shaped within the context of the 
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values of the country. However, the vestiges of the British culture within the 
SANDF are still visible. These are reflected in symbols, celebrations of past British 
achievements and traditions, and the dress code still reflects the British origin. 
5.4.2.3 New role of the SANDF as mandated by the South African 
government  
Since 1994, the South African government has set policies and accepted 
international obligations that promote peace, safety, security, stability and 
cooperation (DOD, 2007–2008:88). The SANDF is actively involved in the 
promotion of these obligations through the employment of its mission-trained 
forces in Africa. In the period after 1994, the SANDF actively supported peace, 
security and stability missions in Africa by giving peace support and general 
military assistance to operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Uganda, the Central African Republic 
(CAR), the Comoros and Mozambique. For the first time, the SANDF deployed 
personnel outside the continent when five military observers were deployed in 
support of the UN mission in Nepal (Operation Induli). In the DRC, the SANDF 
continued to support the ongoing peace operations. In addition, the SANDF 
contingent deployed in Sudan under the African Union, where the AU helped to 
stabilise the fragile peace process in the Darfur region (DOD, 2007–2008:88). 
Internally, several missions in support of other government departments were 
conducted (DOD, 2007–2008:88). 
The involvement of the SANDF in international obligations under the auspices of 
the government, has helped the country to gain legitimacy and recognition 
throughout the continent and the world at large. These international obligations 
have eased the volatile situation in Africa. Therefore, the image of South Africa 
has been boosted as the SANDF is contributing to the international relations of 
the country and cooperation with the international community. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
In any historical situation, if people want to move forward, they need to have a 
firm understanding of the perspectives of the past. The South African military 
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history is rich and diverse and involves all communities of South Africa. The 
experience of guerrilla wars of resistance as led by African indigenous people and 
Boer armies is a basis for the future building of a legitimate defence force. 
However, this African experience was lost for years in South Africa. This was due 
to the exclusion of the African militaries in the integration of forces during the 
formation of the UDF in 1912 and the change of government in 1948. This 
resulted in low levels of legitimacy in the eyes of those who were excluded. It is 
worth noting, though, that the integration of the Boer armies and the traditions of 
the British colonial regiments afforded the UDF a strategic, cultural and doctrinal 
base from which to draw its subsequent campaigns.  
In addition, although the militaries of the liberation organisations had little 
influence on the doctrine of the SANDF, they nonetheless had a significant 
influence on the civil–military relations culture of the DOD and on the achievement 
of popular support for the defence force during the nascent years. Furthermore, 
the overwhelming influence of the SADF officers in the formation of the SANDF 
led to the dominance of SADF doctrine, and very few, if any, of the guerrilla 
traditions of South Africa were codified and reflected in the national defence 
strategy of South Africa. 
In the three epoch-making events, such as the military integration and 
transformation of 1912, 1948 and 1994 (see 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.2.1), is that military 
units historically were loyal to and served the elected government of the day and 
did not cease to exist at the change of political leadership. By implication, 
therefore, units were not created every time there was a change in political 
leadership. Military units had strong bonds to the community, albeit selectively in 
this situation, and provided a sense of continuity and security in their very 
existence. The Constitution provides not only a firm base for the military culture to 
be shaped within the context of values of South Africa, but also for active 
participation in peace missions on the continent. 
Military traditions are not a negative phenomenon, but are there to boost morale, 
pride, continuity, esprit de corps and a feeling of belonging. Traditions in 
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themselves are not fixed, but evolve according to the dictates of the time and 
space. The traditions that lie within units remain the building blocks for an evolved 
common culture in the greater institution. 
It is important also to note that since 1994, the influence of the state on 
developing a democratic constitution, laid a firm base for the military culture to be 
shaped within the context of the values of the country. However, the vestiges of 
the British culture within the SANDF are still visible. These are reflected in 
symbols, celebrations of past British achievements and traditions, as well as the 
dress code, which still reflects its British origin. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LEADERSHIP  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapter, a historical perspective on the evolution of South African 
military culture was explored. In doing so, the chapter gave a compendium of the 
South African military prior to 1912, the formation of the Union Defence Force 
(UDF) and the political context, the historical overview of UDF (1912–1947), the 
South African Defence Force (SADF) during the period 1948 until 1994, the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) from 1994 until 2014. This includes 
political prelude to the 1994 military integration, the integration of armed forces 
and their military cultures and the resultant inclusive military culture from 1994 to 
2014. The crux of Chapter Five was to trace the evolution of military culture in 
South Africa in the different historical periods under different statutory 
governments. 
In this chapter, the researcher discusses leadership approaches in general and 
specifically those that are prevalent in military institutions. Furthermore, strategic 
change management in the SANDF is discussed and evaluated against the 
government prescripts.  
In the next section, the researcher discusses the definition of leadership. 
6.2 LEADERSHIP DEFINED 
McShane and Von Glinow (2015:342) aver that leadership is about influencing, 
motivating, and enabling others to contribute toward the effectiveness.  The 
successful leader is an “individual who understands him/herself, the institution, 
and the environment in which they operate and the people they are privileged to 
lead” (Defence Leadership Centre, 2004:2). The goal of leadership then, is to 
‘transform’ people and institutions. This means that leadership must be able to 
work with the minds and hearts of the people, and bring about permanent change 
within institutions, based on the compelling changes within the environment. 
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Changing an institution involves changing the corporate culture, which in turn will 
then guide the desired behaviour of the individuals. The leadership’s role then 
becomes crucial in clarifying the vision and ensuring that the desired behaviour is 
consistent with the corporate culture, that is, beliefs, principles, or values (Baker, 
2007:105). In addition, Kotter (2001:4) suggests that leadership involves coping 
with change. That is, leaders should chart the direction by developing a futuristic 
vision for the institution along with strategies for achieving the envisaged changes 
to achieve the vision. Furthermore, leadership is the art and the application of 
personal knowledge, skill and behaviour to influence and inspire subordinates to 
achieve the aim at hand (Fielder, 2011:17). 
At strategic level, leadership is identified as the top management of an 
organisation. Denis et al. (2001:809) view strategic leadership as a: 
 collective phenomenon to which different individuals make a contribution 
in different ways; 
 processual phenomenon in which the focus is on the actions of people in 
leadership positions rather than on demographics, personality or cognition; 
 dynamic phenomenon in which participants, roles and influences evolve 
over time; and 
 supra-organisational phenomenon in which leadership roles and 
influences on them can extend beyond institutional boundaries. 
The role of leadership in strategy implementation and change management 
cannot be over emphasised. In order to steer strategy implementation and efforts 
in the right direction, institutions make use of several strategy implementation 
drivers: leadership, institutional culture, reward systems, institutional structure 
and resource allocation (Denis et al. 2001:809). Leadership drives strategic 
change, and strong leadership is perhaps the most important ‘tool’ that a 
strategist could have in the implementation and change management toolkit to 
give direction and purpose to integrated strategy formulation, strategic change 
management, implementation and control. In addition, strategic leadership 
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involves managing through others and influencing human behaviour in order to 
achieve goals (Ehlers & Lazenby, 2007:217). 
In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the differences 
between leadership and management.  
6.3 LEADERSHIP VERSUS MANAGEMENT 
The distinction between a leader and a manager is espoused by Mullins 
(2011:256–267), who postulates that management is viewed as getting things 
done through other people in order to achieve stated institutional objectives, 
whereas the emphasis regarding leadership is on interpersonal behaviour in the 
broader context and is associated with the willing and enthusiastic behaviour of 
followers. 
In describing a leader, Baker (2007:104) avers that at times, the leader will work 
behind employees, putting them in the forefront, allowing them freedom of action 
and giving them a sense of ownership. Furthermore, Haines (2000:16) asserts 
that in order to steer an institution through second-order change, one must be 
willing to act as a visionary and leader of change with the skills of a coach, trainer 
and facilitator. Such leaders must show: 
 willingness and ability to take difficult decisions, however unpopular those 
may be; 
 the ability to engage in strategy and strategic thinking; and 
 his or her focus on the people aspect of change and management. 
Above all, leaders must be able to confront and solve problems, weaknesses and 
dangers facing the institution in the context of paradoxes and challenges that 
confront the broader public sector (Baker, 2007:105). 
Therefore, the function of leading is important in managing change. The leader’s 
role then becomes crucial in nurturing and developing employees, and giving 
them latitude to be innovative and encourage them to take initiative, while at the 
same time instilling a sense of commitment to their work and institution.  
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6.4 TRANSACTIONAL AND TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
APPROACH 
The leadership approach (transactional and transformational) is crucial in shaping 
perceptions that will support cultural values and institutional strategy.  
6.4.1 Transactional leadership 
Transactional leadership is about ‘managing’, helping institutions achieve their 
current objectives effectively (Adair, 2003:23–24). Transactional leadership occurs 
in areas where change primarily takes place via relatively short-term reciprocity 
between people and groups (Adair, 2003:23–24). Transactional leadership 
focuses on fine-tuning and maintaining the status quo of the institution rather than 
on fundamental change (Tucker & Russell, 2004:103). It is effective when the new 
institution undertakes short-term projects to increase production (Reggio & 
Murphy, 2002:106–107). Transactional leadership, according to Derungs 
(2011:52), is not concerned about transformation of the institutional performance 
and nor is it concerned about the orientation of individuals within the institution.  
6.4.2 Transformational leadership 
Esterhuyse (2003:7) argues, “transformational leadership is more important than 
orthodox management when one has a second-order change in mind”. 
Transformation as a process, which should lead to a new structure, culture and 
defining values, requires visionary leadership (Esterhuyse, 2003:7). 
Transformational leadership pays attention to the fundamental concerns and the 
developmental needs of the followers and it encourages the followers to look at 
old problems with new solutions. Avolio (1999:22) argues – 
[T]ransformational leadership is defined relative to the leader’s effect on his or her 
followers in which the latter feel trust, admiration, loyalty, and respect toward the 
former and followers are motivated to do more than they were originally expected to 
do. 
According to Hall et al. (2012:1–2), there are four components of transformational 
leadership, namely: 
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 Idealised influence involves inspiring visions, sharing risks and hardships, 
and earning trust and confidence from subordinates. Leaders who exert 
idealised influence behave in ways that demonstrate high standards of 
ethical and moral conduct. 
 Inspirational motivation involves showing enthusiasm and optimism in 
ways that motivate those around one by providing meaning and 
challenges. 
 Intellectual stimulation entails stimulating efforts to find new ideas and 
creative solutions to problems, encouraging innovation and creativity, and 
new approaches. Such leaders solicit new ideas and innovative solutions 
from followers, and they encourage followers to present ideas that are 
different from their own. 
 Individualised consideration is about recognising that subordinates have 
different needs and desires, and acting as coach in order to develop the full 
potential of all subordinates. Leaders who express individualised 
consideration facilitate the growth of their followers by assigning tasks that 
are appropriate to each person’s competencies and skills. 
Overall research evidence indicated that transformational leadership is strongly 
correlated with lower turnover rates, higher productivity, and higher employee 
satisfaction than under other circumstances. Change often brings with it a feeling 
of uncertainty if not well communicated to the stakeholders. 
6.4.3 Military leadership 
In the previous section, the researcher considered the elements of military culture. 
However, it is important to define and discuss military leadership in general. Hunt 
and Blair (1985:121) aver that leadership generally means to influence another to 
behave in a way intended by the first person. Leadership, according to Mills 
(2005:11), is a process by which one person influences the thoughts, attitudes 
and behaviour of another. Leadership is further about setting direction, developing 
a vision for the future and strategies for achieving the vision. In fulfilling this role, 
leaders, according to Haines (2000:16), should be:  
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 willing and able to take difficult decisions however unpopular they may be; 
 able to engage in strategy and strategic thinking; and 
 able to focus on the people aspect of change and management. 
To expand, Baker (2007:105) concurs with this view by further asserting that 
leaders should be able to confront and solve problems, and deal with weaknesses 
and dangers facing the organisation in the context of paradoxes and challenges 
that confront the broader public sector institutions. Furthermore, Barrington 
(1984:285) postulates that leadership involves intellectual and moral content in 
order to analyse what needs to be done, and then to act on that analysis, Fielder 
(2011:17) propounds a similar postulation by asserting that leadership is the art 
and the application of personal knowledge, skill and behaviour to influence and 
inspire others in order to achieve the aim. However, for the purpose of this study, 
leadership was contextualised within the military. Hence, the next section the 
researcher will focus on military leadership. 
6.4.4 Military leadership  
As a subject, military leadership has been an intriguing as well as beguiling 
subject for military professionals and scholars (Buck & Korb, 1981:7). Military 
leadership is defined by Nye (2002:28) as “a process by which soldiers influence 
others to accomplish the mission”. In addition, Hannah and Avolio (2010:3) argue 
that leadership in the military context is about the human element, focusing on 
guiding the social interaction between soldiers fighting wars with the purpose of 
winning such wars. In the South African context, military leadership is defined as 
the art or process of influencing and directing people to an assigned goal in such 
a manner as to command obedience, confidence, respect and loyalty (DOD, 
2009c:B5). However, Kahn and Naidoo (2011:75) argue that military leaders 
should, in addition to their training in military warfare, also be knowledgeable 
about political, social, business, technical and communication dimensions. 
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6.4.5 Leadership approaches prevalent in the military 
Associated with the characteristics of the military culture are commensurate 
military leadership styles. Wepman (2013:1) identifies authoritarian, democratic 
and laissez-faire leadership styles as being dominant leadership styles in the 
military. However, Yeakey (2002:4) suggests that situational leadership has been 
used by the military for years in training and development. Therefore, the two 
leadership styles mentioned before (see 6.4.1 and 6.4.2) are used in the military 
as follows:  
 Authoritarian leadership, also known as an autocratic leadership style, 
describes a leader who makes decisions without consulting or soliciting any 
inputs from the subordinates (Graf, Hemmasi & Winchell, 1992:62; 
Haberfeld, 2006:96; Murray, 2013:3). In addition, leaders applying an 
autocratic leadership style have complete control over their people while 
such people and staff have little opportunity to make suggestions (Murray, 
2013:3). According to Graf et al. (1992:62), history dictates that leadership 
behaviour in the military has been generally autocratic, especially under 
battle conditions. Kahn and Naidoo (2011:73) postulate that the autocratic 
leadership style applied in the military does not allow soldiers to question 
orders and commands. This is because autocratic leadership is very 
directive and does not allow any participation from soldiers (Luthans, 
2005:548). Therefore, the autocratic leadership style can be used in critical 
mission times where debating orders may result in mission failure 
(Wepman, 2013:1). Furthermore, the autocratic leadership style, according 
to Cherry (2014:1), works well when there is no need for inputs from 
subordinates, when the decision would not change as a result of inputs, 
and where the motivation to carry out subsequent action would not be 
affected by participation or non-participation in decision-making 
(International Association of Administrative Professionals, 2009:22). 
Autocratic leadership is often used in a crisis when decisions must be 
made quickly and no dissent is expected (Murray, 2013:3). In this case, 
115 
 
commanders are responsible for making decisions and the troops can then 
focus on carrying out the allocated tasks. 
 The democratic (participative) leadership style is based on involving 
subordinates in decision-making. The final decision may resort to the 
leader after having facilitated consensus among the subordinates. The 
democratic decision-making process is usually appreciated by 
subordinates (International Association of Administrative Professionals, 
2009:23). This style is used by most military teams to promote esprit de 
corps among the recruits after training (Wepman, 2013:1). Democratic 
leadership, according to Mullins (2011:264) is associated with increased 
follower productivity, satisfaction, involvement and commitment. 
 A laissez-faire (delegative) leadership style is characterised by the 
leader’s non-involvement in decision-making (Mullins, 2011:264). 
Furthermore, such leaders give complete freedom to subordinates to do 
their work and set their own targets and deadlines (Mullins, 2011:264). 
These leaders provide support with resources and guidance in the form of 
advice, if needed, but otherwise do not get involved (Murray, 2013:3). This 
style works well when subordinates are capable of making their own 
decisions and when there is no requirement for central coordination 
(International Association of Administrative Professionals, 2009:24). 
Military leaders frequently use a delegative style of leadership to delegate 
jobs to non-commissioned and other subordinates in the military to 
empower them. In some cases, the reason for delegation may be that 
subordinates or team members know more about a particular job than the 
leader (Wepman, 2013:1). 
 Situational leadership style involves what Bolden, Gosling, Marturano 
and Dennison (2003:6) call a leadership style that is specific to the situation 
in which it is being exercised and there may be differences in required 
leadership styles at different levels in the same organisation (Wepman, 
2013:1). A leader needs to fit his or her leadership to the requirement of a 
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specific situation. Peng-Hsian Kao, Hsin Kao and Thun-Yun Kao 
(2007:565–567) postulate that the leader’s behaviour should be contingent 
on the situation. Leaders are not limited to one leadership style in a given 
situation and, with the nature of the battlefield today and tomorrow, being 
able to adapt appropriately, the styles will influence soldiers’ success 
(Yeakey, 2002:1). A leader should correctly evaluate situational factors and 
select the most appropriate and effective leadership style for a given 
situation (Peng-Hsian et al., 2007:563). 
Mullins (2011:354) postulates that situational leadership styles are divided 
into four categories: 
 A directing/telling style is found where the leader provides specific 
directions about roles and goals and closely tracks the followers’ 
performance in order to provide frequent feedback on results (Mwai, 
2011:6). Within this style, a leader will specifically instruct subordinates 
what to do and how to do it. This style is often used within the law 
enforcement and military communities, as well as on manufacturing 
assembly lines. This style provides a means of managing a diverse 
group of people that span a wide range of experience and maturity 
levels (May, 2014:2). 
– The coaching/selling style is found where the leader explains why, 
solicits suggestions, praises behaviours that are approximately right 
and continues to direct task accomplishment (Mwai, 2011:7). 
Information and direction will still be provided by the manager in this 
style of leadership, but there is also more two-way communication with 
subordinates. Within this role, leaders “sell” their message to get 
employees on board, persuading them to work toward the common 
goal (May, 2014:2). 
– According to a supporting/participating style, the leader and the 
follower make decisions together. The role of the leader is to facilitate, 
listen, encourage and support the follower, for example with 
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participation. Leaders can focus more on relationships and less on 
direction (Mwai, 2011:7). This style is often used by middle-level 
commanders (colonels) who are attempting to influence senior 
commanders (generals) towards developing a new policy for which 
there is no proven history or established practice (May, 2014:2). 
– Delegating occurs when the leader empowers the employee to act 
independently with the appropriate resources to get the job done 
(Mwai, 2011:8). The leader shares responsibility for the goal setting 
and is available, but does not interfere with the followers’ work (Mwai, 
2011:8). Although the leader will still monitor task and institution 
progress, he or she will delegate much of the responsibility for the 
execution and work groups. Delegating allows the leader to be involved 
with decisions, and he or she is therefore able to focus on the work and 
achievements of subordinates (May, 2014:2). 
The leadership styles pertinent to the military are no different from any other 
institution. The above leadership styles associated with the military might not be a 
panacea for all situations where leadership is tested, but can be used as the 
situation dictates. Different combinations or a combination of all for different 
exigencies can be applied. What needs to be noted, though, is the application of 
these leadership styles within the military context. Congruent with this explication 
is the view espoused by May (2014:2) propounding that there is no single best 
approach to leadership that will work well in every situation.  
In addition to these leadership styles, there is a leadership style that is unique to 
the military, and that is command and control, which is an element of military 
leadership (Van Dyk & George, 2006:777). In the next section, the researcher will 
discuss command and control as the leadership style within the military. 
6.4.6 Command and control 
The term ‘command’ is seen as a rigid concept without much space for 
interpretations (McWilliams, 2004:1). Unravelling the complex nature of command 
as a concept used in the military, Coakley (1992:36) contends that command is 
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strategic, that is, it is concerned with the bigger picture. In addition, Fielder 
(2011:17) concurs that ‘command’ within the military context is defined as the 
power or authority earned by rank, position, experience or expertise, which places 
a person in charge of whatever happens. 
The South African Department of Defence (DOD), in support of this definition, 
avers that command is the authority that the commander in the armed forces 
lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment (DOD, 
2009a:B5). Therefore, command, according to McWilliams (2004:1), is to: 
 have authority or jurisdiction over subordinates;  
 give order(s); 
 direct with authority; 
 exercise power or authority; 
 be in control; 
 act as commander; and 
 have power to control or dominate. 
Nye (1986:28–29) adds another dimension to the definition by asserting that to 
command calls for a creative act, confidence and courage to interpret rules and 
orders, and that command is associated with the need for taking intellectual and 
moral responsibility in the performance of one’s military duties.  
Furthermore, Kahn and Naidoo (2011:74) postulate that in a military context, 
military leadership and command are inseparable. In support of this assertion, the 
Defence Leadership Centre (2004:6) avers that leadership and management are 
two sides of the coin of command. This means that command, as a leadership 
style, is composed of leadership and management, and Fielder (2011:18) coins 
this in a formula, namely:  
Command = leadership + management 
Lastly, command in the military is used together with the term ‘control’, hence the 
reference to command and control. Control as used in command and control is 
tactical or operational and focused on immediate management of forces (Coakley, 
1992:36). However, command and control, according to Gill (2010:1), is: 
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Command and control is a style of leadership that uses standards, procedures, and 
output statistics to regulate the institution. Furthermore, command and control approach 
to leadership is authoritative in nature and uses a top down approach, which fits well in 
bureaucratic institution.  
In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of strategic change 
management in the SANDF. 
6.5 STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE SANDF 
In this section, the researcher presents an analysis and interpretation of the 
structure of the SANDF. Thereafter, strategic change management as applied in 
the defence force human resources is discussed.  
6.5.1 Structure and functions of the SANDF 
Following the strategy to create the culture of inclusiveness by the political 
leadership of the defence force, the institutional structure of the SANDF was set 
up after 1994 as a firm basis for commanding and giving strategic direction for the 
defence operations. This structure also provides command and control in the daily 
functioning of the SANDF.  
The institutional structure of the SANDF is delineated in Figure 6.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1 Institutional structure of the South African National Defence 
Force 
Source: Adapted from DOD (2015:27) 
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The SANDF is under the command of the chief of the SANDF, who is charged 
with giving strategic direction and orders/instructions to ensure the execution of   
constitutional mandate of the SANDF, as reflected in section 200(2) of the 
Constitution, 1996. With respect to its composition, the SANDF, as depicted in 
Figure 6.1, comprises the four arms of service (hereafter referred as to the 
Services) and Divisions. The Services are the:  
 South African (SA) Army;  
 SA Air Force;  
 SA Navy; and  
 SA Military Health Services.  
The Divisions are:  
 Joint Operations;  
 Defence Intelligence; 
 Corporate Staff;  
 Defence Inspectorate;  
 Human Resources (Chief Directorate Transformation Management is a 
sub-division of Human Resources Division);  
 Defence Legal;  
 Military Policy and Strategy;  
 Defence Reserves;  
 Logistics;  
 Military Police; and  
 Command and Management Information Systems (DOD, 2015).  
The purposes that these Services and Divisions serve are depicted in Table 6.1 
below.  
Table 6.1 Functions of the Services and Divisions 
Serial 
no. 
Service or division Purpose 
1 SA Army To provide prepared and supported landward defence capabilities 
for the defence and protection of South Africa. 
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Serial 
no. 
Service or division Purpose 
2 SA Air Force To provide prepared and supported air defence capabilities for the 
defence and protection of South Africa. 
3 SA Navy To provide prepared and supported maritime defence capabilities 
for the defence and protection of South Africa. 
4 SA Military Health 
Services 
To provide prepared and supported health capabilities and 
services for the defence and protection of South Africa. 
5 Joint Operations To provide and employ defence capabilities, including an 
operational capability, to conduct all operations successfully, as 
well as joint, interdepartmental, interagency and multinational 
military exercises. 
6 Defence Intelligence To provide defence intelligence and counter-intelligence capability. 
7 Corporate Staff To advise on military policy matters and to co-ordinate the military 
strategic direction process. This process includes developing 
policy, formulating strategies and plans, monitoring the execution 
of plans and the reporting thereof. 
8 Defence Inspectorate To provide the independent and objective internal and closing-
down audits, inspections, perception surveys, anti-corruption and 
fraud prevention services, added value and improved DOD 
operations. 
9 Human Resources  To provide full HR support services to the DOD. 
10 Defence Legal To provide professional, legitimate and deployable defence legal 
services and support commensurate with the needs of the DOD. 
11 Religious Services To provide a chaplain service that cares for all DOD members and 
their dependants and promotes spiritual growth, social support and 
ethical conduct. 
12 Defence Reserves To direct the development and maintenance of the reserve 
system, to provide specialist advise on reserve matters and to 
promote/market the reserves and the volunteer reserve system. 
13 Logistics To provide ongoing general support capabilities and services. 
14 Military Police To provide a military policing capability to the department. 
15 
and 
16 
Command and 
Management 
Information Systems 
Military, Policy, 
Strategy, Strategy 
and Planning  
To provide the department with key information and 
communication systems. 
To advise on military policy matters and to co-ordinate the military 
strategic direction process. This process includes developing 
policy, formulating strategies and plans, monitoring the execution 
of plans and the reporting thereof. 
 
Source: Adapted from DOD (2015:41–54) 
The structure of the SANDF clearly demarcates and divides the responsibilities 
that need to be carried out to fulfil the constitutional mandate of the SANDF. This 
122 
 
also delineates the command and control with clear responsibilities that do not 
overlap nor require boundary management. 
6.5.2 Change management in the SANDF 
This section deals with the strategic change as envisaged by the political and 
defence leadership of the DOD after the integration of the armed forces. 
6.5.2.1 Regulatory framework 
The strategic plan of the SANDF finds its basis in section 200(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (RSA 1996a:113), and in 
section 10 of the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (RSA 1996b:4). The core aim of this White Paper is the formulation of 
the government’s new policy on defence and the transformation of the DOD (RSA 
1996b:4). It is for this reason that the researcher focused on the progress made 
with respect to the transformation of the DOD, with particular reference to the 
SANDF. In addition, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, 
(RSA 1995:16) stipulates that the SANDF must formulate policies regarding 
equality, which include equal opportunities and affirmative action, to achieve 
representivity and equity within the SANDF. Furthermore, Chapter 10 of the South 
African Defence Review, 1998 (RSA 1998:17), reiterates that affirmative action 
and equal opportunities are fundamental principles for transformation of the 
SANDF. 
In concert with the above explications, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
stipulates that affirmative action measures must include the following: 
 measures to identify and eliminate barriers, including unfair discrimination, 
which adversely affect people from designated groups; 
 measures meant to further diversify in the workplace based on dignity of 
and respect for all people; 
 making reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups in 
order to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably 
represented in the work force; and  
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 measures to retain and develop people from the designated groups and 
implement appropriate training measures for skills development. 
This therefore requires a concerted effort to draw up an employment equity plan 
with realisable goals to achieve progress in terms of transformation. 
6.5.2.2 Transformation in the SANDF 
The process of transformation in the SANDF was started by conceptualising a 
Chief Directorate Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Actions in 1997 (which was 
renamed in 2006 ‘Chief Directorate Transformation Management’). The main 
responsibility of this directorate (as stated in Chapter 10 of the Defence Review of 
1998) was to oversee, and manage equal opportunity and affirmative action 
training, implementation and monitoring, and to resolve cases of discrimination. 
To facilitate and realise this responsibility of ensuring balanced representation of 
the South African population in the SANDF, various policies such as Department 
of Defence Fast Tracking Policy (DOD 1999:6) and the Human Resource Strategy 
of 2010 (DOD, 2010) were promulgated. To realise this transformation, the 
SANDF further developed a process called the Plan and Guidelines for the 
Staffing of the Military Component of the Transformed Department of Defence 
(SANDF DS/502/8, dated 11 November 1998) followed by the Revised Staffing 
Strategy (SANDF C PERS/DMPU/R/101/1/B, dated 15 May 2001) (SANDF 
1998:5–6). Concomitant with the above-mentioned policy was a need to 
pronounce the appropriate leadership approach to advance the transformation of 
the SANDF. A transactional leadership approach was adopted by the SANDF as 
the official leadership approach (DOD, 2009a:D1-1). This leadership approach is 
contrary to that of the second-order change, which is transformation. According to 
Anderson and Anderson (2010:60), such transformation is a radical shift of 
strategy, structure, systems, processes or technology, so significant that it 
requires a shift of culture and behaviour and a mind-set to implement the 
transformation successfully and to sustain it over time. Therefore, transformational 
leadership is more appropriate than orthodox management when one has a 
second-order change in mind (Esterhuyse, 2003:7). 
124 
 
Since the integration of forces from 1994 to 2014 (Kubu, 2009:30), the status of 
racial representation in the SANDF reflects a skewed representation of race and 
gender. The racial composition of the SANDF in 1998 revealed that there was an 
over-representation of whites, with blacks (Africans, Asians and coloureds) under-
represented. Africans (38.36%), Asians (1.02%), coloureds (15.96%) and whites 
(44.66%) made up the total personnel strength of 84 052 (Kubu, 2009:30–31). 
Due to this lack of representivity, the SANDF in its endeavour to guide an 
improved the situation, drafted a strategic human resource policy. Furthermore, 
the Department of Defence’s Human Resource Strategy 2010 (DOD, 2003:51) 
instructed Services of the SANDF to reflect on racial representation imbalances at 
various levels. These Services were then expected to suggest ways and means to 
address the identified gaps. Prevalent to all Services was the problem of over-
representation of blacks at entry level and under-representation of blacks at 
senior management level. This was true in reverse for whites in the SANDF. 
Whites were over-represented at senior management level and under-
represented at entry level. 
Table 6.3 Racial representation in the SANDF 
Group/Year 
 
Approved 
target 
1998 2005 2013 
Africans 64.6% 38% 64% 71.8% 
Asians  0.75% 1% 1% 1.1% 
Coloureds 10.2% 16% 11% 12.7% 
Whites 24.3% 45% 23% 14.2% 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Defence Annual Report Financial Year 
2013/14 
However, the racial representation situation as it was in June 2005 suggested that 
there was an improvement, which was in line with the approved targets. As cited 
by Kubu (2009:32), out of total strength of uniformed personnel of 61 660, there 
were 40 001 Africans (64.6%), 882 Asians (0.75%), 6 965 coloureds (10.2%), and 
13 812 whites (24.3%).  
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Further statistics as reflected in the Department of Defence Annual Report 
Financial Year 2012/13 (DOD, 2013:17) suggest that in terms of employment 
equity, the percentage of Africans was 71.8%, Asians 1.1%, coloureds 12.7% and 
whites 14.2%. Racial representation for Africans was improved by 7.8%, and this 
surpassed the Defence Review target of 64.6%. The representation of Asians had 
improved by 0.1%. Racial representation of coloureds had improved by 1.7% and 
surpassed the Defence Review target of 10.2%. Whites were down by 8.8% and 
were still under-represented and below the target of 24.3%.  
However, it needs to be noted that according to the Mid-Year Population 
Estimates for South Africa (RSA, 2014:3), the South African demographics 
showed Africans at 80.2%, Asians at 2.5% coloureds at 8.8% and whites at 8.4% 
of the population. Therefore, since population statistics are used for determining 
racial ratios, the racial targets as given in the Defence Review of 1998 (Kubu, 
2009:30–31), are no longer relevant, because population statistics have changed.  
In summary, a combination of efforts played a role in the overall improvement of 
the racial representation in the SANDF. First, a regulatory framework was created 
by the South African government to charter the direction for the DOD, in particular 
the SANDF. Firstly, a planned approach in implementing the government 
transformation imperatives by creating a transformation management directive 
was adopted. Lastly, monitoring and evaluation of the progress by the 
Transformation Management Chief Directorate helped the Services to focus on 
the transformation agenda of the SANDF. However, racial and gender 
transformation requires transformational leadership that would bring about real 
change in the SANDF, such as the SANDF reflecting the demographics of South 
Africa and the achievement of gender equality. 
6.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, leadership was defined and the distinction between a leader and a 
manager was given. In addition, the leadership approach (transactional and 
transformational) was discussed. Both transactional and transformational 
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leadership are crucial in moulding perceptions that are needed to support 
institutional culture and strategy. 
The content of transactional leadership is about assisting institutions to achieve 
their current objectives and is most suitable for fine-tuning and maintaining the 
status quo of the institution. It is best suitable for an evolutionary change.  
Transformational leadership is about fundamentally changing the strategies and 
culture of an institution. This leadership approach fits in well with revolutionary 
change, which is the second-order change.  
In addition, leadership styles that are common to civilian and military institutions 
were identified and discussed. Authoritarian, democratic and laissez-faire 
leadership styles are the dominant leadership styles in the military. The leadership 
approach applied by the SANDF during its strategic change management was 
transactional. Command and control as a unique leadership style was also 
discussed. However, a transformational leadership approach was found to be 
appropriate for the fundamental change in the SANDF. 
In the next chapter, the researcher provides a discussion of the research design 
and methodology for this research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the preceding chapter, leadership approaches in general and specifically 
leadership approaches that are dominant in military institutions were discussed. In 
addition, in Chapter Six, the strategic change management in the SANDF was 
discussed and evaluated against the government prescripts.  
In this chapter, the researcher provides a description of the research methodology 
that was used in the research. The research methodology comprises the research 
design, methods of data collection, the research setting and participants, 
population and sample, and ethical considerations. 
7.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:28), the research methodology 
concentrates on the procedure of research and the decisions that the researcher 
has to take to carry out the research assignment.  
The present research was about strategic change management in the SANDF. To 
do this research, it was necessary to conduct it with unambiguous and delineated 
parameters guiding the process of research. The component steps in the research 
process and the tools and objective procedures are described and discussed. 
Hence, this research methodology focuses on the research processes and the 
kinds of tools and procedures that were used (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:75). 
Breakwell et al. (2012:9) contend that the nature of the research question 
implicates a particular research method as the most suitable one for a particular 
study. Similarly, the selection of the research methodology and its application are 
informed by the aims and objectives of the research, the nature of the 
phenomenon being studied, and the expectations of the investigator (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2001:xxiv–xxv). Therefore, flowing from the above explications, it is clear 
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that the research methodology is a logical plan that dictates how the research 
problem is to be solved. 
In the next section, the researcher discusses the research design used in this 
research.  
7.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005:56), the research design is the overall 
plan for the relationship between the practical relevancy of the conceptualised 
problem and the empirical investigation. The research design is drawn and used 
as a map, blueprint or plan to help answer the research problem (Mouton, 
2008:55). Gravetter and Forzano (2012:205) suggest that a survey should be 
conducted to obtain descriptive information about a particular group of individuals. 
Therefore, this plan gives a conceptual framework, which guides how the 
research is conducted.  
The present research endeavoured to determine whether transformation in the 
SANDF, as a planned strategic change intervention, has been managed 
adequately between 1994 and 2014 to achieve the desired results. This research 
problem informed the type of evidence to address during the research. It is often 
the type of research question that determines a particular research method as the 
most suitable one for that study (Breakwell et al., 2012:9). 
In addition, a descriptive research method was employed during the research. 
That is, information about variables as they exist naturally was gathered 
(Gravetter & Forzano, 2012:196). This approach is supported by Fabe (2012:3), 
who contends that the descriptive method of research is about gathering 
information on the existing condition. The emphasis is on describing rather than 
on judging or interpreting. This method is used to describe the nature of a 
situation as it exists at the time of the research, and to explore the causes of a 
particular phenomenon. As part of the descriptive research method, survey 
research design was relevant in the present research because it assisted the 
researcher to obtain some characteristics or opinions (Gravetter & Forzano, 
2012:205) about members of the SANDF at the middle management level. 
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Therefore, survey research was used to obtain data from the respondents in a 
sample that was drawn from a population. This data was analysed and interpreted 
to formulate rational and sound findings and recommendations stemming from the 
research (May, 2011:98). 
In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the methods of data 
collection. 
7.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION  
The research was conducted using both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, as combined research strategies. In this section, the researcher 
presents a discussion of the reason for using both methods in this research for 
data collection and analysis. 
7.4.1 Quantitative research method 
Quantitative research, according to Moore (2000:121), aims to show what is 
happening and explains phenomena through the collection of numerical 
information that is analysed with the use of mathematical methods. Supporting 
this definition, McNabb (2008:13), avers that quantitative methods or strategies 
are statistical designs that may be exploratory, descriptive or casual. 
Positivist researchers, according to McNabb (2008:9), are of the view that a 
quantitative or measurement strategy is a suitable approach to employ when 
studying problems in the public and non-profit sectors. In explaining quantitative 
research, Robson (2011:18), asserts that a quantitative research method is 
characterised by a deductive logic where pre-existing theoretical ideas or 
concepts are tested. A generalisation of findings is inferred (Moore, 2000:104). 
Furthermore, (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2010:8–9) identified the following in 
describing quantitative research: 
 the purpose is to evaluate objective data, which is composed of numbers; 
 quantitative researchers use a process of analysis to confirm or disprove a 
hypothesis;  
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 quantitative research deals with an abstraction of reality; 
 quantitative research tries to understand research facts from an outsider’s 
point of view.  
This emphasises the fact that to keep the research free from bias, the 
researcher should be detached and have an objective view of the facts as they 
unfold (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2010:8–9). Furthermore, the investigation 
and structure of the research are controlled by the researcher to identify and 
isolate the variables, and specific measurements are employed for data 
collection (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2010:8–9). 
In the next section, the researcher presents an outline and explanation of the 
qualitative research method. 
7.4.2  Qualitative research method 
Qualitative strategies or methods, according to McNabb (2008:13), involve 
mainstream social science research methods, such as ethnography, 
phenomenology and case studies, and is presented in language instead of 
numbers. It is further based on flexible and explorative methods, because it 
enables the researcher to change the data progressively so that a deeper 
understanding of what is being investigated can be achieved (McNabb, 2008:13). 
In further expatiating the definition of qualitative methods, Lowe (2007:14) avers 
that qualitative methods investigate behaviour as it occurs in a natural 
environment and there is no manipulation of settings. In addition, Wisker (2011:1) 
posits that qualitative research is best employed when the researcher wishes to 
enquire about meanings, and it endeavours to observe, describe and understand 
the subjects’ experiences, ideas, beliefs and values. Agreeing with this view, 
Sivasubramaniyan (2012:6) argues that qualitative research refers to inductive 
logic, holistic, subjective and process-oriented methods used to interpret, 
understand, describe and develop a theory of a phenomenon or patterns, and 
themes are developed.  
131 
 
Stemming from the above explications on the qualitative research method, it can 
be concluded that this method is subject to changes and refinement of research 
ideas as the research progresses, which implies that qualitative data gathering 
tools are flexible. In this method, there is no manipulation of the research setting 
necessary. Furthermore, contrary to the quantitative method, this research 
method evokes a realistic feeling of the research setting. 
In view of the preceding explications, both qualitative and quantitative methods of 
data collection were used for the analytical study. In the next section, the 
researcher presents a discussion of the population and the sample. 
7.5 POPULATION AND SAMPLE  
Sapsford and Jupp (2006:27) describe a population as a total collection of 
elements available for sampling, and it consists of individuals or elements, which 
could be persons or events. It could be anything at all of research interest. In 
addition, Robson (2011:270) argues that ‘population’ refers to all the cases. It is 
unusual to be able to deal with the whole population in a survey. Hence, a sample 
is taken from the population.  
‘Sample’, on the other hand, is described by Sapsford and Jupp (2006:26) as a 
set of elements selected from a population and that it is used to save time and 
effort, but also to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the population 
status in terms of whatever is being researched. A similar description is that of 
Moore (2000:104) who avers that a sample is taken from a large group whose 
characteristics can be inferred from the large group. It therefore means a sample 
is a microcosm of the population. In addition, Robson (2011:271) argues that 
while probability samples allow a researcher to generalise from the sample to the 
population, such generalisations depend on the accuracy of the probability. A 
large sample has the advantage of a lower degree of error in generalising (Moore, 
2000:105).   
Based on the above explications, a sample from a population of SANDF middle 
management officers, with rank levels of major/lieutenant commander to brigadier 
general/rear admiral (junior grade), was studied and the findings was generalised 
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to the population. In this research, objectivity was paramount and the distance 
between the researcher and the participants was maintained. 
To produce a more representative and accurate sample from the mentioned rank 
levels of the SANDF, stratified sampling was applied (De Vaus, 1994:65). An 
added advantage of stratified sampling is that each unit in the population had a 
known chance of being selected (Bryman, 2001:85). 
In this research, as reflected in Table 7.1, the population comprised 5 901 
members from the SANDF. The stratification was done by means of rank levels 
from major/lieutenant commander to brigadier general/rear admirals (junior 
grade). 
In Table 7.1 below the researcher illustrates how the population was stratified.  
Table 7.1  Population and sample  
SANDF SERVICES 
RANK SA 
ARMY 
SA AIR 
FORCE 
SA 
NAVY 
SA 
MEDICAL 
HEALTH 
SERVICE  
(SAMHS) 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
SIZE 
PERCENTAGE 
BRIGADIER 
GENERAL/REAR 
ADMIRAL 
 
96 
 
29 
 
24 
 
27 
 
176 
 
9 
 
16.7 
        
COLONEL/ 
CAPTAIN (SAN) 425 186 
 
132 
 
137 
 
880 
 
7 
 
12.9 
        
LIEUTENANT 
COLONEL/ 
COMMANDER 
 
1 169 
 
536 
 
158 
 
398 
 
2 261 
 
13 
 
24.1 
        
MAJOR/ 
LIEUTENANT 
COMMANDER 
 
1 323 
 
520 
 
133 
 
608 
 
2 584 
 
25 
 
46.3 
        
 
TOTAL 
 
3 013 
 
1 271 
 
447 
 
1 170 
 
5 901 
 
54 
 
100 
        
        
133 
 
 
In Table 7.1, the researcher illustrates that members of the SANDF (SA Army, SA 
Air Force, SA Navy and SAMHS) from the same population were grouped 
together according to ranks. This means that a specific number from each stratum 
was selected, thus making the final sample of 54 members.  
In the next section, the researcher deals with the procedure of data collection.  
7.6 DATA COLLECTION  
Two types of data collection techniques were employed in this research, that is, 
primary and secondary data. The content of the primary data comprised the 
answers provided by respondents during the interviews and in the questionnaires. 
The responses to the interviews and questionnaires during the survey process 
were obtained from the sample of members of the SANDF. In addition, the 
secondary data comprised the information sourced from the published documents 
and literature that were relevant to the research questionnaire (Fabe, 2012:5). 
According to McMillan and Schumacher (1993:40), there are six ways to collect 
data, namely observations, questionnaires, interviews, documents, tests and 
unobtrusive measures. The most commonly used data collection methods are 
interviews and questionnaires (MANCOSA, 2015:87). However, for the purpose of 
this research, the instruments that were employed for data collection were 
interviews, a questionnaire and documents. 
7.6.1  Interviews 
An interview is regarded by De Vos, Schuring, Strydom, Fouche and Poggenpoel 
(2001:298) as a pipeline for extracting and transmitting information from an 
interviewee to the interviewer. Furthermore, Welman et al. (2005:165–166) 
dissect interviews into three categories. 
 Structured interviews. This instrument relies on a previously prepared or 
compiled questionnaire, which is then presented by the interviewer to the 
respondent. The interviewer records the responses of the respondent with 
PERCENTAGE 51.0% 21.5% 7.6% 19.8% 100%   
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no deviation from the original one. This means that the response to each 
question is recorded on a standardised schedule. 
 Unstructured in-depth interviews. Such interviews are informal and have 
no pre-determined questions to be answered. They are used to explore 
general areas of interest in depth. 
 Semi-structured interviews. Such interviews are used where the 
interviewer depends on an established list of themes and questions to 
follow when interviewing. These themes and questions may vary from one 
interview to the next. 
Interviews in general assist the interviewees to elaborate freely on the topic under 
discussion as they wish, and relate their particular experiences. Based on the 
above discussion, the structured interview was used in this research. This implied 
that the researcher applied face-to-face interviews to gain insight into the meaning 
and significance about the research question. To assist the interviewer in 
recording the interview accurately, with the consent of interviewees an audio-
recorder was used, and the interviews were subsequently transcribed. 
In addition to structured interviews, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
the major generals, brigadier generals and colonels of the SANDF to gain insight 
into the leadership and culture of the former forces that were integrated into the 
SANDF. The reason for choosing face-to-face interviews was that they have the 
highest response rates and permit longer interview durations (Neuman, 
2011:301). These interviewees represented the different former forces, and the 
purpose of the interviewing on leadership was to find the predominant leadership 
style of former defence force/armed force leaders and to establish whether the 
style of leadership in former forces was in agreement with the current leadership 
style as adopted by the SANDF. The second part of the questionnaire dealt with 
the institutional culture of the former forces and the current culture as practised in 
the SANDF. In doing so, the focus was on the predominant culture of the former 
defence or armed force to: 
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 establish which artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental systems of 
the former defence or armed forces have been incorporated into the 
SANDF and were being practiced at the time of this research;  
 determine the difference between the culture of the former defence or 
armed forces and the SANDF; 
 solicit opinions of the current culture in the SANDF; and  
 establish whether the SANDF culture had changed over the previous 10 
years (1994 - 2014). 
Interviewees were asked to complete consent forms, and it was indicated to them 
that their participation was voluntary and that confidentiality and anonymity would 
be maintained and honoured. They were given an option to withdraw at any time 
during the interview if they so wished. 
7.6.2  Questionnaire  
Questionnaires are easy to administer and they can be used to collect data under 
different circumstances (Moore, 2000:109). In addition, the questions can be open-
ended or closed-ended. An open-ended question, according to Welman, Kruger 
and Mitchell (2005:174), is one in which the researcher poses questions without 
the option for the respondent to choose from expected answers or a previous list 
of answers. This means that respondents are free to formulate their own 
responses to questions. In a closed-ended question, the respondent is offered a 
range of answers from which to select. Checklists or rating scales are useful in 
closed-ended questions and ratings because they simplify and quantify responses 
(Du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis & Bezuidenhout, 2014:152). Furthermore, a self-
completed questionnaire is one in which the respondent is required to tick 
appropriate boxes out of a range of answers (Welman et al., 2005:174). In this 
research permission was granted by interviewees to use their names in the report. 
Likert-type scales are mostly used in closed-ended questionnaires. A Likert-type 
scale requires respondents to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement 
with a variety of statements related to an attitude or object, and that evaluation 
mostly use a five-point scale (Du Plooy-Celliers et al., 2014:159). Further 
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clarification by May (2011:111) suggests that a Likert-type scale places people’s 
answers on an attitude continuum. Statements are devised to measure a 
particular aspect in which the researcher is interested, and the respondent is 
normally invited to agree, strongly agree, be neutral, disagree and disagree 
strongly with these statements.  
For the purpose of this research, the researcher chose closed-ended questions 
where respondents were offered a range of answers from which to choose. 
This research used a questionnaire (see Appendix A) that comprised of three 
sections.  
 Section A covered the demographic information of the respondents, such 
as race, the arm of service (Service), rank, length of service and academic 
qualifications. 
 Section B explored the leadership approaches in the SANDF. There were 
five scales for the respondents to choose from, namely autocratic 
approach, transactional leadership, situational leadership, democratic 
leadership and transformational leadership. 
 Section C dealt with the views of the respondents regarding the 
institutional culture of the SANDF. In the questionnaire, there were five 
choices for every question or statement: strongly agree, agree, neutral, 
disagree and strongly disagree. The choice represented the degree of 
agreement each respondent had with regard to the given question. 
Therefore, a structured questionnaire was used in this research to collect data 
from 54 respondents.  
In addition, an open-ended questionnaire (Appendix B) was used for the 
interviews to get respondents to formulate their own responses. The questionnaire 
was divided into the institutional culture and leadership. 
The researcher tested the feasibility and validity of the questionnaire with four 
respondents: one from each of the rank groups (brigadier general, colonel, 
lieutenant colonel and major), some of whom were already researchers or 
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students of research in the SANDF. These members used during pilot testing, and 
their responses did not form part of the sample although they were part of the 
population of interest to the researcher. Their comments and suggestions were 
used to rectify any flaws in the questionnaire. 
Once the questionnaires had been rectified, the researcher delivered the 
questionnaires to the selected sample for completion and the questionnaires were 
again collected after completion. The respondents were situated in Pretoria at 
institutions of learning around the same period. This had the advantage of low 
costs and little time taken to do the research. 
In this section, the researcher discussed the interviews and questionnaire. In the 
next section, the researcher discusses secondary sources such as documents. 
7.6.3 Documents 
Documents, in the context of this research, refer to the institutional policies, 
implementation instructions and procedures, which are designed to give direction 
to the rest of the DOD to reach its long-term goals of strategic change. These 
documents ensure that strategic decisions of the executive are translated into 
actions that will result into measurable outcomes.  
The researcher consulted policies of the DOD relevant to the research. In 
addition, with regard to classified information about the DOD, the researcher 
sought permission from the Defence Intelligence Division to have access to 
information and conduct the study. In turn, the researcher made sure that the 
image of the institution was not harmed and that confidentiality was maintained 
throughout the research. 
7.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Researchers work with an ethical-moral dimension that needs to be taken into 
consideration when they design a study so that sound ethical practise is built into 
the study design. Babbie and Mouton (2002:520) is associated with ethics and 
morality as both dealing with matters of right or wrong. Ethics define what is or is 
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not legitimate to do. The ethical issues are the concerns, dilemmas and conflicts 
that arise in terms of the proper way to conduct research (Neuman, 2011:129). 
In the following discussion, the researcher reports on the core of research ethics.  
7.7.1 Confidentiality and anonymity 
Confidentiality is regarded as the ethical protection of those who are the subjects 
of study by holding research data in confidence, so that there are no links 
between specific individuals and specific responses (Moore, 2000:120). This is 
done by presenting data only in an aggregate form (Neuman, 2011:139). In 
addition, the information that matches the participants’ identity to their responses 
will be known to the researcher only and will be made available to no one else (Du 
Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:267–268). During a confidential survey, the researcher 
will therefore promise the respondents not to divulge their identity in public if they 
so wish.  
Anonymity refers to the ethical protection that participants remain unknown and 
that their identity is concealed from public disclosure (Neuman, 2011:139). This 
means that a respondent is anonymous when the research cannot identify a 
participant or attach a given response to a given respondent (Du Plooy-Cilliers et 
al., 2014:267). Therefore, the researcher should ensure that the rights of 
respondents to remain anonymous be observed. However, this is mainly possible 
during the survey questionnaire, but not during interviews because the interviewer 
gathers information from identifiable interviewees (Babbie & Mouton, 2002:523). 
Based on the above theoretical explications, the researcher informed the 
respondents that no one would be forced to participate in the research and that 
participation was voluntary. They were also informed about confidentiality and 
anonymity.  
7.7.2  Informed consent  
As is the norm in research, participants were informed that they were taking part 
in research and that they would be informed of what would be required of them 
during their involvement in the research, whether and how their identities would 
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be protected, and how the results of the research will be used (Du Plooy-Cilliers et 
al., 2014:264). During the research, participants were formally informed about the 
aim of the research/investigation (Moore, 2000:120), and that they were the ones 
to give consent for their participation (Du Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:264). In 
addition, the participants were informed that participation was voluntary and that 
they had a right to withdraw at any time of the research if they so wished.  
7.8 DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS 
On completion of collecting the data, the researcher started to analyse and 
interpret the data to determine the results of the research. A descriptive data 
analysis method was employed for the analysis and interpretation. Statistics 
Programme Software System (SPSS, a computer program) was used to do the 
data analysis. For qualitative data, the interview summary form, which was 
completed after every interview, was analysed. 
With regard to the quantitative data, the completed questionnaires from the 
respondents are tabulated in Chapter 8. After analysis and the findings had been 
stated on the basis of qualitative and quantitative analyses, the findings were 
counter-checked to identify errors of measurement, unfairness and faults that 
could have affected the research negatively.  
7.9  SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researcher provided a description of the research methodology 
that was used during the research. In doing so, the research methodology was 
described as comprising the research design, methods of data collection, 
research setting and participants, population and sample, data collection and 
ethical considerations. Paramount in the explications under these topics was the 
identification of a descriptive method of research to gather information. In addition, 
qualitative and quantitative designs were described as methods that would be 
used to collect data, and such collection of data was to be drawn from both the 
primary (interviews and questionnaire) and secondary (institutional documents 
and scholarly) sources.  
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The population of the research was identified as members of the SANDF with the 
rank levels of brigadier general, colonel, lieutenant colonel and major. A sample 
was drawn from this population, and this sample assisted the researcher to draw 
conclusions regarding the behaviour of the larger population. 
In the next chapter, the researcher focuses on the analysis and interpretation of 
the research. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the preceding chapter the researcher gave an outline of the research 
methodology used for data collection. The researcher discussed the primary and 
secondary sources that were used for the collection of data during the present 
research. The primary sources were based on interviews and the administering of 
questionnaires, while secondary sources were obtained from the literature. The 
researcher also described the sampling method used for questionnaires and 
interviews in this study. In this chapter, the researcher brings together the 
literature and empirical findings and presents an interpretation of the data 
analysis.   
8.2 ANALYSIS OF THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY  
In this section, the researcher deals with the quantitative analysis of data and an 
interpretation of the findings. The researcher presents primary data that was of 
importance to the research. This data was derived from the questionnaires.  
The questionnaire consisted of four sections: biographical information, leadership 
approaches, change management, and the institutional culture of the SANDF. 
Concomitant with this approach, a five-point Likert-type rating scale (May, 
2011:111) was employed to evaluate the respondents’ perceptions. The 
respondents were to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
the statements by ticking ‘Strongly Agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Disagree’, or 
‘Strongly Disagree’. The positive responses ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Agree’ were 
grouped together and the same was done with the negative responses of 
‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Disagree’. The ‘Neutral’ statement remained the same.  
In addition, the analysis and interpretation were based on primary data 
(questionnaires and interviews) and secondary data (the literature review). The 
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questionnaire was administered to 95 respondents (66 men and 29 women) and 
11 interviews were conducted.  
The analysis of data is categorised according to the four objectives, namely to: 
 investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management; 
 explore the institutional culture of the SANDF; 
 examine the effects of change management in the transformation of the 
SANDF; and 
 explore the leadership approach that is necessary for transformation in the 
SANDF. 
The analysis as per objective is given below. 
8.2.1 Institutional culture  
The purpose of this objective was to establish the current institutional culture of 
the SANDF. This objective dealt with respondents’ responses to military values, 
norms and traditions. 
 
Figure 8.1 I accept military values and norms as a way of life 
Figure 8.1 reveals that an overwhelming 94.4% of respondents agreed that 
military values and norms are a way of life, while 3.7% disagreed and 1.9% 
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remained neutral. The results compared favourably with those from previous 
research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:151), which identified a high level 
(93.4%) of respondents with military values.  
 
Figure 8.2 The current regimental ceremonies are the same as in my 
previous armed force 
Figure 8.2 shows that 45.2% of respondents did not agree that the current 
regimental ceremonies were the same as in their previous armed force, whereas 
32.1% agreed and 22.6% were neutral on the research question. Interviewees 
(Mofokeng, 2011; Yam, 2011) reinforced the perception that the regimental 
ceremonies of their former armed forces (MK and APLA) were not part of the 
military culture of the SANDF. Research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:153) 
suggests that there is culturally nothing holistic, unified or reminiscent of national 
pride that reflects the new SANDF. The SANDF therefore, has failed to 
incorporate regimental ceremonies of some of the previous armed forces into the 
new SANDF, thereby not contributing to the establishment of the composite 
culture. 
The dominant military culture is that of the SADF, although the integrated armed 
forces are responsible for establishing a new institutional culture that evolves over 
time (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20–21; McShane & Von Glinow, 2005:487–488). 
The integrated armed forces are equally responsible to establish the new 
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composite culture that preserves the best features of the previous cultures 
(Andrews & Mead, 2009:20–21). There is no culture that is inferior or superior to 
another (Thiart, 1996:26); therefore, the new institutional culture of the SANDF 
needs to reflect the ceremonies and traditions of all integrated armed forces.  
 
 
Figure 8.3 The institutional culture and climate are supportive of 
designated groups 
Figure 8.3 shows that 11.3% of respondents disagreed that the institutional 
culture and climate are supportive of designated groups, whereas only 39.6% 
agreed and 45.3% were neutral. This shows that there is a common thread that 
runs through all defence forces, which among others, includes discipline, esprit de 
corps and respect. These bind soldiers and make it possible for them to work 
together with fellow soldiers from other countries in joint peacekeeping mission 
and combat operations (Mofokeng, 2011; Yam, 2011).  
The line managers are responsible (RSA, 1997b:10) for ensuring that strategic 
change in the SANDF is taking place in a changed HR culture (RSA, 1997b:10) 
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and an enabling institutional environment (RSA, 1997a:11–12). HR policies, such 
as affirmative action, gender equity and equal opportunities, have been instituted 
and significant gains have been realised as indicated in 8.2.3. 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and the regimental system of my 
former defence or armed force have been incorporated and are currently 
being practiced in the SANDF 
In response to the statement, “Artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental 
systems of my former force have been incorporated and are currently practised in 
the SANDF”, 30.2% of respondents agreed, while an equal 30.2% disagreed. This 
reflected a challenge because the majority of respondents at 39.6% remained 
neutral. This concurred with research conducted by Kahn and Louw (2013:80), 
which also came to the conclusion from similar results that the beliefs, traditions 
and values of the TBVC and NSFs were excluded from the new military 
institutional culture of the SANDF. APLA had its own unique march and drill style, 
which they felt could have been used in the SANDF (Mofokeng, 2011; Motloung, 
2011). Research shows that the organisational culture of the SANDF is largely a 
replica of the former SADF (Kahn, 2005:243; Rudman, 2011; Yam, 2011).  
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Figure 8.5 The institutional culture of the SANDF has changed over the 
last 10 years (since 2004) 
The majority of respondents (67.9%) agreed that the institutional culture of the 
SANDF had changed over the previous 10 years (2004–2014), whereas 7.6% 
disagreed and 24.5% were neutral. Members of the SANDF are challenged to 
adapt their lifestyle, attitudes and behaviour to a specific military culture, and the 
present research suggests that they are shifting in the right direction albeit 
towards the culture adopted from the former SADF. The SANDF will have to 
transform to an acceptable military culture in which all members, irrespective of 
their own culture, can coexist and in which operational readiness can be assured 
(DOD Defence Review, 1998: Para 63).  
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Figure 8.6 Will the future institutional culture of the SANDF reflect cultural 
practices of your former armed force? 
Figure 8.6 reflects respondents’ perceptions regarding whether the military culture 
of the SANDF will evolve to include the shared beliefs, norms and traditions of all 
constituent forces. The figure reveals that 28.3% of respondents agreed that the 
future institutional culture of the SANDF would reflect the cultural practices of their 
former forces, while 20.8% disagreed and 50.9% remained neutral. The results 
show that 50.9% of the middle officers were uncertain of whether the cultural 
practices of their former forces would be incorporated in the future organisational 
culture of the SANDF, which is cause for concern. Since the culture of the SANDF 
is still developing towards a culture of inclusiveness, it can be assumed that the 
cultural practices of former forces will be assimilated into the new culture. In their 
research, Kahn and Louw (2013:80) find that the culture of the SANDF could be 
learnt and inculcated during formal and informal training, military ceremonies, 
exercises and operations. However, the qualitative research showed that between 
1994 and the time of the interviews in 2011, not much had changed in respect of 
cultural inclusiveness. 
In summary, the research objective was to explore the institutional culture of the 
SANDF and especially to confirm whether the culture of the SANDF was reflective 
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of the good cultural norms and traditions of the constituent forces. It clearly shows 
that, at the time of this research, the new institutional culture of the SANDF was 
not inclusive of the TBVC and NSFs. It means that the SANDF still has a long way 
to go to reflect the constituent forces.  
8.2.2 Change management 
The purpose of this objective was to establish the extent to which the change 
management had effected transformation in the SANDF. At the time of this 
research, the SANDF was still engaged in change management to transform itself 
in terms of cultural and human capital. Since its inception in 1998, the 
Transformation Management Chief Directorate has been involved in ensuring and 
monitoring progress with affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes in 
the SANDF, as guided by Section 11 of the White Paper on Defence, 1998 (RSA 
1996:6).  
 
 
Figure 8.7 Gender representation of the respondents 
The purpose of this question was to establish progress with respect to human 
transformation in the SANDF. Figure 8.7 shows that, of the respondents, 68.5% 
were men compared to 31.5% women. This gender representation almost reflects 
the corporate workforce of the SANDF, which in 2014 was 71% men and 29% 
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women (DOD Annual Report for the Financial Year 2013/14:106). This shows that 
the SANDF is predominantly a male-oriented environment, which is probably why 
mostly male officers participated in the research. As mentioned by Monethi 
(2013:49), the representivity targets issued by the Public Service Commission 
(2008) were that, by 2009, government institutions had to comprise: 
 75% blacks; 
 50% women in senior management services and 
 2% people with disabilities. 
However, by 2009, women in senior management services stood at 34.87% in the 
public service (Kahn & Motsoeneng, 2014:1066) and 11.98% in the SANDF (Kahn 
& Louw 2013:78). This clearly shows that the SANDF had not achieved its goal of 
50% women in SMSs.  
 
 
Figure 8.8 Length of service in the SANDF 
Figure 8.8 reflects that 98.1% members have more than 11 years of service in the 
SANDF. According to Hull (2005:97), military institutions produce a strong 
institutional culture, because they are led by long-serving officials. Figure 8.8 
reveals that 98% of respondents had a length of service that spanned from 11 to 
20 years. Therefore, it can be expected that these members had an institutional 
memory, a fair knowledge about the culture, norms and traditions of the SANDF. 
Long service also ensures that the military leadership could be firmly grounded in 
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the military culture of the SANDF. These long-serving members in the SANDF 
could be utilised to advance culture, because they could influence behaviour of 
newcomers through ‘showing-by-doing’. 
 
 
Figure 8.9  Candidates are selected for senior management positions 
based on their competency and qualifications 
The figure illustrates that 66.5% of respondents did not agree that the selection of 
candidates for senior management positions was based on their competency and 
qualifications, whereas only 7.5% agreed and 24.1% were neutral on this issue. 
Therefore, the SANDF has a problem in ensuring that members in senior 
management positions were promoted based on their competencies and 
qualifications. 
The Department of Public Service and Administration’s (DPSA) Senior 
Management Service Handbook (RSA, 2003:9) claims that selection on merit is 
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fundamental to ensure that public service institutions recruit and promote people 
of the highest calibre. They must ensure that the person selected is the best 
applicant and is best suited on the basis of: 
 skills; 
 experience; 
 abilities; 
 personal attributes; 
 competencies; and  
 the need to achieve a representative and diverse workforce. 
In addition, job-related selection should be taken into account, such as: 
 competencies acquired through past experience; 
 training received; 
 learning potential; and  
 education should not be the sole determinant of suitability. 
Furthermore, the White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public 
Service (1997) says that selection criteria for appointment or promotion should be 
based on the inherent requirements of the position to be filled only and should be 
based on competencies. This White Paper further says that such merit must be 
defined within the context of employment equity.  
The promotion policy of the SA Army, for example, pronounces the importance of 
appropriate qualifications, relevant experience, demonstrated capabilities, 
proficiency, as well as the potential and capacity to function at the next, higher 
level as the criteria to be used for promotion, irrespective of race or gender (South 
African Army, 2015:9). The promotion is primarily coupled to specific institutional 
requirements, for example the institution might require a member to be promoted 
into a post where his/her skills and knowledge are required for institutional 
effectiveness. The institution could also take into account the needs of the 
individual, for example the member might feel comfortable and prefer to work in 
deployment areas outside his or her own province and country (South African 
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Army, 2015:9). However, the qualitative research found that the SANDF overlooks 
the guidelines of the DPSA and the White Paper on Human Resource 
Management for Public Service when promoting staff. 
 
 
Figure 8.10 The command group of my unit does not respect my culture 
In response to the statement “The command group of my unit does not respect 
my culture”, 47.1% of the respondents did not agree, while 18.9% agreed and 
34% remained neutral. This shows that respondents indicated that, at the time of 
this research (2011), there was respect for cultural differences. These results are 
underscored by previous research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:152), who 
revealed that 26.1% agreed while 56.3% disagreed that there was respect for 
cultural differences. These results show that there is a need for inter-cultural 
socialisation, because it not only allows employees to learn each other’s culture, 
but also allows managers to deal with subordinates’ misconceptions and to 
encourage them to have trust in management (Higgs, 2011; Mdlulwa, 2011; 
Motloung, 2011).  
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Figure 8.11 The team spirit in the section where I work is good 
Figure 8.11 shows that, according to the respondents, there was a degree of 
cross-cultural interaction between different former armed forces regarding an 
understanding of commitment and pride in the SANDF. The majority of 
respondents (61.6%) agreed that the team spirit in their sections was good, 
whereas 24.5% disagreed and 11.3% were neutral. This is a positive development 
that needs to be nurtured. 
Members of the SANDF have a shared sense of sacrifice and identity that binds 
them together with their fellow soldiers (Dorn et al., 2000:8). In addition, they have 
a sense of identity and comradeship with their colleagues in the same unit.  
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Figure 8.12 The SANDF has a culture of non-racialism 
Figure 8.12 reflects that, at the time of this research, 39.7% of the respondents 
did not agree that the SANDF had a culture of non-racialism, whereas 32.0% 
agreed and 24.5% were neutral. These results are consistent with those from 
previous research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:153), which revealed that 
34.9% of respondents agreed that the DOD had a culture of non-racialism, while 
38.6% disagreed.  
Therefore, at the time of this research, it was clear that the SANDF had not yet 
succeeded in creating a culture of non-racialism. The SANDF has a hegemonic 
male-dominated culture and, according to Kilduff and Mehra (1996:119–120), 
hegemonic male cultures are frequently rife with racism. The principle of defence 
in a democracy as derived from the Constitution (1996), mandates that the 
SANDF should develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory 
institutional culture. However, in reality the opposite seems to be true. 
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Figure 8.13 The culture of the SANDF promotes non-discrimination on the 
gender basis 
The research showed that 47.1% of the respondents agreed that the culture of the 
SANDF promotes non-discrimination on the basis of gender, while 30.2% 
disagreed and 20.8% remained neutral. These results were not consistent with 
that from previous research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:153), which 
revealed that 34.9% of respondents agreed that the DOD had a culture of non-
gender discrimination whereas 38.6% disagreed. 
Hegemonic male cultures constrain the entry and progress of women and 
minorities in institutions (Metz & Kulik, 2008:370), these cultures are frequently 
rife with sexism and racism (Kilduff & Mehra 1996:119–120), and women are not 
considered as equals (Eccles, 1996:87–88). The SANDF tends to be a male 
hegemonic institution, because its primary positions (riflemen) are prototypically 
associated with masculine attributes (strength, authority and power) (Dlulane, 
2011; Rudman, 2011).  
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The SANDF has also adapted the 50% women in SMS positions (of the 
government) to 40% representation in senior management decision-making 
bodies and/or committees (Kahn, 2014:1066). The SANDF has failed to reach this 
target. The SANDF culture does not promote non-discrimination on the basis of 
gender. 
 
 
Figure 8.14 My supervisor treats all his/her subordinates equally 
Figure 8.14 depicts that 37.7% of respondents said that their superiors did not 
treat them equally with a very close percentage of 35.8% feeling that their 
supervisors treated them equally, whereas 22.6% were neutral. No matter how 
little the difference between those who felt that they were being treated equally 
and those who did not, this is cause for concern. A new integrated institutional 
culture evolves over time (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20–21). However, between 
1994 and 2014, the SANDF did not manage to establish equal treatment for men 
and women as well as treatment of juniors by seniors. 
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The Code of Conduct, as derived from the White Paper on Defence 1998 (RSA 
1998:9) and the Constitution (1996), states that the SANDF shall respect the 
rights and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline 
and training. The Code of Conduct helps to guide soldiers’ behaviour, be it 
internally or towards the members of society, and to instil patriotism (Asch & 
Hosek, 2004:9). However, the qualitative research revealed that the SANDF does 
not treat its members equally. 
 
 
Figure 8.15 I regularly socialise with my colleagues in the unit, department, 
division and service 
As illustrated in Figure 8.15, the researcher found that 69.9% of respondents 
agreed that they regularly socialised with their colleagues in their respective units, 
departments, divisions and services, while 22.7% disagreed and 7.5% were 
neutral. However, interviewees stated that they engaged in formal social events or 
activities with their rank group colleagues (officers), but were not allowed to 
fraternise with lower ranks (non-commissioned officers) (Higgs, 2011; Kula, 2011). 
This is meant to instil respect for the seniority of ranks and command and control. 
Furthermore, interviews with Xundu (2011) and Dibetso (2011) revealed that 
during formal military socialisation, former forces seem to gather rather than to 
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interact with other former forces. Part of the military culture is military 
socialisation, inter-cultural learning and commemoration of military events (Kahn 
& Louw, 2013:78).  
 
 
Figure 8.16  The SANDF’s human resource practices and policies make 
provision for my cultural obligations 
The quantitative research revealed that 43.4% of the respondents agreed that the 
HR practices and policies of the SANDF make provision for their cultural 
obligations, compared to 30.2% who disagreed and 26.4% who were neutral. 
Contrary to this response, the interviewees (Kula, 2011; Mdlulwa, 2011) stated 
that their cultural beliefs were not catered for by the HR practices and policies. 
Kahn and Louw (2013:87) found that the leave policy did not make provision for 
soldiers to travel to the place of an accident or site of death to collect the spirit of 
the deceased.  
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Figure 8.17  In your opinion, what does the appointment suffix in your force 
number PE mean? 
When respondents were asked the question “In your opinion, what does your 
appointment suffix PE mean?”, 3.8% of the respondents incorrectly indicated 
‘permanent force’ (PF), while 11.3% responded correctly and 60.4% answers 
were invalid (spoilt). It is clear that the respondents did not know what the 
appointment suffix ‘PE’ means. It is obvious that they were indoctrinated to 
believe that ‘Permanent European’ (PE) means ‘permanent force’ (PF), which is 
inaccurate. It is clear that most of the respondents were not aware of the racial 
connotation attached to PE, and it shows that former forces do not know each 
other’s history. The interviewees brought another perspective to the research. The 
respondents assumed that PE means ‘permanent force’ (PF) and never asked 
what PE really means. When the meaning of PE and its relatedness to apartheid 
were explained to the interviewees, they categorically stated that they would 
prefer an appointment suffix that is neutral. Interviewees stated that their former 
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forces had no appointment suffixes (Dlulane, 2011; Makgae, 2011). This explains 
why the TBVC and NSFs never questioned the appointment suffix. It is obvious 
that a small minority of former SADF members were aware of the meaning of the 
suffix PE.  
In summary, the qualitative research revealed that the SANDF was found lacking 
in ensuring that members of the SANDF respect each other’s cultural differences, 
instilling a culture of non-racialism, and ensuring that HR practices and policies 
address the cultural differences of all constituent forces. It showed that the new 
institutional culture of the SANDF is a replica of the former SADF, which nullifies 
an inclusive institutional culture. 
8.2.3 Leadership  
Objective four (refer to 1.4) sought to establish the official leadership approach 
that the SANDF adopted to guide transformation. During the administration of the 
questionnaire, the different leadership approaches were explained to 
respondents. Respondents were then asked to indicate the leadership 
approaches in the SANDF by choosing from amongst the following options: 
 Autocratic leadership 
 Transactional leadership 
 Situational leadership 
 Democratic leadership 
 Transformational leadership. 
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Figure 8.18 What was the predominant leadership approach of your former 
armed force? 
Figure 8.18 shows that 40.2% of respondents expressed that the predominant 
leadership approach of their former armed forces (MK, APLA, SADF and TBVC 
forces) was autocratic, 16.7% indicated democratic, 13.0% situational, 11.1% 
transactional and 5.6% transformational leadership. Of the answers, 7.4% were 
invalid. Interviewees from the constituent forces (Dlulane, 2011; Fongoqa, 2011; 
Gagiano, 2011; Kula, 2011; Motloung, 2011) endorsed the view expressed by the 
majority of respondents that an autocratic leadership approach was predominant 
in their former forces.  
An autocratic leadership approach is seen to be designed to stifle debate and 
avoid soldiers questioning orders and commands (Kahn & Naidoo, 2011:73). All 
militaries are inclined to adopt an autocratic leadership approach. This is more 
evident during combat (Graf et al., 1992:1).  
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Figure 8.19  What is the current predominant leadership approach being 
practiced in the SANDF? 
Figure 8.19 depicts that – 
 26% of the respondents were of the view that an autocratic leadership 
approach was being practised in the SANDF; 
 22% indicated that a democratic leadership approach had been adopted;  
 19% said it was transformational;  
 another 19% were of the view that it was situational; and  
 9% revealed it to be a transactional leadership approach; while 
 5% did not commit to an answer.  
Interviewees (Dibetso, 2011; Fongoqa, 2011) also highlighted that they were not 
aware of the officially adopted leadership approach for transformation in the 
SANDF. This shows that middle management officers were not aware that a 
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transactional leadership approach was adopted by the SANDF as the official 
leadership approach (DOD, 2009a:D1-1). The failure to know the official 
leadership approach can be ascribed not only to a lack of knowledge in reading 
policies and doctrine, but also in communicating these to the members of the 
SANDF. 
 
 
Figure 8.20 What is your style of leadership? 
Figure 8.20 shows that the majority of respondents (35.1%) preferred to apply a 
transformational style of leadership, compared to 27.8% respondents who desired 
a democratic leadership style, whereas 22.2% respondents favoured to use a 
situational leadership style. This might be because the respondents had been 
taught different leadership styles during training. Therefore, they were conversant 
with the mentioned leadership styles and when they were applicable. For 
example, autocratic leadership is used in combat, while transactional leadership 
was used for promotions prior to 1994, situational for peace missions and a 
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democratic leadership is especially relevant for internal institutional functioning. It 
is worth noting that situational, democratic and transformational leadership styles 
are dominant among the respondents as the leadership style preferred by the 
middle management in the SANDF.  
 
 
Figure 8.21  Are men better leaders than women? 
Figure 8.21 reflects respondents’ answers on whether men and women enjoy 
equal leadership opportunities, which is in line with the government imperative of 
equal opportunities. Figure 8.21 depicts that a slight majority of respondents 
(35.1%) felt that men are not better leaders than women, although 33.4% 
disagreed. There was a small margin of 1.8% difference between these 
responses. Interviewees (Debetso, 2011; Mothlabane, 2011) shared the view that 
men are not better leaders than women. Therefore, both men and women should 
receive equal leadership development opportunities to fill senior management 
positions. Pounder and Coleman, (2002:127) argue that the debate about gender 
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and leadership is inconsequential because it is the results of work performance 
that count regardless of gender. This is underscored by the findings by the Pew 
Research Centre (2015:1) that there is little difference between men and women 
in terms of several of leadership traits.  
 
 
Figure 8.22  Transactional leadership approach has been adopted by the 
SANDF 
Figure 8.22 shows that 41% of respondents disagreed that a transactional 
leadership approach had been adopted by the SANDF compared to 25.9% who 
agree and 32% who were neutral. This confirms that, at the time of this research, 
middle management officers were not aware of the official transactional 
leadership approach that the SANDF had adopted (DOD 2009a:D1-1). These 
results show a need for clear and decisive communication of important doctrine 
and policies as well as a need for including such important doctrinal and policy 
decisions in leadership training and development manuals.  
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In summary, a transactional leadership approach was officially adopted by the 
SANDF for transformation instead of a transformational leadership approach. 
According to Esterhuyse (2003:7), the transformational leadership approach is 
especially important when one has a second-order change in mind, that is, the 
revolutionary and fundamental change of an institution. As a result of adopting the 
transactional leadership in the SANDF, the status quo has remained unaltered. 
Furthermore, there also seems to be no communication to members about this 
leadership approach.  
8.3  ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
In this section, the researcher deals with the qualitative analysis of literature and 
the interpretation of the findings. The analysis is grouped under similar headings 
as the quantitative analysis.  
8.3.1 Strategic change management 
In this section, the researcher deals with the first objective (refer to 1.4), which 
was to investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management. 
The research on strategic change management in the SANDF paid attention to 
cultural and human capital transformation. Cultural transformation, according to 
Williams (2001:1), is concerned with the radical change of the military culture, the 
leadership, management and the administration ethos, the value system and the 
traditions, which are the bedrock of the military.  
The SANDF is the result of the integration of five statutory forces (the SADF, 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) and two non-statutory forces (MK 
and APLA). The view expressed by Andrews and Mead (2009:21), is that these 
constituent forces are supposed to be responsible for establishing a new culture 
that evolves over time. In essence, a new composite culture should be created 
which preserves the best features of the previous cultures of the integrated armed 
forces into the SANDF.  
In the current SANDF, there seems to be a lack of evidence that the best features 
of the previous cultures of the constituent forces were considered in creating the 
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new composite culture (Mofokeng, 2011; Yam, 2011). The leadership of the 
SANDF has failed to establish an inclusive military culture, which is their 
responsibility (McShane & Von Glinow, 2005:490). The dominant culture in the 
SANDF is a replica of the former SADF with a few new structural designs 
(Fongoqa, 2011; Kahn, 2005:243; Xundu, 2011). 
Human capital transformation involves radically changing the racial, gender and 
ethnic composition of the SANDF and its HR practices (Williams, 2001:1). Section 
195(1)(h) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (RSA, 
1996a:111) gives guidance that good Human Resource Management (HRM) and 
the optimal development of human potential (RSA, 1996b:107) should take place 
in a transformed institutional culture and changed HR environment (RSA, 
1997a:11–12). The institutional culture of the SANDF reflects that the racial and 
gender composition has not yet transformed although some of the HR policies, 
guidelines and practices have changed. 
The HR strategic goal of the SANDF determines the racial and gender ratios, 
which should reflect the demographics of South Africa as prescribed in the 
Defence Review of 1998 (Kubu, 2009:57). The SANDF endeavoured to achieve 
the HR goals through instituting affirmative action, gender equity and racial goals. 
Racial targets took centre stage rather than the transformation of human 
resources, namely development and empowerment of the workforce of the 
SANDF. To comply with racial targets of 1998 meant that members were 
promoted without the necessary experience and military qualifications and without 
their optimal human potential being developed. Hence, a perception exists that 
the most suitable and competent members were not appointed to the appropriate 
posts. 
8.3.2 Institutional culture 
The integration into the SANDF in 1994 included five statutory forces (SADF and 
TBVC) and the two non-statutory forces (MK and APLA). The non-statutory and 
statutory forces integrated into the SANDF have a responsibility to establish a 
new composite institutional culture that preserves the best features of the 
168 
 
previous cultures. Such a new composite culture evolves over time (Andrews & 
Mead 2009:20–21). However, twenty years later, the new institutional culture of 
SANDF does not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of 
all former forces (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007:255). None of the current 
regimental ceremonies of the SANDF is from the previous armed forces, except 
the SADF (Mofokeng, 2011; Rudman, 2011; Yam, 2011; also see Figure 8.2). 
Since no culture among the integrated forces is inferior or superior to another 
(Thiart 1996:26), the new institutional culture of the SANDF should have been 
inclusive of all integrated armed forces.  
8.3.3 Change management 
Strong institutional cultures have inclusive properties that create internal 
consensus and cohesiveness, but dysfunctional cultures exclude as well as 
include (Metz & Kulik, 2008:370). It can then be concluded that the SANDF has a 
dysfunctional culture, which constrains the advancement of people who are 
different in terms of race (see Figure 8.12) or gender from the dominant culture. 
Furthermore, to be considered is the fact that the SANDF as a male hegemonic 
culture can be seen as rife with sexism (Kilduff & Mehra, 1996:119–120), and 
women are not seen as equal to men (Eccles, 1996:87–88). Soni (2000:399), who 
claims that the dominant group, the former SADF, is not supportive of diversity in 
the SANDF, underscores this. Therefore, it is expected that efforts by HR 
practitioners of the SANDF to make the culture more inclusive are likely to be met 
with considerable resistance because members of dysfunctional cultures have a 
vested interest in maintaining the exclusivity of the institution. Leaders and 
managers in those cultures are unlikely to be trained to implement diversity 
policies, and would receive little support from colleagues for implementing them. 
Wilson (2000:299) supports this view, stating that HR policies alone are 
insufficient to overcome a “cultural devaluing of difference”.  
The opposite is true as institutional cultural changes begin to take place. 
Although cultural change is a process that takes years to undo traditions, 
assumptions, values and norms that have become part of employees’ lifestyle 
169 
 
(Thompson & Strickland, 2003:378–379), after 20 years (1994–2014), the SANDF 
has not changed the perceived dominant culture of the SADF fundamentally (see 
Figure 8.2). Cultural change in the SANDF is supposed to be implemented in a 
changing environment. The main elements are a change in management and 
work environment, including regulations, policies and practices (RSA, 1997a:11–
12). A change in the work environment will allow members of the SANDF to adapt 
to the culture of the institution. The management of the SANDF should first 
embrace change and then create an enabling institutional environment that allows 
for cultural change (Luthans, 2005:119). The workforce should be encouraged 
and motivated to follow the new trends set by management (Thompson & 
Strickland, 2003:378–379). 
8.3.4 Leadership 
Transactional leadership is about helping institutions achieve their current 
objectives more effectively (Adair, 2003:23–24), without fundamentally changing 
everything. It is effective when the new institution undertakes short-term projects 
to increase production (Reggio & Murphy, 2002:106–107). It focuses on fine-
tuning and maintaining the status quo (Tucker & Russell, 2004:103). It is clear that 
transactional leadership is designed to accomplish short-term goals, which is in 
contradiction with section 199(2) of the Constitution, 1996, which mandates the 
SANDF as the only defence force of the Republic of South Africa. This implies 
that the transformation of the SANDF is a long-term goal, which requires a 
transformational leadership approach (RSA, 1997a:11–12). 
The qualitative research (see Figures 8.8 and 8.10) revealed that the institutional 
culture of the SANDF at the time of this research (i.e. 2011) is a replica of the 
former SADF. It showed that the status quo, preserved by transactional 
leadership, would benefit the predominant culture, namely the former SADF, its 
policies, practices, norms and traditions. This raises the following questions.  
 How could the SANDF incorporate and merge the transformational goals 
and objectives when being guided by apartheid practices and policies?  
 How could the SANDF institute transactional leadership?  
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 How could the SANDF persuade and get the acceptance of its officers to 
implement transformational leadership?  
 How could black officers benefit from transformational leadership?  
It needs to be acknowledged that the leadership of the SANDF erred in terms of 
leadership approach by adopting a transactional leadership approach instead of 
transformational leadership that is in line with the White Paper on the 
Transformation of the Public Service (RSA, 1997a:11–12) and the spirit of the 
Constitution, 1996 (RSA, 1996b:111). However, the quantitative evidence (see 
Figure 8.20) suggests that the majority of respondents at middle management 
level preferred to apply transformational leadership, which is commensurate with 
managing second-order change in institutions (Esterhuyse, 2003:7). 
The qualitative research showed that the transactional leadership approach 
reinforced the assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of the former SADF in 
the new institutional culture of the SANDF. It therefore failed to transform the 
culture of the SANDF to one of inclusiveness. Thus, the status quo remained. A 
transformational leadership approach would achieve cultural inclusiveness in the 
SANDF (Morgan, Green, Shinn & Robinson, 2008:301–302; Van Wart, 2008:80). 
The application of the transformational leadership approach would benefit black 
officers, in that they would be represented at all levels of the military hierarchy. 
The SANDF has not yet managed to lead by example, treating subordinates 
equally (see Figure 8.14) with dignity and respect, showing a keen interest in their 
well-being and career advancement without favour (Dlulane 2011; Higgs 2011; 
McShane & Von Glinow, 2007:260). 
8.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the theory and questionnaire were interpreted according to the 
primary research question stated in Chapter 1, namely: 
Has transformation in the SANDF as a planned strategic change intervention 
been adequately managed (from 1994 to 2014) to achieve the desired 
results? 
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Furthermore, the purpose of this study, which was to provide an evaluation of the 
theory and practice of transformation and strategic change management in the 
SANDF, was considered during the analysis and interpretation of data.  
It can be concluded from the quantitative and qualitative research that the 
institutional culture of the SANDF does not reflect shared assumptions, beliefs, 
traditions and values of all the integrated former armed forces. The current culture 
seems to reflect the culture of the former SADF. Therefore, there is no visible 
inclusive military culture in the SANDF. This means that there was no effort to 
take the best features of the previous cultures of the constituent forces into 
consideration when creating the new composite culture.  
Furthermore, quantitative and qualitative research shows that promotion and 
placement of members without the necessary experience and without their human 
potential being optimally developed have allowed the SANDF to miss the 
opportunity to place the right member in the right post. The change management 
process resulted in the most competent members not being appointed in the most 
appropriate positions. It also failed to reflect the African culture in institutional 
policies and practices.  
Furthermore, the research found that a transactional leadership approach, which 
is not commensurate with a transforming institution because it preserves the 
status quo, was officially adopted as the leadership approach to be applied for 
transformation. This is contrary to the transformational leadership approach, 
which fits well in transforming institutions. The quantitative research revealed that 
the middle management level of leadership of the SANDF prefers the 
transformational leadership approach, which is commensurate with managing 
second-order change in institutions. 
The next chapter, based on the analysis given, the researcher reports the findings 
of the research, gives recommendations to rectify shortcomings, and presents the 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter focused on the data analysis and qualitative interpretation of 
the research. Based on the analysis and findings reported in the previous chapter, 
in this chapter, a synthesis of all chapters of this thesis identify findings are 
identified, and make recommendations and present conclusions are given. 
9.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this study was to determine the strategic change management in 
the SANDF (1994–2014). To address the stated purpose of the study, the 
following research objectives, as mentioned in Chapter One, were formulated to 
guide the study: 
 to investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management; 
 to explore the institutional culture of the SANDF; 
 to examine the effects of strategic change management in the 
transformation of the SANDF; and 
 to explore the leadership approach that is necessary for transformation in 
the SANDF. 
9.3 SYNTHESIS OF CHAPTERS 
In an attempt to investigate strategic change management in the SANDF, the 
proposal for the study was discussed in Chapter One with specific reference to 
the background and rationale for the study, an outline of the problem statement, 
study objectives, study demarcation period, terminological clarification, research 
methodology, literature review, and finally an outline of the chapters.  
In Chapter Two, the researcher dealt with the institutional context of strategic 
change management from a theoretical perspective. The discussion focused on 
transformational change as a type of change.  
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In Chapter Three, the researcher focused on a discussion of a strategic 
management framework with the focus on theoretical perspectives of strategic 
management, strategic planning and the strategic management process. Strategic 
management was defined as the process of coordinating the management 
function in a structured manner to achieve institutional objectives. This process 
was underpinned by three stages. The first was the environmental scanning 
where systematic monitoring of external forces was influencing the institution. The 
second stage was the strategy formulation and was regarded as the process of 
determining appropriate courses of action for the accomplishment of the 
objectives of the institution. The third stage was the strategy implementation 
whereby institutional strategies were converted into pragmatic actions. It was 
during this stage that decisions about allocation of resources were made. 
In Chapter Four, the researcher discussed different definitions of institutional 
culture and the different levels that characterise it. Here the focus was especially 
on the theoretical positioning of the basic nature of an institutional culture. Types 
of institutional cultures, strong and weak institutional cultures and an overview of 
military culture were discussed. 
In Chapter Five, the evolution of the military culture in South Africa was 
discussed. Highlighted in this chapter was the exclusion of the indigenous African 
militaries and their military cultures in the integration of forces during the formation 
of the UDF in 1912, and the military culture transformation in 1948 and 1994. 
These were coupled with changes in government. However, it was noted that the 
militaries were serving the governments of the day and did not cease to exist 
when a new government came to power. Also elucidated in this chapter, was the 
dominance of British military culture vestiges in the UDF, SADF and SANDF. 
In Chapter Six, two main leadership approaches, transactional and 
transformational leadership, were discussed, and five leadership styles associated 
with military institutions were discussed, namely authoritarian, democratic, 
laissez-faire, situational, and command and control. It was concluded that 
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leadership approaches are common to all institutions except command and 
control, which can only be applied in military institutions.  
In Chapter Seven, the researcher provided a description of the research 
methodology that was used in the research. The research methodology dealt with 
the research design, methods of data collection, research setting and participants, 
population and sampling, data collection and ethical considerations. 
In Chapter Eight, the researcher presented the qualitative and quantitative data of 
the research. Quantitative data was translated into descriptive statistics and 
presented in the form of bar graphs. In addition, qualitative data that was collected 
through interviews and the document analysis was presented in the form of 
narratives.  
In the current chapter, Chapter Nine, the researcher presents the research 
findings, recommendations and conclusions. 
9.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In this section, the researcher provides the findings stemming from the literature 
review, Chapters Two to Six, and the empirical analysis of this study reported on 
in Chapter Eight.  
9.4.1 Strategic change management 
In this section, the researcher deals with the first objective to investigate the 
theories that was mentioned in Chapter One. Quantitative and qualitative research 
found the following with respect to strategic change management. 
The management of the SANDF was unsuccessful in establishing an inclusive 
military culture, because they have failed to consider the best features of the 
previous cultures of the constituent armed forces (MK, APLA, TBVC and SADF) to 
create the new composite culture of the SANDF. The dominant culture in the 
SANDF is that of the former SADF with certain additions, a new structure and 
hierarchal design.  
The SANDF strategic goal of human capital transformation as adopted from the 
1998 Defence Review remained constant without adjusting it according to the 
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2001 and 2011 population censuses, as well as the 2014 Mid-Year Population 
Estimates of South Africa. 
Therefore, the SANDF has not kept pace with strategic change management, 
because it still adheres to the race targets as stipulated in the Defence Review of 
1998, which does not correlate with the 2014 population estimates.  
The SANDF is struggling to fulfil section 9 of the 1996 Constitution, which deals 
with gender equality. Therefore, the SANDF does not reflect the demographics of 
the South African population. 
Certain units and regiments, among others the Natal Carbineers Regiment 
(established in 1855) and the Transvaal Scottish Regiment (established in 1905), 
of the SANDF still have colonial names that are linked to Britain. However, there 
has been a concerted effort to rename certain military units, especially in the 
South African Navy, that have African names (such as SS Masego, SS Mendi and 
SS Maxeke). This shows the gradual inroads that the SANDF has made to portray 
an African defence force.  
By 2014, the SANDF was still honouring its members by bestowing former MK 
medals only on MK members. The same principle applies to APLA and TBVC 
forces. These medals distinguish members according to their former armed 
forces, and do not create unity and therefore do not contribute to an inclusive 
military culture.  
9.4.2 Institutional culture 
In this section, the researcher deals with the second objective that was mentioned 
in Chapter One. This objective attempted to establish whether the current 
institutional culture of the SANDF is the sum of all the good cultures taken from 
the constituent forces as mentioned in paragraph 1.4. 
The quantitative research results showed that the majority of respondents 
disagreed (45.3%) that the current regimental ceremonies of the SANDF are 
inclusive of their former armed forces (see Figure 8.2), 32.1% agreed and 22.6% 
were neutral). This clearly shows that the SANDF has failed to incorporate 
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regimental ceremonies of the previous armed forces into the new SANDF. 
Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative research showed that the SANDF had 
failed to incorporate regimental ceremonies of the previous armed force into the 
SANDF to form a composite inclusive culture.  
The quantitative research revealed that 49.1% of respondents disagreed that, at 
the time of this research, the institutional culture and climate were supportive of 
designated groups, whereas only 5.7% agreed, and 37.7% were neutral (see 
Figure 8.3).  
The qualitative research showed that, at the time of the research, the 
organisational culture of the SANDF did not reflect the shared assumptions, 
beliefs, traditions and values of all integrated armed forces (Roos, 1997:56). 
However, the integrated armed forces were collectively responsible for 
establishing a new institutional culture that evolved over time (Andrews & Mead, 
2009:20–21; McShane & Von Glinow, 2005:487–488; Thiart, 1996:26). Twenty 
years after 1994, the organisational culture of the SANDF was still largely a 
replica of the former SADF, except for a few design and structural changes (Kahn, 
2005:243).  
Rewarding bravery and good service, the new medal system continues the old 
order by bestowing medals of the former MK, APLA, TBVC and SADF on 
members in the new SANDF.  
This shows that artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental systems of 
integrated former armed forces, except the SADF, have not been incorporated 
and practised in the SANDF.  
9.4.3  Change management 
In this section, the researcher addresses study objective 3 and identifies the 
quantitative and qualitative research findings. The quantitative research findings 
reflected that 39.7% of the respondents did not agree that the SANDF has a 
culture of non-racialism, whereas 34.0% agreed, 24.5% remained neutral and 
1.9% of the answers were invalid (see Figure 8.12). In addition, the SANDF has a 
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hegemonic male culture (see Figure 8.7) and, according to Kilduff and Mehra 
(1996:119–120), hegemonic male cultures are frequently rife with racism and 
sexism. The SANDF tends to be a ‘male hegemonic’ institution because its 
primary positions (riflemen) are prototypically associated with masculine attributes 
(strength, authority and power) (Mdluli, 2011; Rudman 2011). Therefore, both the 
quantitative and qualitative research findings showed that the SANDF had failed 
in instituting change management strategies and interventions to bring about 
change. 
The quantitative research showed that 47.1% of respondents agreed that the 
culture of the SANDF promotes non-discrimination on the basis of gender in 
contrast to 30.2% who disagree, 20.8% who remained neutral, and 1.9% invalid 
(spoilt papers) answers (see Figure 8.13). The principles of the White Paper on 
Defence (1996), termed ‘defence in a democracy’ as derived from section 1 of the 
Constitution, 1996, dictate that the SANDF should develop a non-racial, non-
sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture. The qualitative and quantitative 
research however showed that the SANDF has not yet been able to promote non-
discrimination on the basis of gender.  
The quantitative research revealed that 66.7% of respondents did not agree that 
the selection of candidates for senior management positions was based on their 
competency and qualification (see 8.9 and 9.4.1).  
Human resource development allows the SANDF to develop and train its 
employees for senior positions (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin & Cardy, 2010:167–178). An 
officer, for example at the rank of colonel spends approximately 16 years 
undergoing training and development. The qualitative research showed that 
public institutions must appoint and promote suitable candidates with high-calibre 
skills, experience, abilities, personal attributes and competencies and take the 
need to achieve a representative and diverse workforce into account (Department 
of Public Service and Administration 2003:9).  
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In the quantitative research, the researcher found that the new institutional culture 
of the SANDF does not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs, traditions and 
values of all former forces. It is a replica of the former SADF (see Figure 8.4).  
The quantitative research found that 37.7% of respondents felt that they were not 
treated equally by their superiors with a very close percentage of 35.8% feeling 
that their supervisors did treated them equally, 22.6% of respondents were neutral 
and 3.8% of the papers were invalid (see Figure 8.14). In addition, the Code of 
Conduct, as derived from the White Paper on Defence (1998) and the Constitution 
(1996), states that the SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its members 
within the normal constraints of military discipline and training. It helps to guide 
soldiers’ behaviour, be it internally or towards members of society, and instil 
patriotism (Asch & Hosek, 2004:9).  
The qualitative research revealed that, at the time of this research, the HR 
practices and policies of the SANDF did not make provision for different cultural 
obligations of the SANDF. The interviewees (Kula, 2011; Mdlulwa, 2011) also 
stated that their cultural beliefs were not being catered for by the HR practices 
and policies. For example, in their research, Kahn and Louw (2013:87) 
established that the leave policy of the SANDF did not make provision for soldiers 
to travel to the place of an accident or site of death to collect the spirit of the 
deceased.  
Qualitative research revealed that the first two numbers in a force number reflect 
the year of enlisting, for example the force number 94668522PE identifies the 
member to have enlisted in 1994. These force numbers starting with 94 were only 
allocated to all integrating forces, except the SADF, as if SADF was never part of 
the integrated armed forces. This shows some form of discrimination against other 
integrated forces. 
9.4.4 Leadership 
The quantitative research results reflected that 26% of the respondents were of 
the view that an autocratic leadership approach was practised in the SANDF, 
while 22% indicated that a democratic leadership approach had been adopted, 
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19% showed it was transformational, another 19% were of the view that it was 
situational, 9%, revealed it to be a transactional leadership approach, with 5% not 
committing to an answer to the question (Figure 8.19).  
Quantitative research reveals that 41% of respondents disagreed that the 
transactional leadership approach has been adopted by the SANDF compared to 
25.9% who agreed, whereas 32% were neutral (Figure 8.22). This confirmed that 
the middle management officers were not aware of the official transactional 
leadership approach that the SANDF had adopted (DOD, 2009:D1-1). This clearly 
showed that there seems to be a lack of communication in the channels of 
command regarding policy and doctrinal matters to members. 
The qualitative research showed that a transformational leadership approach 
plays a crucial role in transforming institutions that amalgamated to form a new 
institution (Tucker & Russell 2004:103–104).  
Therefore, the quantitative and qualitative research revealed that the SANDF had 
adopted a transactional leadership approach, rather than a transformational 
leadership approach to transform the integrated SANDF. 
 
9.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations discussed in this section are based on the findings 
discussed above.  
9.5.1 Strategic change management 
It is suggested that the HR policies and practices of the SANDF should be 
adjusted to accommodate the uniquely African beliefs, traditions and values that 
exist among the members of the institution, for example, to introduce a suffix that 
has no racial undertones or any reminder of apartheid. 
The SANDF, in consultation with the DPSA, should subject its racial ratio policy in 
consultation with Statistics South Africa on an annual basis. This will enable the 
SANDF to resemble the racial and gender demographics of the South African 
population. 
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In addition, it is proposed that the units and regiments of the SANDF that have 
colonial names should change to names that reflect South African history and 
heroes. Furthermore, the medals that are designed and issued to former armed 
forces should be done away with and be replaced with medals that reflect the new 
SANDF while recognising past successes.  
9.5.2 Institutional culture  
It is suggested that the current leadership of the SANDF should agree on the best 
culturally and politically correct artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental 
systems of former defence or armed forces that can be incorporated into the new 
institutional culture of the SANDF. Care should be taken to avoid ceremonies that 
hinge on tribe, religion, race and gender denigration. It is proposed that a 
committee that is representative of all the former armed forces be set up to do the 
deliberations, make recommendations and presentations to the Military Command 
Council and finally to the Council on Defence for ratification. 
9.5.3 Change management  
It is suggested that the SANDF HR policies on selection of senior members 
incorporate the guidelines as given by the Department of Public Service and 
Administration’s (DPSA) Senior Management Service Handbook (DPSA, 2003:9) 
It is suggested that the SANDF non-racialism should not only be captured in 
policy statements, but should also punish racism to ensure that non-racialism is 
practiced. Discrimination on the basis of race should be discouraged and be 
reported via a separate channel, for example the military ombudsperson.  
The HR racial and gender equity goals should not only form part of commanders’ 
directives, but should also be included as their performance agreements and/or 
goals.  
The leadership of the SANDF should show non-racialism by correct behaviour 
and lead by example to influence the behaviour of subordinates positively. 
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Part of promoting non-discrimination on the basis of gender should be equal 
access to training and development opportunities. Promotion on merit and 
experience should be applied, irrespective of gender.  
Furthermore, internal communication methods, such as leaflets, intranet, 
billboards in units and noticeboards should be used to disseminate information.  
Added to these, the actions and behaviour of senior members of the SANDF 
should reflect gender non-discrimination. 
It is proposed that the leadership of the SANDF internalise the cultural changes 
they envisage and reflect the expected behaviour in their deeds and behaviour. 
The leadership should lead by example, treating subordinates with dignity and 
respect, and showing a keen interest in their well-being and career 
advancements.  
It is suggested that the suffix Permanent European (PE) be replaced with 
Permanent Member (PM). Coupled with this change should be a randomly 
selected eight-digit force number that does not reflect the year of enlistment into 
the SANDF. Members who integrated in 1994 are identified by their force 
numbers starting with 94 and those from the SADF have force numbers starting 
with numbers up to 93. This identification is open to discrimination. 
9.5.4 Leadership 
It is recommended that transactional leadership be replaced with transformational 
leadership. Furthermore, the SANDF should ensure that the theory of a 
transformational leadership approach be translated into action so that members 
can feel it and identify with it. The practical understanding and behaviour about 
transformational leadership should be encouraged through incentivising good 
behaviour. 
9.6 PROPOSED STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT MODEL  
The SANDF should therefore follow the adapted change management model as 
depicted in Figure 9.1. The model was adapted from Lewin’s (1951) change 
management model. In using the model, it is important to start the transformation 
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process by ensuring a legal base is created (which the SANDF correctly created). 
Such a legal framework is the Constitution of South Africa (1996), the White 
Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service of 1995, the White Paper on 
Affirmative Action in the Public Service of 1998, and the Labour Relations Act of 
1996. During the unfreeze stage, the leadership of the SANDF should 
communicate with all members, informing them about reasons for instituting 
change in the institution and about how they would benefit from changes. This 
should ensure that members accept, own and support the initiated change. A 
transformational leadership approach should be applied at all stages. 
Stage 1 should be to dismantle (unfreeze) (see 2.6.1) the 1994 status quo, which 
includes building commitment from the members and management of the SANDF. 
To achieve the best possible results, leaders should empower teams that can 
design, test and implement strategies through which change effectiveness can be 
assured (Ajmal, Faook, Sajid & Awan, 2013:115). The SANDF established the 
Transformation Management Chief Directorate (CDTM) as an institution to 
implement the Equal Opportunity (EO) and Affirmative Action (AA) programmes. 
The CDTM was mandated to promote representativeness and to ensure that the 
SANDF reflects an appropriate demographic composition (Monethi, 2013:56). 
Services and divisions of the SANDF should keep the CDTM updated on progress 
with respect to EO and AA.  
The second stage corresponds with stage 2 in Figure 1.1, is also depicted in 
Figure 9.1, and involves the actual change (action) to be carried out. This stage 
involves change in strategy, culture, attitudes and skills. It is during this stage that 
policies are formulated and implemented to effect the changes (Evison, 2014:1; 
Robbins et al., 2003:411). 
9.6.1 Leadership  
The transformation process in an institution should be driven by leaders who are 
able to formulate strategies to take the institution forward by giving strategic 
direction (Evison, 2014:1). Such a transformation process should be guided by a 
particular leadership approach commensurate with it. To guide its transformation 
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process, the SANDF adopted the transactional leadership approach. The 
transformational leadership should rather have been adopted because it is the 
preferred leadership approach that cannot only transform institutions, but also 
empower employees to transcend above their own aspirations and goals to 
achieve institutional strategic goals (Senior,C.,Martin, 
R.,Thomas,G.,Topakas.,A.,West,M.&Yeats,RM.2012.Development Stability and 
Leadership effectiveness. The Leadership Quarterly. 23(3):281-291 
9.6.2 Strategy 
 
The SANDF, for example, adopted Human Resource Strategy 2010 (DOD 
2003:5-6) whose objective was the rejuvenation of the military by recruiting more 
young soldiers and allowing those who are too old to leave the military. The 
Mobility Exit Mechanism (MEM) was introduced to facilitate the exit of those who 
are old and who can no longer make a positive contribution to the organisation. 
MEM was wrongly applied in that skilled and experienced members were allowed 
to exit the SANDF. This left a void in the SANDF. Concomitant with these 
strategies were programmes such as Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunities, 
which were the focus of transformation to correct gender and racial imbalances 
within the SANDF. These strategies and programmes were never fully realised as 
reflected in the findings (see 9.4). The rejuvenation of the SANDF is still a 
necessity and needs to be pursued, i.e. a new rejuvenation strategy needs to be 
adopted. Such a strategy should not be used to enhance race and gender 
transformation, but to appoint suitably qualified young men and women 
irrespective of their background. The MEM should be applied as an employer-
initiated package, which does not allow members to apply as they wish to avoid 
the exodus of skilled members.  
There must come a time when all members need to be seen only as South 
Africans, with no colour identification. This means that transformation efforts 
should have a target end date and not be seen as a perennial exercise.  
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9.6.3  Culture  
The SANDF inherited the culture of the SADF, which had a racial discrimination 
and gender insensitive character. Training and development opportunities were 
mostly reserved for white Afrikaner men. In addition, to change this culture, the 
SANDF used a transactional leadership approach instead of a transformational 
leadership approach. A new institutional culture within the context of 
transformational culture should be created by adopting good cultural aspects from 
the constituent armed forces. 
9.6.4  Strategic change management 
This is where all the policies are formulated to institute change. The SANDF 
should establish ways to encourage and to incentivise behaviour that reflects a 
positive culture in the institution. The SANDF should develop a performance 
management and development system, a reward system that encourages the 
display of a positive culture. Training and development of members are crucial 
during this stage. However, the training and development opportunities for all 
races and both genders should be equal so that members enjoy the same 
opportunities for promotions.  
Stage three (refreeze) (see Figure 9.1) is about consolidating the successes of 
stage two. This is where cultural changes, such as traditions, assumptions, values 
and norms have been successfully changed and accepted by members. The 
context of cultural change is a changed environment whose main elements are a 
change in management and work environment, including regulations, policies and 
practices. These main elements, once achieved, need to be guarded against 
abuse and negligence (Roos, 1997:56).  
In this stage (stage three), the institution is reconfigured in terms of a new strategy 
and structure and setting out performance indicators so that the performance of 
the institution can be ready to be measured or evaluated (Anderson & Anderson, 
2001:60).  
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9.6.5  Change management 
This is the implementation of human resources established practices and policies 
that the SANDF would refreeze as good acceptable behaviour. Such policies, for 
example, are based on performance management, equal employment 
opportunities and equal training and development opportunities for all members, 
irrespective of gender and race. 
Coaching, mentoring and modelling by the leadership of the SANDF should take 
place. The leaders at different levels of the SANDF should assimilate members 
into new ways of doing their work according to the new direction of the institution. 
 
Figure 9.1  Transformation model for the SANDF 
Source: Adapted from Robbins et al. (2003:411) and Evison (2014:1) 
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9.7 CONCLUSION 
The research focused on strategic change management in the SANDF, in 
particular transformation of the institutional culture. The research firstly found that, 
after twenty-three years, the strategic change management as applied in the 
SANDF has not succeeded in creating a unified inclusive military culture from the 
seven former forces. The research has also shown that the SANDF is 
experiencing challenges with regard to gender representation, selection of 
members for senior management positions, and the institutional culture and 
climate support of designated groups. Thus, the new institutional culture of the 
SANDF does not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs and values of all 
integrated armed forces.  
Secondly, change management in the transformation of the SANDF has not 
succeeded in ensuring that members of the SANDF respect each other’s cultures. 
The SANDF lacks the urge to enforce a culture of non-racialism and non-
discrimination on the basis of gender.  
Thirdly, a transactional leadership approach was adopted by 0the SANDF during 
strategic change management, contrary to prescriptions by the White Paper on 
Defence of 1986 and the Defence Review of 1998 to use a transformational 
leadership approach. A transactional leadership approach helped the SANDF to 
preserve the culture of the former SADF in the SANDF. The status quo was 
preserved without fundamental or revolutionary change in the culture of the 
SANDF. The transactional leadership approach adopted by the SANDF was 
further compounded by the view that middle management leadership was not 
aware of its adoption as the official leadership approach (see Figure 8.22). A 
transformational leadership approach could have helped the SANDF to transform 
the SANDF fundamentally to have an inclusive military culture. In addition, unity 
among the leadership in terms of strategic direction of the institution is paramount 
during transformation. Such unity must manifest itself in appropriate policies that 
would help the institution to achieve its desired goals. 
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However, it can be concluded that transformation in the SANDF as a planned 
strategic change intervention has not been managed adequately (1994 to 2014) to 
achieve desired results. 
9.8 LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY 
A limitation might be that the research focused only on one service of the security 
cluster, namely the SANDF.  
9.9  FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are areas of research that could not be explored in this research as it was 
focused on strategic change management in the SANDF. However, the following 
research topics could be of interest to enhance human science: 
 Research by other arms of the security cluster on strategic change 
management would enhance the general findings of this study. 
South Africa is part of Africa. Therefore, a comparative study with another African 
country to determine to what extent the SANDF reflects an African culture, would be 
welcome. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Questionnaire on organisational culture of inclusiveness in the South African 
Defence Force 
 
PLACE A CROSS (X) IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX OF YOUR CHOICE 
SECTION A: ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS 
 
1. Gender 
 
Male  Female  
 
2. Race 
 
African  Indian  Coloured  White  
Other 
(Specify) 
 
 
3. Arm of service 
 
Army  
Air 
Force 
 Navy  
Medical 
Services 
   
 
4. Rank 
 
Maj  
Lt 
Col 
 Col  
Brig 
Gen 
  
 
 
5. Length of service 
 
225 
 
6–10 
years 
 
11–
14 
years 
 
15–
20  
years 
 
21–
25 
years 
 
25 
years 
and 
more 
 
 
6. Academic qualification  
 
Grade 
12 
 Certificate  Diploma  Degree  
Post-
graduate 
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SECTION B: This section of the questionnaire explored the leadership approach in 
the SANDF 
 
PLEASE CHOOSE AN APPROPRIATE ANSWER ON THE FOLLOWING SCALE 
1 = Autocratic leadership 
2 = Transactional leadership 
3 = Situational Leadership 
4 = Democratic Leadership 
5 = Transformational Leadership 
 
No. Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
1 What was the predominant leadership approach of your 
former armed force? 
     
2 What is the current predominant leadership approach 
being practiced in the SANDF? 
     
3 What is your style of leadership?      
4 Which leadership approach has significantly impacted 
transformation in the SANDF? 
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PLEASE CHOOSE AN APPROPRIATE ANSWER ON THE FOLLOWING SCALE 
1 = Agree Completely  
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree  
5 = Disagree Completely 
 
Nr Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
5 My line manager is competent; therefore, I have no 
reason to question his/her command or integrity 
     
6 Men are better military leaders than women      
7 I respect and treat women officers as my equal      
8 As a woman, I had the experience of being a combat 
commander 
     
9 I provide preferential treatment to my own race and 
gender 
     
10 Candidates are selected for senior management 
positions based on their competency and qualification 
     
11 As a woman, I envisage being a combat commander in 
the future  
     
12 Transactional leadership approach has been adopted 
by the SANDF 
     
13 I prefer an appointment suffix in my force number that 
reflects ‘Africa’ 
     
14 I accept military values and norms as a way of life      
15 As a woman officer, I am treated differently than men      
16 I execute commands from my seniors unconditionally      
17 My seniors respect my opinion/suggestions      
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18 The moral standards of my supervisor are of a high 
standard 
     
19 As a woman officer, I do not enjoy the respect as my 
male counterparts  
     
20 My supervisor treats all his/her subordinates equally      
21 My country, South Africa is my first priority not my 
former force 
     
22 I respect seniors, colleagues and peers      
23 I am an advocate (supporter) of equal and just 
treatment of all 
     
24 The SANDF is the public institution of choice to work for        
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SECTION C: This section explores your perceptions regarding the organisational 
culture of the SANDF 
 
RATE YOUR RESPONSE USING THE FOLLOWING SCALE 
1 = Agree completely 
2 = Agree 
3 = Disagree 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Disagree Completely 
 
No. Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
1 I perceive the employment equity and affirmative action 
policy as successful 
     
2 The SANDF adequately communicates its affirmative action 
employment equity intentions 
     
3 In my experience, affirmative action and employment equity 
has been successfully implemented 
     
4 I perceive employment equity and affirmative action as 
promoting inequality in the workplace 
     
5 Employment equity and affirmative action brings about 
change at an acceptable pace 
     
6 My line manager is sincerely supportive of employment 
equity and affirmative action 
     
7 The current uniform in the SANDF is the same as my 
previous armed force 
     
8 I have experienced employment equity and affirmative action 
as a positive process 
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9 The current regimental ceremonies are the same as my 
former armed force 
     
10 The institutional culture and climate is supportive of 
designated groups 
     
11 My line manager can manage diversity      
12 I regularly socialize with my colleagues in the unit, 
department, division and service 
     
13 The SANDF’s Human resource practices and policies make 
provision for my cultural obligations 
     
14 I am optimally utilized according to my skills and 
competencies 
     
15 I am not promoted because I am categorized as a member of 
a designated group 
     
16 Artefacts, rituals, ceremonies, and regimental system of my 
former defence or armed force have been incorporated and 
are currently being practiced in the SANDF 
     
17 The organizational culture of the SANDF has changed over 
the last 10 years 
     
18 The prevailing norms and values have a positive influence on 
the transformation in the SANDF 
     
19 The former SADF culture prevails in the SANDF      
20 Will the future organizational culture of the SANDF reflect 
cultural practices of your former armed force 
     
21 Do ideology and patriotism inspire you      
22 The command group of my unit does not respect my culture      
23 The team spirit in the section where I work is good      
24 The SANDF has a culture of non-racialism       
25 The SANDF’s culture promotes Non-discrimination on the      
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basis gender 
 
GENERAL 
26.  In your opinion, what does the appointment suffix in your force number PE mean? 
a 
Permanent 
Force 
 b 
Port 
Elizabeth 
 c 
Permanent 
European 
 d 
Post  
Election 
 e  
ditto  
Executive 
 
 
 
27.  What future organizational culture and leadership changes would you like to see 
take place in the SANDF? 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Thank you 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
1. Describe the predominant culture of your former defence or armed force? 
2. What artefacts, culture, rituals, ceremonies and regimental system of your former 
Defence or armed forces has been incorporated into SANDF and being practiced 
currently? 
3. What’s the difference between the culture of your former defence or armed force 
and the SANDF? 
4. How often do you socialize with your subordinates/ colleagues of your service, 
division, Department or unit? 
5. What is your opinion on the current culture in the SANDF? 
6. How has the SANDF culture changed over the last 10 years? Give example. 
7. What are the driving forces (motivations) that make you come to work every day? 
8. What is the relationship between your and colleagues/peers or former forces? 
9. What is the prevailing value system in the SANDF? 
10. What are the prevailing norms and values in the SANDF? 
11. Are all the different cultures, races, and genders being treated equally? 
12. Do the prevailing HRM policies and practice allow you to utilize your subordinates 
according to their abilities and competencies? 
13. How often do you socialize with your colleagues/peers of your former defence/ 
armed Forces? 
14. Do you think the current culture of the SANDF will change overtime? 
a. What will this culture be like?  
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APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS 
1. What was the predominant leadership style of your former defence force/armed 
force? 
2. What in your opinion are the qualities of good leaders? 
3. What are some of the challenges that leaders face in your opinion? 
4. What makes great leaders? 
5. Name some great military leaders – past and present? 
6. What made them great or what are the outstanding qualities of those leaders? 
7. How can leaders influence their followers? 
8. How can leaders overcome cultural biases? 
9. Are their special qualities that military leaders should possess? 
10. What is your relationship with your subordinates? 
11. Do you distinguish between race and gender when rewarding your subordinates? 
12. What is the predominant leadership style being practiced in the SANDF? 
13. What is your style of leadership? 
a.  How does it compliment or differ from the prevailing style in the SANDF? 
14. How does your style of leadership contribute to the effectiveness of your service? 
15. Why should leaders do introspection and reflect on their decisions? 
16. Do you utilize your subordinates according to their abilities and competencies? 
17. Do you apply the same leadership style as your previous superior? 
18. What do you expect from your superiors? 
a. How do you go about meeting their expectations? 
19. What do you expect from your subordinates? 
a. How do you go about satisfying the expectations of your subordinates? 
20. What is your take on transactional leadership? Do you think it will work in the 
SANDF? 
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21. There are two theories of command namely, Attrition and Maneuver which do you 
apply – one or both? 
 
